Saturday, May 31, 2014

One of my favorite Science figures - Weekend Confidential: Ray Kurzweil

Weekend Confidential: Ray Kurzweil

Ray Kurzweil Photo: Drew Kelly for The Wall Street Journal

Ray Kurzweil is teaching computers how to read better—one more step in the march of technological progress. The 66-year-old inventor and futurist thinks that by 2030, computers won't only be able to understand ordinary spoken language but will show emotions too. Next to arrive will be the "singularity"—a term he popularized nearly a decade ago for the point at which humans and computers will merge as one. That will happen in 2045, he predicts, when human intelligence will be enhanced a billion-fold thanks to high-tech brain extensions.

For now, as a director of engineering atGoogle, a role he started in January 2013, Mr. Kurzweil is primarily working on getting machines to understand what scientists call "natural" language. Computers aren't as good as humans at context. Today, for example, a computer might scan the words in a news article and conclude that there is a 56% chance that Barack Obama is the president of the U.S. But a human would read the same article and determine the same thing with near certainty. Mr. Kurzweil is developing software that he hopes will enable computers to understand language conceptually, rather than just by key words—with the near-term goal of creating a better, more conversational search function for Google.

His latest effort follows a long career in technology. Growing up in New York City, he decided at age 5 that he wanted to become an inventor. He went on to graduate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he started his first software company as a sophomore.

Since then, he has launched several companies and invented the first print-to-speech reading machine for the blind, among other breakthroughs. He has become especially well-known for his books on artificial intelligence, such as "The Age of Spiritual Machines" (1999) and "The Singularity Is Near" (2005).

His latest book is "How to Create a Mind," published in 2012. In it, he advocated building a synthetic extension of the brain—connecting it to the cloud. He thinks that nanobots will one day travel to our brains through our capillaries and that blood-cell-sized computers will connect to the cloud the way our iPhones do now.

While that is still decades away, Mr. Kurzweil is trying to get computers to simulate the brain's natural thought process. Before the publication of "How to Create a Mind," he met with Google chief executive Larry Page to give him a copy and pitch him on investing in a company he wanted to create based on the ideas in his book. Mr. Page was interested but instead persuaded Mr. Kurzweil to start it at Google, having the use of the company's resources but keeping his independence intact. (Since then, Google has continued building a veritable artificial intelligence laboratory, hiring artificial-intelligence researcher Geoffrey Hinton and recently acquiring the company DeepMind, which combines techniques from machine learning and neuroscience to build algorithms.)

Talking in his West Coast apartment, Mr. Kurzweil is quick to add that Google isn't working on brain nanobots. But he imagines that once our neocortex's are connected to the cloud—something he expects will happen in the 2030s—this wireless connection will make us much smarter. "Somebody's approaching and I need to think of something clever, and if my neocortex doesn't cut it, I'll be able to access more neocortex in the cloud," he says.

Some of his other ideas have hit the mainstream recently. Spike Jonze, the director of "Her," has said that the 2013 movie was inspired by Mr. Kurzweil's writings. Still, Mr. Kurzweil found some fault in the film's development of the futuristic operating system, voiced by Scarlett Johansson. With her level of emotional understanding, he says, she also should have had a virtual body.

Mr. Kurzweil is also concerned with matters of a more strictly biological nature. He has written three books on health and nutrition, co-founded a company that sells "longevity products" like supplements and has long been fascinated with radical life extension. He thinks that humans will one day be able to live indefinitely, but first we must cross three "bridges."

The first of these is staying healthy much longer. To that end, the smooth-skinned and youthful Mr. Kurzweil consumes 120 vitamins and supplements every day, takes nutrients intravenously (so that his body can absorb them better), drinks green tea and exercises regularly. That regimen keeps his "real age" in the 40s, he says.

The second bridge is reprogramming our biology, which began with the Human Genome Project and includes, he says, the regeneration of tissue through stem-cell therapies and the 3-D printing of new organs.

We will cross the third and final bridge, he says, when we embed nanobots in our brains that will affect our intelligence and ability to experience virtual environments. Nanobots in our bodies will act as an extension of our immune system, he says, to identify and destroy pathogens our own biological cells can't.

Mr. Kurzweil projects that the 2030s will be a "golden era," a time of revolution in how medicine is practiced. He compares the human body to a car. "Isn't there a natural limit to how long an automobile lasts?" he asks. "However, if you take care of it and if anything goes wrong, you fix it and maybe replace it, it can go on forever." He sees no reason that technology can't do the same with human parts. The body is constantly changing already, he says, with cells replacing themselves every few days to months.

His vision of the future raises the question of what it means to be human. Yet he believes that adding technology to our bodies doesn't change our essence. "The philosophical issue of identity is, 'Am I the same person as I was six months ago?' " he says. "There's a continuity of identity."

In some ways, we've already expanded our brains, he says. When it comes to mobile devices like smartphones, for instance, "philosophically I don't see a significant difference whether [technology] is inside your brain or whether my brain is directing my fingers," he says. "It's really an extension of my brain already, but we will make it more convenient by directly connecting it into our brains."

"Remember what happened the last time we expanded our neocortex?" he asks. "That was two million years ago, when we became humanoids and developed these large foreheads, whereas other primates have a slanted brow." This time around we won't be limited by physical constraints. As a result, he says, "we'll think deeper thoughts, we'll have more beautiful music, and we'll have deeper relationships."

Mr. Kurzweil believes that our thinking will eventually be a hybrid of the biological and the nonbiological. "I would say humans are not purely biological," he says. "We've already expanded humanity with our technology, and the technology is part of humanity; we are the technology."

Mr. Kurzweil is well aware of the darker side of a more technological future. "Technology has always been a double-edged sword," he says. Fire has helped humans improve their lives, but it also burns down villages. And while he thinks technology can reprogram our biology away from disease, it can also fall into the hands of terrorists who might reprogram colds into deadly viruses. ("We're not defenseless against that," he adds, having spent time helping the U.S. Army come up with a program to combat biological threats.) And he's reassured by the ubiquity of networked technology. With smartphones in the hands of billions of people, crowds can organize to deal with many problems.

The futurist is unabashed about his positive outlook. "I'm accused of being an optimist, and I am," he says. "It's not a naive optimism, though." He has thought extensively about the possible dangers ahead, he says, and thinks "we have to give very high priority to managing the downside."

In any case, Mr. Kurzweil plans to be around to see whatever the future holds. "The goal is to live indefinitely," he says. As a backup plan, he will cryogenically preserve his body. But, he says, "the goal is not to need to."

China escalates! VIETNAM - CHINA South China Sea: Chinese navy assaults Vietnamese marine surveillance vessels and trawlers by Paul N. Hung

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» 05/31/2014 13:24
VIETNAM - CHINA
South China Sea: Chinese navy assaults Vietnamese marine surveillance vessels and trawlers
by Paul N. Hung
In addition to, and warships , China also uses fighter jets that violate Vietnamese airspace. At least 30 Vietnamese patrol boats hit this week. A fishing boat was sunk . Another was boarded by Chinese military boarding

Hanoi ( AsiaNews) - The escalation of tension in the South China Sea shows no sign of abating. Yesterday 100 Chinese patrol boats, four ships and about 40 military vessels (at least in appearance) surrounded Vietnamese coastguard and fishing vessels near an oil rig that China has placed in Vietnamese territorial waters. In addition, some Chinese fighter jets violated Vietnamese airspace to defend the platform .

Hanoi media claim that Chinese naval vessels had "pointed their guns" on the Vietnamese marine surveillance ships. Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng said that so far at least 30 patrol boats were hit and damaged by Chinese military vessels, described as "very aggressive ."

On 27 May, a Vietnamese trawler was rammed and sunk after being surrounded by dozens of navy ships and Chinese "fishing" vessels; 10 fishermen had to jump overboard and were rescued by other ships in the vicinity . In recent days, in an act of piracy at least 20 Chinese marines boarded a small Vietnamese boat at 9pm close to one of the Paracel Islands (Phú Lâm). The captain described the episode as a "night of terror" : Chinese sailors forced their way into his cabin and brutally beat him. The Chinese marines also attacked the other crew who were sleeping . The fisherman Tân S. Pham reports: "They beat me with sticks and a gun. Lê Anh [another sailor ] was shot in the chest and is still coughing and spitting up blood even now".

For years, China has been claiming sovereignty over the small Spratly and Paracel islands contested by various Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines. After many promises to resolve the dispute in a peaceful manner and through dialogue , in recent years , Beijing has launched an aggressive policy and a "fait accompli" by installing oil platforms, stationing troops and defending the area with warships. Scientists speculate that under the seabed there are enormous energy reserves. The area is also important for the protection of maritime shipping lanes.

The Shangri -La Forum between the United States and representatives of the governments of South- East Asia is currently underway in Singapore. U.S. defense secretary Chuck Hagel has accused China of wanting to "destabilize" the South China Sea and has ensured that the United States "will not look the other way".

China, for its part, has accused the U.S. of  "making threats".

 


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See also
05/27/2014 VIETNAM - CHINA
South China Sea: Hanoi accuses Beijing of sinking a Vietnamese ship 
05/07/2010 CHINA – JAPAN – VIETNAM
Tokyo and Hanoi to challenge Chinese sovereignty in the East/South East China Sea
12/07/2011 CHINA
Hu Jintao tells Chinese Navy to prepare for war
06/15/2011 CHINA – VIETNAM
South China Sea: Beijing excludes the use of force, but warns US
06/13/2011 VIETNAM – CHINA
South China Sea: Beijing slams Vietnamese naval drill

Could Tensions in the South China Sea Spark a War? The National a Interest, 31 May 2014

Could Tensions in the South China Sea Spark a War?


And by the way...Washington could get dragged in. 

In the South China Sea, where China’s ambitious “nine-dash line” claim of sovereignty has been disputed by several other claimants, relations have in recent weeks turned remarkably chillier. Vietnam and the Philippines are facing the brunt of Beijing’s ire, and the potential for crisis and conflict is significant. Positions are hardening, willingness to compromise is low, and the fact that the Philippines is an ally of the United States raises the potential for a disastrous crisis and potential conflict between the U.S. and China.

The clash between China and Vietnam has attracted more attention in recent days. Just a few days after President Obama’s visit to the region, a Chinese mobile oil rig took position in a carefully selected site that, while closer to the Vietnam mainland than China’s Hainan Island, is just fourteen nautical miles from Chinese-occupied island, a part of the Paracel Island group that is claimed by both China and Vietnam. China sent a large flotilla of ships to escort the derrick; a group that included several armed Naval vessels. After Hanoi expressed outrage at this action and violence against Chinese nationals across Vietnam, Beijing expanded the escort flotilla to over 100 ships. Most recently, Chinese ships interdicted, rammed, and sunk a Vietnamese fishing vessel that was challenging the derrick. Vietnam claims that four ships were attacked in all, and now there are reportedly 113 ships standing off against sixty Vietnamese vessels.

Similar incidents have played out in recent months between China and the Philippines. After China took effective control over the Scarborough Shoal in 2012, Beijing seemed to set its sights on the Second Thomas Shoal—a small land formation about 105 nautical miles from the Philippines but is claimed by both countries. To buttress its claim, the Philippines in 1999 intentionally beached the hospital ship Sierra Madre on the reef and has maintained a small crew on the beached craft ever since (see an exceptional piece about the sailors on the ship and the broader dispute by the New York Times here). Most recently, the Philippines arrested a group of Chinese fishermen found 70 miles from the Philippines near Half Moon Shoal with a ship filled with endangered (and valuable) turtles.

To an outsider, all this hyperbole and saber rattling about small rocks, oil derricks, fishermen, and turtles must seem like much ado about nothing. Yet it is deadly serious—these seemingly trivial issues are used as avatars for deadly serious questions about history, power, ambition, and national sovereignty. An examination of how countries see these issues and how they have behaved in the past provides a window for how they are likely to act in the future. It’s not a comforting thought.

Chinese Ambition and Reactive Assertiveness

The common denominator in all of the South China Sea’s existing disputes is China. Beijing serves as the primary catalyst for tension and crisis in these disputes. Its declaration of a nine-dash line claim of sovereignty that covers almost the entire Sea is stunning in its ambition and audaciousness: in April, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Daniel Russel described the claim as lacking any “apparent basis under international law regarding the scope of the claim itself.” That’s because China has justified its claim by asserting its historical control over those waters, yet the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—which sets standards for defining territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and the land features that generate them—does not allow for claims based on history. Moreover, while various Chinese dynasties have at various times controlled various islands within the South China Sea, China has never controlled all of them at the same time.

China’s behavior in the South China Sea has changed significantly in recent years. The South China Sea was not a major issue for Beijing for the first few decades after Chairman Mao established the People’s Republic in 1949. It wasn’t until Deng Xiaoping took the reins of power in the 1970s that it became a significant issue in China’s foreign affairs, and Deng set a path for restraint and nonconfrontation. Seeing China as relatively weak and in need of a peaceful external environment to allow China’s economy to develop, Deng pursued a policy to shelve disputes in order to pursue joint development of resources.

As China’s economy has grown more prosperous and powerful, its calculations have changed. The growth of its economy has far outpaced indigenous development of natural resources, and China’s economy has grown ever more hungry for new sources of food and energy—a hunger that the South China Sea can potentially help to address. At the same time, China’s economic, political, and military power has grown exponentially and now towers above the other claimants. Their economies are fundamentally tied to China, which leaves them vulnerable to economic coercion from Beijing, while their political influence and military power now pale in comparison to China’s.

Many of China’s elites have recognized this change in the distribution of power and believe China should act more assertively in the pursuit of its interests in the South China Sea. Led by large state-owned corporate interests such as CNOOC and SINOPEC and abetted by hawks in the PLA, China’s leaders have apparently been convinced that Beijing should abandon Deng’s precedent of restraint and conciliation and instead seek to change the status quo in China’s favor.


And by the way...Washington could get dragged in. 

China’s strategy toward the goal of strengthening control over the South China Sea has been fairly remarkable for its ingenuity. While certainly assertive, China’s leaders have insisted on a strategy that is restrained and defensive on its face. Beijing always couches its actions as reactions to perceived attacks and incidents from the other claimants. Yet China’s behavior is always to escalate the situation and use its overwhelming power to enhance its claims and strengthen its position.

This approach, which can be called Reactive Assertiveness, is used by Beijing to describe China as fundamentally defensive and its adversaries as the ones causing trouble. With all apparent genuineness, Beijing paints the claims and actions as impinging on China’s national sovereignty—an equivalent to a foreign military force establishing a beachhead in Florida. As one Chinese scholar told me, “This is our territory and we have every right to use any means necessary, including the use of force, to evict them.”

Yet China does not want a war. The tactics at use—fishing vessels and coast guard ships, harassment and ramming without firing a shot—are designed to stay below the level of tension that would rise to the level of an outright conflict. Beijing even attempts to paint its own hostile actions as defensive and the fault of the other party. A day after Chinese ships intentionally rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing vessel, a Foreign Ministry spokesman urged Vietnam to “immediately stop all disruptive and damage activities” and the Vice Foreign Minister said that no country should doubt China’s determination and will to safeguard the peace and stability of the South China Sea. The message from Beijing is clear: the other claimants should wholly accede to all Chinese claims, and any violence that result from their resistance is wholly their responsibility.

Fear and Loathing in Manila and Hanoi

Leaders in the Philippines and Vietnam see themselves as walking a strategic tightrope. On one hand, China’s economic importance, geographic proximity, and overwhelming military power demands that they maintain a positive relationship with Beijing. Yet their claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea are felt just as strongly and genuinely as they are felt in Beijing, and they feel an obligation to their country to defend its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

One topic that is raised regularly in both countries is, a bit incongruously, Crimea. Elites in both Manila and Vietnam see much of themselves in Ukraine—a small nation embroiled in a serious territorial dispute with their (relatively) economically vital and militarily dominant neighbor. Russia’s intervention and subsequent annexation of Crimea seemed to demonstrate to leaders in Southeast Asia that economic dependence and military weakness is a geopolitical liability, and that territorial integrity and national sovereignty are not inviolate in the twenty-first century.

These countries fear that Russia has set the stage for China to use force to take control over disputed territories. As a reaction, they are seeking to diversify their economies in order to reduce their dependence on China while also building their own military power somewhat reduce China’s military advantage. Vietnam has in recent years purchased 6 Kilo-class submarines from Russia, maritime patrol aircraft from Canada, and Sigma Corvettes from the Netherlands. The Philippines has likewise announced plans to increase its defense spending and to purchase three decommissioned Hamilton-class cutters from the U.S. Coast Guard, along with twelve new FA-50 fighters from Korea. Both also seek to buttress their defense cooperation with the United States—Hanoi’s engagement with Washington has increased noticeably in recent years, and Manila recently signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with Washington to strengthen defense cooperation and expand the American military presence in the Philippines.

Vietnam and the Philippines will not stand idly by as China gradually erodes their hold on what they believe to be their territory. Yet they also do not want a war with China—their strategy appears to be focused on resisting China’s efforts to erode their claims while buying time to build their power, reduce their dependence on China, and hope the international community will intervene. Manila has brought its dispute with China to the International Court of Justice for arbitration, a decision from which is expected near the end of 2015. Moreover, both have turned to ASEAN to bring added geopolitical weight to negotiations with Beijing to develop a legally binding maritime code of conduct in the South China Sea—an agreement that would not affect the disputes themselves, but would considerably reduce tensions.

Chilly Times Ahead

The future of these disputes is not promising for long-term peace and stability. Neither side has demonstrated any interest in backing down or compromising, and the potential for future escalation and crisis is high.


China’s approach to these disputes is particularly problematic. Its refusal to compromise, its continued reliance on escalation, and its commitment to change the status quo (no matter how gradually) is a recipe for persistent tension. Most troubling is the confidence with which China approaches escalation. Beijing appears to see escalation as a tool that can be used with absolute control and predictability. China’s strategists and policy makers are fairly new to major power geopolitics, and have not learned the lessons their American and Russian counterparts learned during the Cold War: that escalation is a dangerous tool, that an adversary can respond in very unpredictable ways, and that tension can quickly spiral out of control.

One problem on the near horizon is how China will react to the arrest of Chinese fishermen by the Philippines. Beijing will certainly react, and will again seek to punish Manila and strengthen China’s claims in the process. One option would be to arrest Philippine fishermen operating in waters claimed by China. Another more likely and more provocative response would be to evict the Philippine forces currently on the groundedSierra Madre on the Second Thomas Reef. China has already harassed routine efforts by the Philippines to resupply those sailors, and may seek to tighten the blockade on the ship in order to force the sailors to withdraw. The potential for shots to be fired or another ship to be rammed and sunk would be high, and lives may be lost.

Without serious engagement, China is unlikely to back down. Beijing has painted this issues as directly related to its territorial integrity and national sovereignty, and its recent public marking of the 100th anniversary of the May 4 movement—in which the existing government was overthrown by a popular uprising that judged Beijing as weak in the face of foreign exploitation—strongly suggests that China’s leaders are sensitive to linkages between perceived weakness abroad and instability at home. With the growth of China’s economy likely to slow dramatically in coming years, Beijing appears to see incidents like these as useful in stirring nationalist sentiments at home to buttress the popular legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.

Should China use force against the Philippines, no matter how much Beijing may try to describe the act as defensive or reactive, the United States would probably be drawn into the crisis—certainly in a diplomatic sense, and potentially in a military sense as well. The United States will be unlikely to back down in such a situation, as the credibility of America’s willingness to intervene overseas has already come into question after decisions to not intervene in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or Assad’s crossing the chemical weapons “redline” in Syria. While Washington would certainly attempt to de-escalate any crisis and prevent the use of force, it will also be sure to demonstrate will and resolve in order to both deter hostilities and reassure its allies.

While the United States is not a party to these disputes per se, it has a major interest in seeing them resolved peacefully. A conflict in the South China Sea would be disastrous for regional trade and for U.S.-China relations—both of which are of singular importance to the United States. The United States could enhance deterrence for Beijing by raising the costs to China for additional incidents—potential initiatives include further strengthening military cooperation with the other claimants in the South China Sea, building their military capabilities, and enhancing mechanisms for multinational training and exercises. Additionally, Washington should work as an honest broker among all parties to identify opportunities for de-escalation and to develop a roadmap to the peaceful resolution of disputes. The upcoming Strategic and Economic Dialogue is an important opportunity for Beijing and Washington to speak directly about these issues and the dangers they post, and to find a way to prevent a crisis.

China and other claimants in the South China Sea are on a collision course, and it is incumbent on the United States to demonstrate leadership by forestalling a future crisis that could throw the entire region into conflict. Unless the claimants are able to turn away from aggression and see de-escalation as a useful tool of strategy, it is only a matter of time until Beijing miscalculates and escalates over a redline that leads to crisis and raises the potential for conflict. A mix of countries with incompatible, apparently nonnegotiable interests willing to use force and unwilling to acknowledge any way out than the absolute capitulation of the other side is a highly dangerous mix—this is how wars start.

Abraham M. Denmark is Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research. He previously served as Country Director for China Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has visited China, the Philippines, and Vietnam in recent weeks and discussed these issues extensively in each country. The views expressed are his own. Follow him him Twitter: @AbeDenmark

Image: Flickr/U.S. Navy/CC by 2.0