ROILO GOLEZ BIO 2018

ROILO GOLEZ BIO

Roilo Golez was the National Security Adviser of the Philippines from 2001 to 2004.  He served as a congressman in the House of Representatives, where he was elected for six terms (from 1992 to 2001, and again from 2004 to 2013).  During his time in congress, he has served as the Chairman of the House Committee on National Defense, and the House Committee on Public Order and Security.  In his last term, he served as the Head of the House Contingent to the Commission on Appointments.  He was formerly the Postmaster General from 1981 to 1986, and the Deputy Administrator of the Maritime Industry Authority from 1978 to 1981.

Golez is a regular lecturer on the South China Sea at the National Defense College of the Philippines, and one of three conveners of the West Philippine Sea Coalition.  He is the Founder and current Chairman and Lead Convener of the Movement and Alliance to Resist China’s Aggression, and has participated in various roundtable discussions on the South China Sea security situation in the Philippines, Japan and Vietnam.  He is regularly interviewed by TV, Radio and print media and various fora on the South China Sea situation.

Golez graduated from the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis with a Bachelor of Science (majoring in Mathematics and Operations Analysis), and as Valedictorian of his class from the University of the Philippines with a Master of Business Administration.

War with China Thinking through the unthinkable. rand.org

War with China

Thinking through the unthinkable https://t.co/maCVEpfxFD via @RANDCorporation

Rand.org
I quote from the article:
Key Findings

Unless Both U.S. and Chinese Political Leaders Decline to Carry Out Counterforce Strategies, the Ability of Either State to Control the Ensuing Conflict Would Be Greatly Impaired.
Both sides would suffer large military losses in a severe conflict. In 2015, U.S. losses could be a relatively small fraction of forces committed, but still significant; Chinese losses could be much heavier than U.S. losses and a substantial fraction of forces committed.
This gap in losses will shrink as Chinese A2AD improves. By 2025, U.S. losses could range from significant to heavy; Chinese losses, while still very heavy, could be somewhat less than in 2015, owing to increased degradation of U.S. strike capabilities.
China's A2AD will make it increasingly difficult for the United States to gain military-operational dominance and victory, even in a long war.

Conflict Could Be Decided by Domestic Political, International, and Economic Factors, All of Which Would Favor the United States in a Long, Severe War
Although a war would harm both economies, damage to China's would be far worse.
Because much of the Western Pacific would become a war zone, China's trade with the region and the rest of the world would decline substantially.
China's loss of seaborne energy supplies would be especially damaging.
A long conflict could expose China to internal political divisions.
Japan's increased military activity in the region could have a considerable influence on military operations.

Recommendations
U.S. and Chinese political leaders alike should have military options other than immediate strikes to destroy opposing forces.
U.S. leaders should have the means to confer with Chinese leaders and contain a conflict before it gets out of hand.
The United States should guard against automaticity in implementing immediate attacks on Chinese A2AD and have plans and means to prevent hostilities from becoming severe. Establishing "fail safe" arrangements will guarantee definitive, informed political approval for military operations.
The United States should reduce the effect of Chinese A2AD by investing in more-survivable force platforms (e.g., submarines) and in counter-A2AD (e.g., theater missiles).
The United States should conduct contingency planning with key allies, especially Japan.
The United States should ensure that the Chinese are specifically aware of the potential for catastrophic results even if a war is not lost militarily.
The United States should improve its ability to sustain intense military operations.
U.S. leaders should develop options to deny China access to war-critical commodities and technologies in the event of war.
The United States should undertake measures to mitigate the interruption of critical products from China.
Additionally, the U.S. Army should invest in land-based A2AD capabilities, encourage and enable East Asian partners to mount strong defense, improve interoperability with partners (especially Japan), and contribute to the expansion and deepening of Sino-U.S. military-to-military understanding and cooperation to reduce dangers of misperception and miscalculation.

War with China

Thinking Through the Unthinkable

by David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Cristina L. Garafola

• Related Topics: 
• China, 
• International Diplomacy, 
• Japan, 
• Threat Assessment, 
• United States, 
• Warfare and Military Operations

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Research Questions

1. What are the alternative paths that China and the United States might take before and during a war?
2. What are the effects on both countries of each path?
3. What preparations should the United States make, both to reduce the likelihood of war and, should war break out, to ensure victory while minimizing losses and costs?

Premeditated war between the United States and China is very unlikely, but the danger that a mishandled crisis could trigger hostilities cannot be ignored. Thus, while neither state wants war, both states' militaries have plans to fight one. As Chinese anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) capabilities improve, the United States can no longer be so certain that war would follow its plan and lead to decisive victory. This analysis illuminates various paths a war with China could take and their possible consequences.

Technological advances in the ability to target opposing forces are creating conditions of conventional counterforce, whereby each side has the means to strike and degrade the other's forces and, therefore, an incentive to do so promptly, if not first. This implies fierce early exchanges, with steep military losses on both sides, until one gains control. At present, Chinese losses would greatly exceed U.S. losses, and the gap would only grow as fighting persisted. But, by 2025, that gap could be much smaller. Even then, however, China could not be confident of gaining military advantage, which suggests the possibility of a prolonged and destructive, yet inconclusive, war. In that event, nonmilitary factors — economic costs, internal political effects, and international reactions — could become more important.

Political leaders on both sides could limit the severity of war by ordering their respective militaries to refrain from swift and massive conventional counterforce attacks. The resulting restricted, sporadic fighting could substantially reduce military losses and economic harm. This possibility underscores the importance of firm civilian control over wartime decisionmaking and of communication between capitals. At the same time, the United States can prepare for a long and severe war by reducing its vulnerability to Chinese A2AD forces and developing plans to ensure that economic and international consequences would work to its advantage.

Key Findings

Unless Both U.S. and Chinese Political Leaders Decline to Carry Out Counterforce Strategies, the Ability of Either State to Control the Ensuing Conflict Would Be Greatly Impaired

• Both sides would suffer large military losses in a severe conflict. In 2015, U.S. losses could be a relatively small fraction of forces committed, but still significant; Chinese losses could be much heavier than U.S. losses and a substantial fraction of forces committed.
• This gap in losses will shrink as Chinese A2AD improves. By 2025, U.S. losses could range from significant to heavy; Chinese losses, while still very heavy, could be somewhat less than in 2015, owing to increased degradation of U.S. strike capabilities.
• China's A2AD will make it increasingly difficult for the United States to gain military-operational dominance and victory, even in a long war.

Conflict Could Be Decided by Domestic Political, International, and Economic Factors, All of Which Would Favor the United States in a Long, Severe War

• Although a war would harm both economies, damage to China's would be far worse.
• Because much of the Western Pacific would become a war zone, China's trade with the region and the rest of the world would decline substantially.
• China's loss of seaborne energy supplies would be especially damaging.
• A long conflict could expose China to internal political divisions.
• Japan's increased military activity in the region could have a considerable influence on military operations.

Recommendations

• U.S. and Chinese political leaders alike should have military options other than immediate strikes to destroy opposing forces.
• U.S. leaders should have the means to confer with Chinese leaders and contain a conflict before it gets out of hand.
• The United States should guard against automaticity in implementing immediate attacks on Chinese A2AD and have plans and means to prevent hostilities from becoming severe. Establishing "fail safe" arrangements will guarantee definitive, informed political approval for military operations.
• The United States should reduce the effect of Chinese A2AD by investing in more-survivable force platforms (e.g., submarines) and in counter-A2AD (e.g., theater missiles).
• The United States should conduct contingency planning with key allies, especially Japan.
• The United States should ensure that the Chinese are specifically aware of the potential for catastrophic results even if a war is not lost militarily.
• The United States should improve its ability to sustain intense military operations.
• U.S. leaders should develop options to deny China access to war-critical commodities and technologies in the event of war.
• The United States should undertake measures to mitigate the interruption of critical products from China.
• Additionally, the U.S. Army should invest in land-based A2AD capabilities, encourage and enable East Asian partners to mount strong defense, improve interoperability with partners (especially Japan), and contribute to the expansion and deepening of Sino-U.S. military-to-military understanding and cooperation to reduce dangers of misperception and miscalculation.

DEALING WITH RIGOROUS PRO CHINA FOLKS. RIGOBERTO'S LACK OF RIGOR

DEALING WITH RIGOROUS PRO CHINA FOLKS
Wow! Thank you venerable Rigoberto Tiglao for grouping citizen Golez with Vice President Robredo and Acting Chief Justice Carpio. An honor!!!
Except Rigoberto showed lack of rigor 😂😂😂when he displayed blissful ignorance by saying I don't know the geography of Woody Island and the rest of the Paracels.

THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE: FYI, Woody Island has been and continues to be a vital part of my regular, numerous talks on the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea in my presentations in think tanks in Japan, Hanoi and here in the Philippines as well as in the National Defense College of the Philippines, Maritime Forum, Philippine Merchant Marine Academy Graduate School, Philippine Navy, PNP, Rotary Clubs, etc., and numerous TV and radio interviews.
In my lectures, I often discuss your China's goal of establishing a Strategic Triangle in the South China Sea, using the photo inserted here, consisting of military bases in Woody Island, the northern point of the Triangle, Spratlys (Fiery Cross, Mischief, etc), the western point and Scarborough Shoal, the eastern point. I present a PowerPoint diagram of that Strategic Triangle showing that Woody Island is around 900 kilometers north of the Spratlys and 650 kilometers from Scarborough Shoal. I have been giving this Strategic Triangle lecture since 2015 ever since that concept was discussed in an international Strategic Conference in Tokyo. Many of these lectures and TV, radio interviews  are accessible on YouTube, FB and live video.

In fact as early as 1970-1971, while you were helping the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines plot how to topple our democracy, I got to visit the Spratlys several times as part of secret Navy missions to transport troops, supplies and equipment to our islands there. We studied very throughly the geography of the area and I was one of those in charge of navigating through the tricky shoals and reefs.

What about you the venerable Tiglao? When was the last time you gave a lecture on the South China Sea and Woody Island? What kind of audience did you have, if any?

On the threat of your China bomber, I mentioned that in my lecture last Thursday at the National Defense College of the Philippines. I said it's a grave threat because the nuclear capable bomber’s combat radius covers the entire Philippines and that it carries even a long range cruise missile, the CJ-10A, which has a range of 1,500-2000 kilometers. The CJ-10A may be nuclear tipped. Given the bomber's combat radius of around 3,500 kilometers, the possible reach of that cruise missile is awesome. I also said that I believe China’s next move is to deploy combat planes on Mischief Reef inside our EEZ, Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef. In geo-security, to be within the killing zone of a weapon that can deliver a nuclear payload is very serious.  Especially if the power deploying that weapon is claiming and grabbing 90% of our West Philippine Sea. The mere presence of such weapon systems is very coercive.

Of course China's H-6K bomber is exhilarating to those who support and defend China’s claims and want China to win and take over the Philippines.

http://www.manilatimes.net/carpio-robredo-and-golez-make-a-fool-of-themselves-over-chinese-bomber-issue/401599/

UNCLOS Article56 Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone 1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State

UNCLOS

Article56

Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone

1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:

(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;

(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:

(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;

(ii) marine scientific research;

(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;

(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.

Except for these new developments over last year: 1st bomber deployments, 1st anti-ship, anti-missile, and jamming platforms in Spratlys, 1st maritime patrol aircraft deployments, increased naval and coast guard deployments, and 72 acres of new construction

Retweeted Greg Poling (@GregPoling):

Except for these new developments over last year: 1st bomber deployments, 1st anti-ship, anti-missile, and jamming platforms in Spratlys, 1st maritime patrol aircraft deployments, increased naval and coast guard deployments, and 72 acres of new construction

China's recent deployment of strategic bombers and long range missiles in the South China Sea violate the FRAMEWORK OF A Code of Conduct (COC) Adopted last year

Roilo: China's recent deployment of strategic bombers and long range missiles in the South China Sea violate the FRAMEWORK OF A Code of Conduct (COC)
Adopted last year which states the following:

"To promote mutual trust, cooperation and confidence, prevent incidents,
manage incidents should they occur, and create a favourable environment for the peaceful settlement of the disputes"

"To ensure maritime security and safety and freedom of navigation and
overflight."

Roilo: China's missiles and bombers promote the opposite: mistrust, loss of confidence, and pose grave threats to maritime security, freedom of navigation and overflight.

FRAMEWORK OF A COC
Adopted at the 14th ASEAN-China Senior Officials’ Meeting on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (SOM-DOC) Guiyang, China
May 18, 2017
1. Preambular provisions a. Bases of the COC
b. Inter-connection and interaction between DOC and COC c. Importance and aspirations
2. General provisions a. Objectives:
i. To establish a rules-based framework containing a set of norms to guide the
conduct of parties and promote maritime cooperation in the South China Sea;
ii. To promote mutual trust, cooperation and confidence, prevent incidents,
manage incidents should they occur, and create a favourable environment for
the peaceful settlement of the disputes;
iii. To ensure maritime security and safety and freedom of navigation and
overflight.
b. Principles
i. Not an instrument to settle territorial disputes or maritime
delimitation issues
ii. Commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), the Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence, and other universally recognized principles of
international law
iii. Commitment to full and effective implementation of the DOC
iv. Respect for each other’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity in
accordance with international law, and the principle of non- interference in the
internal affairs of other states
c. Basic undertakings
i. Duty to cooperate
ii. Promotion of practical maritime cooperation
iii. Self - restraint / Promotion of trust and confidence iv. Prevention of incidents
1. Confidence building measures
2. Hotlines
v. Management of incidents
3. Final Clauses
a. Encourage other countries to respect the principles contained in the COC b. Necessary mechanisms for monitoring of implementation
c. Review of the COC
d. Nature and Entry into force

Thayer Consultancy

ABN # 65 648 097 123

South China Sea: What China's First Strategic Bomber Landing on Woody Island Means The Diplomat

"South China Sea: What China's First Strategic Bomber Landing on Woody Island Means."
Roilo: Militarization of South China Sea accelerated.

I quote from article:
THE LONG RANGE OF THE H-6K BOMBER WOULD GIVE IT COVERAGE ACROSS NEARLY THE ENTIRE SOUTHEAST ASIA.The military significance of bomber basing at either Woody Island or the three Spratly artificial islands capable of hosting these aircraft isn’t insignificant. The long-range of the H-6K would give it coverage across nearly the entirety of Southeast Asia, excluding parts of Myanmar and Indonesia.
Roilo: Some say the existing long range missiles based in China mainland can do the same. But the bombers have more coercive presence. They are visible. They can fly over areas and conduct very coercive bomber diplomacy which missiles cannot do. Bombers can buzz like what it did over Scarborough Shoal in July 2016 on the eve of the announcement of the ruling of the Arbitral Tribunal. 

ALL FIVE EDCA BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES ARE COVERED. "As the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative observed last week, “all five Philippine military bases earmarked for development under the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement” are covered by the combat radius of South China Sea-based H-6K bombers."

But the PLAAF will consider more than just combat radius in deciding when and how to base its bombers in the South China Sea. Consider that given the U.S. Navy’s forward presence in the region, any forward-based aerial assets in the Spratlys or Paracels will be vulnerable to precision strikes, making continental basing far safer. With aerial refueling, H-6 variants can extend their combat radius considerably.

MILITARIZATION TREND. "Friday’s landing crystallizes a trend that has been ongoing for months now. China is accelerating the military utility of its outposts in the South China Sea as the United States, under the Trump administration, has stepped up the tempo of its freedom of navigation operations and presence operations." @Diplomat_APAC

South China Sea: What China's First Strategic Bomber Landing on Woody Island Means

The Diplomat

Expect these bombers to come to one of China’s three airstrip-equipped Spratly artificial islands soon.

Last week, on Friday, reports emerged that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Air Force (PLAAF) had, for the first time, landed an H-6K strategic bomber on one of the country’s South China Sea islands. China’s state-run People’s Daily shared footage of the bomber landing on an airstrip.

The island in question was Woody Island, China’s largest military outpost in the South China Sea. Woody Island sits in the Paracel Islands, but Chinese military activity there has foreshadowed possible moves in the seven artificial islands that Beijing also possesses in the Spratly group.

In addition to permanently stationing military personnel on Woody Island, China has deployed J-11 fighters, HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles, YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missiles, and other materiel there.

Recently, China has taken part of its Woody Island playbook to the Spratlys and deployed surface-to-air missiles and anti-ship cruise missilesin the Spratlys. Beijing has also deployed electronic warfare equipment to Fiery Cross Reef, one of the seven artificial islands in the Spratlys.

Friday’s H-6K landing on Woody Island likely foreshadows similar operations on Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Mischief Reef — the three Spratly artificial islands equipped with airstrips and hangers large enough to house Xian H-6 variants, including the H-6K, all of which are heavily modified and modernized versions of the Soviet Union’s Tupolev Tu-16 twin-engine bomber.

The military significance of bomber basing at either Woody Island or the three Spratly artificial islands capable of hosting these aircraft isn’t insignificant. The long-range of the H-6K would give it coverage across nearly the entirety of Southeast Asia, excluding parts of Myanmar and Indonesia.

As the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative observed last week, “all five Philippine military bases earmarked for development under the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement” are covered by the combat radius of South China Sea-based H-6K bombers.

But the PLAAF will consider more than just combat radius in deciding when and how to base its bombers in the South China Sea. Consider that given the U.S. Navy’s forward presence in the region, any forward-based aerial assets in the Spratlys or Paracels will be vulnerable to precision strikes, making continental basing far safer. With aerial refueling, H-6 variants can extend their combat radius considerably.

Friday’s landing crystallizes a trend that has been ongoing for months now. China is accelerating the military utility of its outposts in the South China Sea as the United States, under the Trump administration, has stepped up the tempo of its freedom of navigation operations and presence operations.