Saturday, April 30, 2016

Why the Philippines Should Vote for Poe

Why the Philippines Should Vote for Poe

 04/29/2016 09:24 am ET
  • Daniel WagnerCEO of Country Risk Solutions / co-author of the book “Global Risk Agility and Decision Making”.
  • Edsel TupazProfessor of international and comparative law
Six years ago the Philippines faced a critical choice in its presidential election, and its voters ended up making the right choice. The election of President Aquino in 2010 was the smartest thing the Filipino people could have done - for their country and for themselves. The country was falling further and further behind other Asian countries in terms of its growth rate, basic economic indicators, and perceived desirability as a place to do business. As a result of Aquino’s policies, and many of the changes he has made to the way the Philippines functions, today it is a better place on many levels - as a place to do business and as a place to live. Next month, voters face a similar choice - whether to maintain momentum and continue the path Aquino has set for the country, or change course. 
The current front-runner for the presidency is Rodrigo Duterte, a tough-talking, foul-mouthed mayor whom many analysts portray as Asia’s version to Donald Trump. Duterte is praised by some as someone with a record of getting things done - as a mayor. He is also known for his approval of (and admitted involvement in) extra-judicial killings as a means of enforcing the law in Davao since the 1990’s — during and since his second term as mayor. No doubt, a significant reason why Duterte has such appeal with voters is that the Philippine National Police reported a 46% increase in crime nationwide in the first half of 2015. Crime is a problem, clearly, but do Filipinos really want a future in which vigilante justice rules and armed militias are roaming their streets with the approval of the government? Can that really be the answer?
Leading in the vice presidential polls is Senator “Bongbong” Marcos, son of former president Ferdinand Marcos. The Marcos clan has long been revered in their home province of Ilocos Norte, and the Marcos name remains golden in local and regional politics. Voters from the province continue to deliver members of the Marcos family to a variety of elected offices. But the idea of having the son of the late dictator a heartbeat away from presidency is unsettling for many outside the province, three decades after his parents were forcefully removed from office. Do Filipinos really want to return the son of a man who ruled with an iron fist for decades and looted the Philippine nation to Malacanang Palace? How is doing so likely to be beneficial for the country in the long-term?
While recent surveys show Duterte overtaking Senator Grace Poe, these surveys do not capture Duterte’s latest fallout after publicly joking about a 1989 rape and murder of an Australian missionary, whom Duterte described as “so beautiful” that “the mayor should have been first, what a waste.” After trading barbs with the U.S. and Australian ambassadors to the Philippines following their strong condemnations of his remarks, Duterte said he would “cut ties” with their countries once he becomes president. Seriously? Do the Filipino people want to elect a man to the highest office in the land who jokes about rape and threatens to cuts ties with two of its most important allies as a result of their ambassadors objecting to his outrageous and inflammatory statements?
Since the last of the televised debates among presidential candidates, Duterte has offered no coherent foreign policy, no policy for the domestic economy and job generation, and no form of behavior even closely resembling statesmanship. Indeed, he has a lot in common with Donald Trump, who is also riding a wave of discontent in the U.S. to lead in the Republican polls. Other than a singular conviction to end criminality in the Philippines in “3 to 6 months” by “killing all criminals”, Duterte is the least distinguished candidate in terms of original policy making, and appears to be perfectly content “copying” the platforms of his competitors.
What is driving Filipino voters to prefer Duterte and Marcos over the plethora of other choices in this election cycle? Apart from being in the habit of voting for family names they know well, part of the answer may be disillusionment with Aquino’s daang matuwid (straight path) governance. In a prior article, we noted that while President Aquino has been successful in moving the economy forward, inclusive growth and unemployment will remain the top two issues for his successor. Duterte has addressed neither, but he does argue (wrongly) that his solution to criminality will be the solution for everything else. Like Donald Trump, Duterte has succeeded in turning a deep sense of dissatisfaction over daang matuwid into a platform for sustained demagoguery. And, like Trump, Duterte has given no meaningful explanation for how he intends to accomplish his stated objectives, while being perfectly happy to prey upon voters’ worst fears.

While Aquino’s legacy includes garnering at least eight sovereign credit rating upgrades (with the Philippines having attained ‘investment grade’ status), and despite Aquino enjoying a high degree of public trust, the gains of the Aquino administration have not been transposable to anyone else. Voters appear to think that Aquino’s anointed successor, former interior secretary and investment banker Mar Roxas, is too disconnected from the supermajority of Filipinos who are poor (although this has not stopped voters from electing a slew of other candidates in the past who came from wealthy families). Surely, never before have Filipinos been faced with so many electoral options and viable national-level candidates, yet, contrary to what logic and common sense would appear to dictate, voter preferences cutting across all classes are indicating an unshakeable nostalgia for ‘quick fix’ solutions under a strong man - despite the dangers they must know that implies.
This is no more evident than in the rise in popularity of Senator Marcos as forerunner for the vice presidency. Analysts will agree - although many will outwardly deny it - that Marcos Jr. has been able to slowly revise the true historical narrative of martial law during his father’s rule, recasting his father’s rule as one that, had it not been for the 1986 EDSA revolution, would have catapulted the Philippines into greater heights — despite clear evidence to the contrary. That is simply preposterous. Yet, truly surprisingly, voter demographics show that the biggest voter segment who favor Marcos Jr. actually belong to the 35 to 54 age group, and not the millennials who are routinely accused of knowing anything about what the Philippines was like under martial law. Thirty years after the fact, can the EDSA revolution have meant nothing?
The Philippines and its people clearly deserve better. Rather than ascribe to abrupt change, the Philippines and its leaders need a balanced mix of continuity and reform. Senator Poe’s platforms are anchored on inclusive growth (Walaang Maiiwan, or ‘let no one be left behind’) and Gubyernong May Puso (compassionate governance), and focus on the development objectives of health and education. Instead of relying on ‘bullets’ and ‘murderous violence’, Poe proposes to end criminality by ending poverty. She has incorporated many of Aquino’s programs, such as the conditional cash transfer program as a vehicle for poverty alleviation, but has proposed to take this a step further by adopting measures aimed at enhancing policies and programs in place without taking too radical a departure from them. Given the progress that has been made under President Aquino, a ‘radical’ departure is not what is needed.
Aside from wanting to transpose the gains in the economy into tangible gains in poverty alleviation and inequality (which remains a necessity), Aquino’s successor must be able to translate economic leadership into a more meaningful role in regional politics. This is in large part because of China’s brinkmanship in the South China Sea, known to Filipinos as the ‘West Philippine Sea’. Under President Aquino, the Philippines has taken forceful action to oppose China’s antics, being the first country to oppose China at a UN-sanctioned international tribunal, and by re-engaging the U.S. in joining forces to ramp up their military presence in the region.
Since the Philippines has taken the lead in hauling China into an international court, other countries that have also experienced violations of their territorial sovereignty from China — such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and recently, Malaysia — have contemplated taking similar legal action and look to the Philippines as an example in that area. Poe’s view on that portion of the South China Sea adjacent to the Philippines can be summed up in one brief statement: “The West Philippine Sea is ours.” 
Poe believes that the Philippines must be able to balance economic diplomacy with territorial and maritime concerns, the latter being bilaterally non-negotiable. Between Poe and Duterte, Poe is clearly the better statesperson. Despite being relatively new to politics, Poe has taken on the strongest and most progressive position in Philippine foreign policy of any presidential candidate. In addition, Poe is keen on revising the country’s national security policy and formulating a more detailed national security strategy within her first 100 days of office, along with establishing credible defense and armed forces modernization through a combination of pragmatic diplomacy, constructive engagement, and managing relations with its allies under existing mutual defense pacts. 
By contrast, Duterte has displayed an appalling lack of knowledge or interest in international affairs. Governments and business communities around the world are concerned about a Duterte presidency, as they are about a possible Trump presidency, seeing either as a huge step in the wrong direction. The difference is, the Philippines faced its cross-road 6 years ago, and bolted boldly into the future, with excellent results. The U.S. faces that cross-road today. Both countries have a much better option staring them in the face; Both have female candidates who have a strong command of the issues, are clear about what they plan to do, and have their peoples’ interests at heart.
The upcoming elections in both the Philippines and the U.S. should not be about demagoguery, manipulating voters’ worst fears, and spewing incendiary rhetoric. Nor should they be about perpetuating lowest common denominators and the fanciful notion that there are quick fixes to big problems. These elections are about maintaining momentum, implementing policies that ooze with common sense, and having a long-term orientation. If you want that, vote for Poe!
*Edsel Tupaz is a public interest attorney and legal academic, based in Manila. Follow Edsel Tupaz on Twitter: www.twitter.com/edseltupaz.
*Daniel Wagner is CEO of Country Risk Solutions and co-author of the book “Global Risk Agility and Decision Making”. Follow Daniel Wagner on Twitter: www.twitter.com/countryriskmgmt.

Friday, April 29, 2016

Chinese Scarborough Shoal base would threaten Manila

n Manila

April 28 2016 at 10:46 PM
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WASHINGTON: If China builds an artificial island on the disputed Scarborough Shoal, Sen. Dan Sullivan warned today, it will complete a “strategic triangle” of bases that can dominate the South China Sea. At this morning’s Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Sullivan displayed a map (above) of the region overlaid with the ranges of Chinese fighters striking from a triangle of bases on (1) the Chinese island of Hainan, (2) the disputed Spratly Islands, and (3) Scarborough Shoal (as yet unbuilt). The overlapping rings would cover not only almost all the South China Sea, but much of the Philippines and Vietnam. 

“Your map’s absolutely accurate,” responded Defense Secretary Ashton Carter. China’s actions are “deeply disturbing to countries in region, which has them all coming to us….We are being increasingly invited to work with countries,” from old allies like Australia, Japan, and the Philippines to new partners like India and Vietnam. 

Vietnam has agreed to allow the US Army to preposition equipment for humanitarian responses, in itself a major shift by China’s neighbor. And the US has expanded its long-standing but often-strained relationship with the Philippines. Under a new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), the two countries announced in March that US forces would have access to five military bases across the country. But as Sullivan’s map makes clear, two of those five bases would be in range of Scarborough-based Chinese fighter-bombers, as would the capital city of Manila. 

“Senator Sullivan is right,” said Greg Poling, director of the much-cited Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “If China built an artificial island and military base at Scarborough, as it has in the Spratlys and Paracels, it would bring the entire South China Sea within Chinese radar, air, and eventually missile coverage. It would also bing much of the Philippines, including Manila, Clark (air base), Subic (Bay), and at least two of the bases the US is getting access to under EDCA within that Chinese umbrella.” 

So far, China hasn’t started work on Scarborough, Poling and his CSIS colleague Bonnie Glaser agreed. “In the [satellite] imagery that we have obtained from DigitalGlobe, we have not seen anything,” Glaser told me. That said, given the limits of commercial imagery, she added, “we are not monitoring this 24-7, of course.” 

The Chinese are allegedly more active in the region. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Richardson has described “survey type of activity,” there are rumors of dredging vessels in the area (though not at the Shoal itself), and Philippine papers reporting more Chinese Coast Guard vessels, historically far more aggressive than their Chinese navy counterparts. In response, US aircraft have stepped up patrols of the area, including land-based A-10 attack planes flying from the Philippines. 

There are also strong signals from unnamed sources and websites associated with Beijing that China will begin reclamation. Glaser, however, is skeptical. One People’s Liberation Army officer “with stars on their shoulders” told her island-building on Scarborough is “very, very unlikely,” because Beijing is well aware how badly the region would react. Such action would blatantly violate both China’s 2015 pledge to cease island-building and its 2002 Declaration of Conduct with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). China has broken both promises before, but never so egregiously as building on Scarborough would be. 

“A resumption of land reclamation after stating they would stop would make the rest of the region very, very nervous,” Glaser said. “It would also be a signal, not only to the region, but also to the rest of the world that China is going to flout international law.” 

If China did build an island, the second question would be what it built on the island. So far, high-end military capabilities like bomb-proof aircraft hangars and HQ-9 anti-aircraft batteries are restricted to the Paracel Islands, which are natural features off Vietnam, said Glaser. The artificial islands in the Spratlys have received advanced radar and runways, Poling said. 

Putting offensive capabilities like missile batteries on the islands would be “a very destabilizing move,” said Andrew Krepinevich, former president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Such assets would be intimidating in a crisis, but so vulnerable in an actual shooting war that China would face the temptation to “use it or lose it.” 

“Given the small size of the islands, the missiles would be highly vulnerable, as they could not rely on mobility or hardening to provide passive defense against attack,” said Krepinevich. “They are high-value assets that are also soft targets tethered to a very small area—the island they are on.” 

“The deployment makes the most sense if you have a military doctrine that calls for striking first,” Krepinevich continued, “or if your principal purpose is not to fight, but to intimidate your much weaker neighbors in the absence of a serious effort by the United States.” 
http://breakingdefense.com/2016/04/chinese-scarborough-shoal-base-would-threaten-manila/ 

wow. ccp is full of sht! seeing that map it is obvious those islands are nowhere near china's eez. china deserves what's coming to them once the u.n 
rules against them. philippines will likely ask the u.s for assistance (obvious) and the u.s should help. 

u.s and philippines should start with a blockade and not allow any chinese vessels on those islands again. starve the remaining chinese on those 
islands. philippines would be within their rights to take such actions against china. china is illegally occupying those islands.

 
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Re: Chinese Scarborough Shoal Base Would Threaten Manila

Thursday, April 28, 2016

Chinese Ambitions in South China Sea Must Be Resisted, Think Tank Says

Chinese Ambitions in South China Sea Must Be Resisted, Think Tank Says

  • Newfound PLA Navy professionalism masks China's strategy
  • `Virtually impossible to compel China to roll back outposts'
The professionalism displayed by China’s navy in some of the world’s most contested seas is masking an underlying challenge to the existing order in the East China Sea and South China Sea that must be resisted, according to a report by an Australian security think tank.
“Beijing’s newly acquired taste for maritime ‘rules of the road’ is lowering the risk of accidental conflict,” wrote Ashley Townshendand Rory Medcalf in a report published Friday by the Sydney-based Lowy Institute for International Policy. “In turning away from tactical aggression, Beijing has refocused on passive assertive actions to consolidate a new status quo in maritime Asia.”
China’s strategy is based around its island-building program, which has created more than 3,000 acres (1214 hectares) of land on seven features it occupies in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. Though its actions have sparked tensions with other claimants including the Philippines and Vietnam, and prompted the U.S. to carry out naval transits to defend freedom of navigation in the waters, China has still managed to expand its maritime influence.
“As it is virtually impossible to compel China to roll back its outposts, the current policy imperative -- aside from defending freedom of navigation -- is to deter further militarization or the creation of a new air defense identification zone, particularly in relation to the Spratly Islands,” the authors wrote.
QuickTake map shows overlapping territorial claims of Brunei, China, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. {NSN O2OSHZ1ANZG8}
QuickTake map shows overlapping territorial claims of Brunei, China, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. {NSN O2OSHZ1ANZG8}
China declared an air defense identification zone in November 2013 over part of the East China Sea covering islands contested with Japan, and said its military would take “defensive emergency measures” if aircraft enter the area without reporting flight plans or identifying themselves. While China has rarely attempted to enforce the restrictions, analysts speculate that China may attempt to establish a similar zone above the South China Sea.
U.S. Rear Admiral Marcus Hitchcock this week underlined one of the themes of the Lowy report, praising the People’s Liberation Army Navy for abiding by a code set up for unplanned encounters at sea, “no matter what their nations are going through diplomatically.”

Scarborough Shoal

Even as China’s navy adheres to those rules of conduct, U.S. officials are concerned that China may start creating an island on Scarborough Shoal, which it seized from the Philippines in 2012. On April 19 the U.S. sent six U.S. Air Force planes into the vicinity of the shoal, which lies about 230 kilometers (143 miles) from the Philippines coast. An airstrip there would add to China’s existing network of runways and surveillance sites that Admiral Harry Harris, head of U.S. Pacific Command, said last year “creates a mechanism by which China would have de facto control over the South China Sea in any scenario short of war.”
The authors dub Beijing’s current strategy as “passive assertion,” where China uses the cover of the region’s relative stability to push ahead with island building, militarization, and the expansion of its naval and law enforcement patrols to create new zones of military authority.
Part of the strategy is to portray the U.S. and its allies as the aggressors. “By consistently portraying the United States and its partners as destabilizing forces, China’s public relations campaign could muddy the international narrative about who is actually driving Asia’s maritime tensions,” the authors wrote.

New Recommendations

To combat China’s strategy, interested nations should adopt measures aimed at imposing direct and indirect costs on China. The recommendations include:
* Strengthening and widening maritime and aerial confidence-building measures to bring China-Japan and China-Association of Southeast Asian Nation codes to the same level as China-U.S. rules. Codes on unplanned encounters at sea should also include coast guards and other civilian maritime law enforcement agencies.
* Countries should execute freedom of navigation flights and voyages within the 12-mile zones of the islands China claims and its 200 nautical mile (230 miles) exclusive economic zone.
* Maritime capacity building should also be expanded to enable all countries to respond to China’s growing presence. This should involve the transfer of ships, aircraft and surveillance technologies to allow countries like the Philippines and Malaysia to patrol their regional waters.
* Expansion of diplomatic criticism to target its reputation as a good international citizen, including strengthening support for the Philippines’ case against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
Townshend is a visiting fellow at the Asia-Pacific Center at Fudan University, Shanghai. Medcalf is head of the National Security College at the Australian National University in Canberra.

Monday, April 25, 2016

How to get tough with China. The National Interest


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How to Get Tough with China

America has given Beijing a pass for 45 years. Time to get it right.

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The United States’ approach to dealing with China from the Nixon-Kissinger era onwards resembles a forty-five-year science experiment—an experiment that has failed.

The underlying hypothesis was that an accommodating approach to the PRC would inevitably lead to a more liberal China that followed the established rules of the international system. It seemed so logical, as it was under that system that China would so handsomely benefit.

After four-plus decades, there is scant evidence this hypothesis is correct. In fact, the PRC’s relentless effort to create what might cheekily be called a “Greater South China Sea Co-Prosperity Sphere” belies any notion this view was ever correct. China’s island-building expansion across the South China Sea is just the latest evidence that most of the “experts” got China wrong.

Fortunately, the South China Sea is now properly getting attention. But the PRC’s objective is, at a minimum, regional hegemony. While the United States must hold the line in the region and make clear it won’t be bullied out of East Asia, the South China Sea problem will not be resolved in the South China Sea itself.

Rather, a successful approach must also involve simultaneously applying pressure elsewhere on the PRC—and particularly on the ruling elite in the Communist Party of China (CPC).

Ultimately, the United States must take the lead and develop a comprehensive strategy, similar in its broad scope to the strategy used to protect U.S. interests when dealing with the Soviet Union. Although it will be useful to involve other countries in this effort, there is no single country or combination of countries in Asia that by themselves can restrain the PRC. Like it or not, it’s up to the Americans, and an effort to hold the line might include the following components.

 

Establish That the United States Has Its Own Core Interests

Just as China demands respect for its “core interests”—as if stating them as a core interest automatically makes them unassailable—the United States should declare publicly and privately that it possesses its own core interests in Asia, and will defend them.

This requires more than just talk and furrowed-brow pronouncements of concern—or even of “grave concern.” U.S. forces need to maintain a constant, credible, and obvious presence on, below and above the South (and East) China Sea, regardless of cost.

 

Establish a Permanent, Serious Presence in the South China Sea

There should be no more half-hearted FONOPs broadcast in advance, as if seeking Chinese acquiescence. This sheepish approach has had minimal effect. The United States should broadly publicize and criticize Chinese military provocations. Don’t hush them up, always respond and be prepared to “bump back” when Chinese vessels use a favored method to impede U.S. ships.

 

Clarify and Strengthen U.S.-Japan Bonds

Solidly link U.S. and Japanese forces, with the “unsplittable” political linkage that comes with it. This linkage will present People’s Liberation Army (PLA) planners with their most difficult challenge. Neither the United States nor Japan can maintain its position in the Asia-Pacific without the other’s fullest support.

The United States and Japan should continue to better integrate their military capabilities, to include contingency planning, joint training and patrols, and interoperable command-and-control systems. Build camaraderie and interoperability along the lines of the U.S.-UK military relationship, back when bilateral relations were at their peak. A compelling reason for Japan to seek this interoperability is that, once China has the South China Sea “locked up,” the East China Sea is next.

Better alignment of U.S. forces and Japan Self-Defense Forces will also have a bracing effect on other regional nations that are nervously watching the PRC—and just as nervously watching whether the U.S. can and will still lead.

Although ASEAN will never take a unified stance toward PRC territorial aggression, it is possible to encourage a handful of ASEAN nations to do more. For those countries, doing more includes joining multilateral patrols and exercises in the South China Sea and surrounding waters. This, of course, requires convincing these nations that they will not be left hanging due to the United States once again displaying temerity and ambiguity about challenging PRC domination of the region.

 

Kill “Engagement for Engagement’s Sake”

The United States should restrict engagement with the PLA to what is professional and essential. The longstanding policy of engagement for engagement’s sake has not produced a less belligerent Chinese military, nor has it deterred the PRC. More to the point, it makes the United States appear to be a supplicant, clearly the more interested in developing military-to-military relations, and provides Beijing with a point of leverage where one need not exist. Pending sudden improvement in PRC behavior, the United States should withdraw the PRC’s invitation to the July 2016 RIMPAC exercise in Hawaii.

While “holding the line” in the South China Sea area is essential, pressure needs to be applied elsewhere via a number of different lines of effort.

 

The United States should make it clear that it backs Taiwan against any coerced change in the status quo. This means the United States should provide requested high-tech arms, and even submarines. The United States might even push Japan to sell its older subs to Taiwan, keying this to Chinese behavior towards both Japan and Taiwan.

This is not a change from the United States’s longstanding “One China” policy. Yes, the United States recognizes only one China—and a “One China” that looks like Taiwan would not be a bad thing. Taiwan is a priceless reminder that Chinese people can govern themselves in a consensual manner, and have a free press, a full range of individual liberties and a functioning legal system.

Taiwan belies the CPC’s claims that stability and prosperity in China requires repression. This argument recalls apartheid-era Afrikaners insisting that black Africans were a unique race that demanded a boot on the neck, and were happy to have it.

 

Apply Meaningful Economic Pressure

It is long past time that the PRC follow its World Trade Organization commitments. Rather than continue to allow exceptions, the United States should insist on the simple—but apparently radical, by Washington standards—approach that China obey trade laws.

Also, the Americans might require the PRC to allow reciprocal treatment and market access for U.S. and foreign companies. China’s serial, decades-long record of hacking and intellectual property theft needs to be punished with real sanctions. There are many opportunities for punishing sanctions that would be effective.

The U.S. government’s recent harsh sanctions on Chinese electronics maker ZTE, for illegal dealings with Iran and other sanctioned countries, were a good example of what can be done. Still, it might have been more useful if these sanctions had been kept in place longer than two weeks before the United States backed down.

The United States might also apply pressure of the sort that will squeeze China’s ruling class by upsetting the money-making machine, centered on manufacturing and exports, that is the source of its power. Start taking thirty days to clear Chinese ships entering the United States, rightfully justified by the need to check carefully for counterfeits and unsafe products. Delayed cargo clearance and Lloyd’s of London raising insurance rates would potentially apply more pressure on PRC elites than the U.S. Air Force could dream of inflicting.

 

Use International Law to Challenge the PRC

The United States should energetically seek to bring territorial and other disputes to international forums for resolution—and support countries that do likewise. Further, in these legal forums, condemn and respond forcefully to the environmental damage foisted on the global commons by unbridled Chinese island building and its rapacious commercial fishing fleet.

This is helpful, but will not be decisive. International law has its limits, and the PRC will either ignore it or absorb whatever criticism ensues from unfavorable court rulings. In the PRC’s view, criticism is a small price to pay for gaining domination of the South China Sea and other useful territory.

 

Get Beyond Sophomoric Strategic Communication: Develop a Useful U.S. Narrative 

In the absence of a clear national strategy for confronting the PRC’s bullying behavior and expansionism, it’s no surprise that what passes for U.S. strategic communication regarding the threat is not working. There is no “whole-of-government” communication approach to the threat, and a lack of useful synchronicity in messaging between the National Security Council, State Department and Department of Defense.

On this point, America should take bold action: it can tell the truth about the PRC.

Further, the United States can aggressively and unapologetically speak up for the system of rights, freedoms and accepted rules of international behavior that, in fact, has been largely responsible for the PRC’s development over the last forty years.

From senior U.S. officials down to the wide range of U.S. influencers, constantly challenge and expose false Chinese claims of the South China Sea being “historically Chinese” and transparently false statements of “non-militarization” of the islands. And go after China’s willful ecological destruction of the reefs and natural habitat of the South China Sea.

Exploit existing cultural exchanges and journalist programs to bring in emerging leaders, journalists and other influentials from like-minded nations in the Pacific to examine such topics as the likely future impact of PRC hegemony on the Asia-Pacific region.

These are simply a few strategies and tactics. There is much more that should be done. But the United States must quickly get beyond its often confusing, timorous statements suggesting “grave concern” from State Department spokesmen or other U.S. government officials. The United States must begin to speak firmly, clearly and consistently.

Meanwhile, in the existing vacuum, the Chinese position is heard repeatedly from multiple channels, as if playing on a loop. The PRC’s claims may be nonsense, but if they unchallenged or inconsistently opposed, the relentless claims tend to reinforce the Chinese position and create a sense of inevitability.


The United States should make it clear that it backs Taiwan against any coerced change in the status quo. This means the United States should provide requested high-tech arms, and even submarines. The United States might even push Japan to sell its older subs to Taiwan, keying this to Chinese behavior towards both Japan and Taiwan.

This is not a change from the United States’s longstanding “One China” policy. Yes, the United States recognizes only one China—and a “One China” that looks like Taiwan would not be a bad thing. Taiwan is a priceless reminder that Chinese people can govern themselves in a consensual manner, and have a free press, a full range of individual liberties and a functioning legal system.

Taiwan belies the CPC’s claims that stability and prosperity in China requires repression. This argument recalls apartheid-era Afrikaners insisting that black Africans were a unique race that demanded a boot on the neck, and were happy to have it.

 

Apply Meaningful Economic Pressure

It is long past time that the PRC follow its World Trade Organization commitments. Rather than continue to allow exceptions, the United States should insist on the simple—but apparently radical, by Washington standards—approach that China obey trade laws.

Also, the Americans might require the PRC to allow reciprocal treatment and market access for U.S. and foreign companies. China’s serial, decades-long record of hacking and intellectual property theft needs to be punished with real sanctions. There are many opportunities for punishing sanctions that would be effective.

The U.S. government’s recent harsh sanctions on Chinese electronics maker ZTE, for illegal dealings with Iran and other sanctioned countries, were a good example of what can be done. Still, it might have been more useful if these sanctions had been kept in place longer than two weeks before the United States backed down.

The United States might also apply pressure of the sort that will squeeze China’s ruling class by upsetting the money-making machine, centered on manufacturing and exports, that is the source of its power. Start taking thirty days to clear Chinese ships entering the United States, rightfully justified by the need to check carefully for counterfeits and unsafe products. Delayed cargo clearance and Lloyd’s of London raising insurance rates would potentially apply more pressure on PRC elites than the U.S. Air Force could dream of inflicting.

 

Use International Law to Challenge the PRC

The United States should energetically seek to bring territorial and other disputes to international forums for resolution—and support countries that do likewise. Further, in these legal forums, condemn and respond forcefully to the environmental damage foisted on the global commons by unbridled Chinese island building and its rapacious commercial fishing fleet.

This is helpful, but will not be decisive. International law has its limits, and the PRC will either ignore it or absorb whatever criticism ensues from unfavorable court rulings. In the PRC’s view, criticism is a small price to pay for gaining domination of the South China Sea and other useful territory.

 

Get Beyond Sophomoric Strategic Communication: Develop a Useful U.S. Narrative 

In the absence of a clear national strategy for confronting the PRC’s bullying behavior and expansionism, it’s no surprise that what passes for U.S. strategic communication regarding the threat is not working. There is no “whole-of-government” communication approach to the threat, and a lack of useful synchronicity in messaging between the National Security Council, State Department and Department of Defense.

On this point, America should take bold action: it can tell the truth about the PRC.

Further, the United States can aggressively and unapologetically speak up for the system of rights, freedoms and accepted rules of international behavior that, in fact, has been largely responsible for the PRC’s development over the last forty years.

From senior U.S. officials down to the wide range of U.S. influencers, constantly challenge and expose false Chinese claims of the South China Sea being “historically Chinese” and transparently false statements of “non-militarization” of the islands. And go after China’s willful ecological destruction of the reefs and natural habitat of the South China Sea.

Exploit existing cultural exchanges and journalist programs to bring in emerging leaders, journalists and other influentials from like-minded nations in the Pacific to examine such topics as the likely future impact of PRC hegemony on the Asia-Pacific region.

These are simply a few strategies and tactics. There is much more that should be done. But the United States must quickly get beyond its often confusing, timorous statements suggesting “grave concern” from State Department spokesmen or other U.S. government officials. The United States must begin to speak firmly, clearly and consistently.

Meanwhile, in the existing vacuum, the Chinese position is heard repeatedly from multiple channels, as if playing on a loop. The PRC’s claims may be nonsense, but if they unchallenged or inconsistently opposed, the relentless claims tend to reinforce the Chinese position and create a sense of inevitability.

Implement the Taiwan Relations Act as Originally Intended