Thursday, May 5, 2016

THE FLASHPOINT THAT WILL IGNITE THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: SCARBOROUGH SHOAL. Written by Brian Kalman exclusively for SouthFront: Analysis & Intelligence

THE FLASHPOINT THAT WILL IGNITE THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: SCARBOROUGH SHOAL

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Written by Brian Kalman exclusively for SouthFront: Analysis & Intelligence
Brian Kalman is a management professional in the marine transportation industry. He was an officer in the US Navy for eleven years. He currently resides and works in the Caribbean.

Introduction

The Permanent Court of Arbitration based at The Hague is due to release its ruling on the case filed by the Philippines against China in January of 2013, over the Chinese seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012. The ruling should be made public in late May or early June of this year. The message has been communicated through unofficial channels via the state-run Chinese media that the Chinese government intends to commence major land-reclamation efforts at Scarborough Shoal during this same time period. Unlike its claims in the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, China’s claim to Scarborough Shoal has absolutely no validity on either historical grounds nor any internationally recognized legal grounds, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The United States claimed the shoal as a possession along with the entirety of the Philippines after Spain surrendered the territories to the U.S. upon the conclusion of the Spanish American War, as stipulated in the 1900 Treaty of Washington. The shoal was administered by the U.S. Navy until it was returned to the Philippines upon the nation’s independence in 1946. China laid no claim to Scarborough Shoal until the U.S. military officially closed its military bases in the Philippines in 1992. In 2012 they effectively took control of the shoal after forcing the Philippine Coast Guard, law enforcement and fisherman out of the area in a tense conflict that lasted for weeks. While avoiding a violent confrontation over the shoals, the Philippine government protested the Chinese actions in the United Nations and lodged legal challenges to the occupation of their sovereign territory.
Although the United States’ official position is that it will not back any claimants’ position in the many disputes in the South China Sea, the issue of Scarborough Shoal is unique in a number of respects. An understanding of the historical and legal status of Scarborough Shoal, coupled with a formal defense treaty with the Philippines makes impartiality in this particular territorial dispute impossible. As the United States reforges military ties with the Philippines in an attempt to contain a more ambitious and capable China, the odds of a conflict over ownership of the shoal only becomes more probable.
The location of Scarborough Shoal in relation to China and the Philippines.
The location of Scarborough Shoal in relation to China and the Philippines.

The History of Sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal

The Philippines was claimed by Spain in 1521 by Ferdinand Magellan and administered as a colony under the authority of the Viceroyalty of New Spain in Mexico, until Mexico’s independence in 1821. By 1570 the Spanish had largely conquered the Islands, after defeating the Kingdom of Maynila (Manila) and had named the island nation Las Islas Filipinas after Philip II of Spain. With the completion of the Philippine referendum of 1599, where all natives of the islands declared Spain to be the rightful sovereign authority, Spain gained legitimate sovereignty over the entirety of the Philippine Islands.
Although Chinese pirates often raided the Spanish settlements and the ships of the Manila-Acapulco Galleon trade, the Chinese nation made no counter claims against the Spanish sovereignty in the area, and no one attempted to claim sovereignty over the diminutive shoal that we know today as Scarborough Shoal. The shoal gained its English name when the captain of the East Indiaman Scarborough, ran aground on the shoal in 1784. In 1898, the Spanish-American War resulted in the defeat of Spain, and the transfer of Spanish colonial holdings in the Caribbean and the Pacific to the dominion of the United States. The Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the subsequent Washington Treaty of 1900 legally formalized this transfer of territories. It is interesting to note that the sale of the Philippines to the United States as stipulated in the Treaties, for the amount of $20 million, was narrowly ratified by the U.S. Congress. There was a sizable minority of anti-imperialist sentiment in the U.S. Congress at this time.
The United States then fought a war of colonial occupation against a vibrant Philippine Independence movement from 1899 to 1902 that would result in approximately 220,000 casualties, not including tens of thousands of civilians that died during the same time period, due to starvation and disease exacerbated by the war. The short-lived first Philippine Republic was defeated in this war, and the Philippines would have to suffer under one more foreign occupation, at the hands of Imperial Japan, before a new Republic was declared upon independence after World War II. The Treaty of Manila of 1946 between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines granted full independence; however, local governance and a high level of autonomy were the norm, beginning in 1916. In 1934 the U.S. Congress passed the Philippine Independence Act, effectively turning the Philippines into a self-governing Commonwealth. It was during this period that the Philippines first asserted a desire to administrate the Scarborough Shoal.
Aftermath of a battle between U.S. forces and Moro rebels during the Philippine-American War.
Aftermath of a battle between U.S. forces and Moro rebels during the Philippine-American War.
In 1938, the Commonwealth government asked the U.S. Department of War and the U.S. Secretary of the Navy for permission to develop the Scarborough Shoal as an aid to navigation for both sea and air traffic. The U.S. Navy had been administering the region for the purpose of safety of navigation, as well as naval gunnery training. Official correspondence from the U.S. Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and U.S. Civil Aeronautics Authority clearly show the acknowledgement that Scarborough Shoal is a sovereign territory of the Philippines, and that the U.S. government agrees to cede all practical administration of the shoal to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, later to become the Republic of the Philippines. A letter from the U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to the U.S. Secretary of War, Harry Woodring, regarding the matter, stipulates the position of the U.S. government at the time and is listed in its entirety below:
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The Scarborough Shoal Stand-off of 2012

China did not raise any official objections to the inclusion of Scarborough Shoal as an integral sovereign territory of the Philippines as a colony of Spain, the United States or as an independent nation as of 1946. From 1599 to 1946, a period of 347 years, there were no Chinese claims of sovereignty over the shoal. For an additional 46 years, from the date of Philippine independence to the official closure of the last U.S. military base operating at Subic Bay, China did not dispute Philippine sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal. Shortly after the U.S. ensign was lowered for the last time at Subic Bay Naval Base, China started a diplomatic effort to dispute the sovereignty of the territory.
After the most recent four centuries of Philippine history was absent of any counter claims of sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, China opportunistically raised the issue in 1991 when they estimated the Philippine government, absent a strong U.S. military presence, to be most weak. While it would have been logical and legal according to all international norms for the Philippines to reject outright such claims, the Philippine government, under President Fidel Ramos, decided to set upon a path of de-escalation and to prevent the militarization of the issue. In 1995, both governments signed an agreement adopting a code of conduct that committed both nations to resolve the issue through peaceful, political means. This would turn out to be a major strategic mistake by President Ramos.
The Scarborough Shoal remained de-militarized and was visited intermittently by both Chinese and Philippine fisherman, and civilians engaged in various marine biology, weather and oceanographic survey projects. Although there were minor incidents regarding illegal fishing in the vicinity of the shoal, no major disputes arose. Scarborough Shoal was an international gray area ripe for an emergency.
The second major strategic mistake on the part of the Philippines, was the drafting and passage of Republic Act No. 9522, the Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law in 2009. The administration of President Arroyo deemed it essential to define the limits of the Philippine Archipelago to mirror as closely as possible the definitions set forth in UNCLOS. In order to be more compliant with an international legal treaty, the Philippine government redefined the boundaries of their nation in a fashion that dissenting senators declared was “a sellout of national Philippine sovereignty.” Both the Kalayaan Islands (Spratly Islands) and Scarborough Shoal were excluded from the extended continental shelf (ECS) of the archipelago as a whole. In the same year, China presented its famous “Nine-Dash Line” claim to the United Nations, claiming almost the entirety of the South China, including Scarborough Shoal.
The peaceful status quo was maintained until April 10th, 2012, when the Philippine Coast Guard interdicted and apprehended a group of Chinese fisherman for conducting illegal fishing practices on the shoal. Chinese “civilian research vessels” interdicted and prevented the arrest of the Chinese fishermen the very next day. This precipitated what came to be known as the Scarborough Shoal Stand-off. A tense situation, where both Chinese and Philippine civilians planted their respective national flags on the shoal, fishermen from both nations clashed with Coast Guard vessels flying Chinese and Philippine colors soon followed. The diplomatic corps of both countries spared with increasingly nationalistic statements over the intervening months. Finally, in June the United States was able to broker a deal between both nations in which they both agreed to withdraw all forces from the shoal in an effort to deescalate the situation, and to rely on diplomatic means to resolve the dispute. The Philippines honored this agreement and withdrew all navy and coastguard vessels and personnel.  China; however, immediately reneged on the agreement and reinforced their position on the shoal, building a barrier blocking its south-eastern entrance.
The Philippines responded with diplomatic and legal protests, refraining from getting involved in a military confrontation with a much stronger China. The Philippines lacked the naval and air power to evict the Chinese from the shoal and to hold it against a determined Chinese assault. They did not possess the resources for a viable anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability at such a range from the main islands. On January 22nd, 2013, the Philippines instituted arbitration proceedings through the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, an internationally respected arbitration court that was founded in 1899. While not technically a court in the traditional sense, the PCA was established as a framework of international tribunals meant to resolve major legal disputes between states.

The Scarborough Shoal Today; The Spark That Will Ignite the Powder Keg

As the PCA approaches a decision on case number 2013-19, The Republic of the Philippines vs. The People’s Republic of China, over the coming months, China is preparing to begin major land reclamation efforts at Scarborough Shoal. As most legal analysts believe that the PCA will most likely rule in the favor of the Philippines, major construction efforts on the shoal by China are extremely provocative and will undoubtedly raise tensions between the two nations, as well as exaserbate a series of other territorial disputes between China and other nations bordering the South China Sea.
China most likely aims to build a major early warning radar installation and airfield on the site of Scarborough Shoal, to complete a larger network of such installations that will allow it effective A2/AD capability over the entire South China Sea. What some analysts have dubbed a “Strategic Triangle”, the major base on Woody Island in the Paracels, and the bases currently being completed on Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, Subi Reef and Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands, form two points of the triangle. A similar base on Scarborough Shoal would form the third point, and close the triangle of strategic control over the South China Sea.
The location of Scarborough Shoal in relation to the Paracel and Spratly Islands.
The location of Scarborough Shoal in relation to the Paracel and Spratly Islands.
The United States and the Philippines conducted joint military exercises over a period of eleven days this April. Operation Balikitan (Shoulder-to-Shoulder) involved approximately 10,000 personnel from both nations’ militaries, and simulated amphibious assaults, interdictions and boarding of hostile vessels at sea, and joint naval and air maneuvers. The military exercises were aimed at practicing cooperative efforts between the U.S. and Philippine militaries, and to send an obvious message to China that both nations are ready and willing to respond to military provocations. Perhaps more controversial than U.S. military cooperation with the Philippines, was the visit of Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force vessels to Subic Bay at the same time. The JS Oyashio attack submarine and two guided missile destroyers, JS Ariake DDG 109 and JS Setogiri DDG 156, docked in Subic Bay on April 3rd.
The JS Oyashio, JS Ariake and JS Setogiri dock in Subic Bay, north of Manila April 3, 2016.
The JS Oyashio, JS Ariake and JS Setogiri dock in Subic Bay, north of Manila April 3, 2016.
Whether land reclamation efforts by China at Scarborough Shoal will be interpreted as a direct violation of Philippine sovereignty or not remains to be seen, but the added influence of a PCA ruling in favor of the Philippines may add extra impetus for such a decision. Backed by an internationally recognized legal decision by an organization of the highest reputation, the Philippines will have added legitimacy in demanding that China halt all activity and vacate Scarborough Shoal. If China refuses, and the Philippine military decides to forcible evict Chinese forces and enforce Philippine sovereignty of the shoal, will the United States intervene on the side of the Philippines if a violent military confrontation ensues?
The United States is bound to defend the Republic of the Philippines if attacked. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement was upheld by the Philippine Supreme Court just this January, after the constitutionality of the treaty was challenged in 2014. This Act gives the United States broad access to base military assets at five major bases throughout the Philippine Islands, and reinforces the Mutual Defense Treaty between the two nations. The treaty stipulates that both parties are obligated to defend the other if an armed attack is carried out “on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific.” This treaty would only be binding on the United States if the sovereignty of the Scarborough Shoal is finally determined and broadly recognized internationally.

Conclusion

It is easy to see a major confrontation over the sovereignty of Scarborough Shoal occurring this summer, as a confluence of events and legal decisions sets the stage for resolving a long standing dispute, one way or the other. China has used different strategies to advance its interests in the South China Sea. In the Paracel Islands, where China has legitimate legal and historic claims to at least some of the islands, military force was used to reinforce these claims. They fought and soundly beat the naval forces of the Republic of Vietnam in 1974 and immediately occupied the islands. In the Spratly Islands, China has used a mix of diplomacy, military force and the unprecedented efforts to build artificial islands, to claim sovereignty over these territories. Chinese claims in the Spratly Islands do not meet the legal requirements as stipulated in UNCLOS, and claims on historic grounds are quite flimsy and inconclusive. In this case, China has wisely decided to exercise sovereignty through island development and occupation.
Republic of the Philippines Marines practice small scale amphibious landing operations during Balikitan 2016.
Republic of the Philippines Marines practice small scale amphibious landing operations during Balikitan 2016.
China has chosen this last strategy in exerting sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, as its legal and historic claims carry no weight. Much hinges on the ruling of the PCA and Philippine efforts to garner international support via unilateral diplomatic efforts and through the United Nations, if the ruling of the arbitration turns out in their favor. If Philippine sovereignty is broadly accepted internationally, then a major military confrontation may be very probable. As the governments of China, the Philippines and the United States set their respective courses and continue to solidify their strategies over this territorial dispute, in consideration of broader regional and global strategic issues, the chances of a major military confrontation increase exponentially.
It is hard to conduct a simple cost-benefit analysis of a confrontation for any of the parties to this potential conflict, as it is impossible to know just how much any of these parties are willing to sacrifice in pursuit of their strategic aims. What is known, is the possible outcome of any military confrontation when carried to its furthest escalation; thermonuclear war between China and the United States. The U.S. test-launching of multiple Minuteman III ICBMs off the coast of California late last year, and the similar test-launch of a DF-41 ICBM into the South China Sea by China on April 12th, speak volumes as to the messages being sent by Washington D.C. and Beijing. Although successive Philippine administrations have been keen to deescalate the dispute in the past, the prospect of a major military installation of a foreign power being built only 130 miles from the national capitol, clearly changes the strategic calculus of Manila. One way of the other, a major compromise or escalation is bound to occur over the next few months.

Chinese state media blast U.S. Navy for 'menacing' China's sea claims David Larter, Navy Times

Chinese state media blast U.S. Navy for 'menacing' China's sea claims

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The U.S. Navy’s stepped up patrols in the South China Sea are getting under the skin of some Chinese leaders.
An outlet affiliated with the Chinese communist party implied the U.S. Navy’s patrols prompted the denial and blasted the Pacific Fleet for raising tensions in the region.The Stennis Carrier Strike Group has been in the South China Sea for more than a month and was denied a port visit to Hong Kong, a move that many saw as payback for the long patrol and a recent visit by Defense Secretary Ash Carter.
“The U.S. Pacific Fleet has now become the biggest source of such a pessimistic mentality for both countries,” Global Times wrote in a May 4 editorial. “While they have become accustomed to controversies such as human rights, trade frictions and diplomatic divergences on hot spots, the US abruptly started its menacing military deployment against China's offshore interests, showcasing its military muscle by sending naval vessels and warplanes to China.
“That seems to be changing the nature of the Sino-US frictions. Due to the severe strategic suspicions, military problems have unprecedentedly emerged between the two.”
Experts rely on editorials in state-approved media to gauge opinions inside the Chinese government.
China, which has been constructing islands and airstrips atop reefs and rocky outcroppings in the Spratly Islands, sees the whole South China Sea as its territory. Evidence is mounting that China also aims to build another island atop the Scarborough Shoal, an atoll just 140 miles from the Philippines’ capital of Manila and well within the Philippines' 200-mile exclusive economic zone.
Global Times is among the most hawkish voices within Chinese state media and the editorial reveals deep-seated frustrations within some elements of the Chinese government, especially the military, said Zhiqun Zhu, a political scientist who heads The China Institute at Bucknell University in Pennsylvania.
“In their views, U.S. military involvement in the South China Sea, especially U.S. Navy's freedom of navigation operations, have complicated the dispute and emboldened other claimants especially the Philippines to stand up against China,” Zhu said.
“The USS John C. Stennis’ port call on Hong Kong was denied exactly because of U.S. Navy's more frequent and active patrols in the region that are challenging Beijing's position,” he said. “This is a political statement. I think Beijing wants to see a decrease or more low-profile U.S. military activities in the region.”
The cancellation angered some U.S. officials and lawmakers, including Rep. Randy Forbes, R-Va., who is a member of the House Armed Services Committee. Forbes called for the U.S. to respond by considering a port visit to Taiwan, which would almost certainly infuriate Beijing.The canceled Hong Kong visit was the first time in three years the Chinese have canceled liberty call for U.S. sailors, but it is not unprecedented. The amphibious command ship Blue Ridge was in Hong Kong at the time, however, and its port visit was not affected.
"China has repeatedly politicized the long-standing use of Hong Kong for carrier port visits, inconveniencing the families of thousands of U.S. sailors and continuing a pattern of unnecessary and disruptive behavior,” Forbes said in a statement.
“As Beijing's direct control of Hong Kong intensifies, the U.S. Navy should strongly consider shifting its carrier port calls to more stable and welcoming locations. While China finds profit in needlessly harming our sailors' families, many U.S. allies and partners in the region, including Taiwan, would no doubt welcome our carriers and their crews with open arms. The time has come to consider these alternate locations going forward.”
That move would likely be a non-starter, said Bonnie Glaser, a China expert and director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
“The proposal that U.S. carriers should use ports in Taiwan instead of Hong Kong is unlikely to be considered,” Glaser said. “It would be among the most provocative actions that the U.S. could take from Beijing's point of view.
“It would be viewed as a direct challenge to Chinese sovereignty. … Such a move would be seen in Beijing as signaling U.S. support for Taiwan independence and emboldening [Taiwan’s new president] to challenge Beijing.”
Zhu, the Bucknell professor, said the flare-up shouldn’t have a lasting impact.
“As happened in the past, such incidents harm military relations in the short-term,” he said. “But it seems both militaries are playing down the incident. … So the militaries are keeping the doors open, which is good news.”

Tuesday, May 3, 2016

More than half of teens ‘addicted’ to phones, poll says

More than half of teens ‘addicted’ to phones, poll says

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The first step to recovery is admitting you have a problem. And that’s exactly what US teens are doing in a new poll on smartphone use, with more than half of those surveyed saying they feel “addicted” to their mobile devices.
The poll, conducted by nonprofit group Common Sense Media and published Tuesday, surveyed more than 1,200 teens and their parents in the hope of highlighting the impact media and technology can have on parent-child relationships. In the survey, 50 percent of teens and 59 percent of their parents agreed the teens were hooked on their phones.
Younger children fare little better. Kids between ages 8 and 12 reported spending nearly six hours a day plugged in, while those 13 to 18 clocked in at nine hours a day, according to Common Sense.
Parents didn’t escape criticism, either. Twenty-eight percent of teens faulted parents for checking their phones too often, and 27 percent of parents also acknowledged their own addictive use of mobile devices. Alarmingly, the majority of parents copped to checking their devices while behind the wheel. More than half of the teens said they’d seen their parents do so. 
Despite both groups claiming an awareness of excessive mobile device usage, conflict over the devices continues to plague many households. About a third of those polled noted daily arguments over screen time. Ironically, the survey points to many of those arguments arising from a breakdown in communication; 77 percent of parents said their teens seemed distracted by devices even during family time, and 41 percent of teens knocked their parents for similar preoccupation. 
“What we’ve discovered is that kids and parents feel addicted to their mobile devices,” said Common Sense CEO James Steyer in a statement. “It is causing daily conflict in homes, and . . . families are concerned about the consequences.”
In a separate review, Common Sense concluded that multitasking with mobile devices impairs individuals’ learning abilities, including their capacity for memorization and effective work habits. In addition, such habits get in the way of face-to-face conversation, particularly handicapping children’s ability to develop empathy.
Steyer added that he hopes the new poll will help equip parents with the necessary information to make responsible decisions about phone use. 
Ellen Wartella, director of Northwestern University’s Center on Media and Human Development, said in a statement that the results of the poll should worry parents, but she praised the survey for raising important issues. 
“It is a good thing that parents and educators are focused on kids’ social and emotional learning and asking the right questions — many of which we don’t know the answers to yet,” she said. “We need to devote more time and research to understanding the impact of media use on our kids and then adjust our behavior accordingly.”

Monday, May 2, 2016

SUCCESSFUL SIGNALING AT SCARBOROUGH SHOAL? ZACK COOPER AND JAKE DOUGLASMAY 2, 2016


SUCCESSFUL SIGNALING AT SCARBOROUGH SHOAL?

MAY 2, 2016
The United States may have just quietly deterred China. 
Critics are lining up to condemn the Obama administration’s apparent delay of a third freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea as yet another sign of weakness, but there is larger strategic game underway that may explain the administration’s decision. Other simultaneous U.S. actions may have deterred China from occupying and reclaiming land at Scarborough Shoal, a disputed atoll only 140 miles from Manila. If this hypothesis is correct, the administration deserves praise, not blame, for taking effective, measured steps to deter a potentially destabilizing Chinese escalation.
Before explaining this hypothesis in detail, it is necessary to explain why a Chinese move to occupy or reclaim Scarborough Shoal would be so provocative. First, Scarborough is a uniquely valuable piece of (mostly underwater) real estate. It is geographically isolated in the northeastern quadrant of the South China Sea, far from the main Spratly and Paracel island groups. If China constructs facilities on Scarborough akin to those it built in the Spratlys, then Chinese radar, aircraft, and cruise missiles could one day easily cover Manila and several Philippine bases to which the United States recently gained access. An outpost at Scarborough would also give Beijing a “strategic triangle” of airstrips in the South China Sea.
Additionally, establishing a base on the shoal would be a clear violation of the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which prohibits the occupation of currently uninhabited features. China seized administrative control of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012 following a failed U.S. effort to de-escalate a standoff, but the shoal has not been occupied by any claimant to date. Occupation of Scarborough would signal that China has little intention of ever concluding a binding Code of Conduct with its Southeast Asian neighbors, which has languished in negotiations for 14 years.
Finally, if it were to occur in the next few months, Chinese land reclamation at Scarborough would appear to be a deliberate challenge to the rules-based order. Observers are awaiting the result of a case that the Philippines has brought against China under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Among other findings, the Permanent Court of Arbitration could invalidate much of China’s “nine-dash line,” so land reclamation around the time of the decision would demonstrate the limits of international law in restraining Chinese maritime assertiveness. For all these reasons, Scarborough Shoal is not just another reef, but a vital strategic feature. Indeed, preventing Chinese reclamation at Scarborough is now seen by many in the region as a litmus test for U.S. resolve.
In spite of the clear rationale for a strong U.S. stance against Chinese reclamation at Scarborough, observers have found many of the Obama administration’s recent statements and actions on the issue “confusing and befuddling.” Earlier this year, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson publicly expressed concern that Scarborough might be a “next possible area of reclamation,” citing Chinese “survey” activity. However, President Obama conspicuously avoided mentioning both land reclamation and the South China Sea in joint remarks with Chinese president Xi Jinping shortly after Richardson’s comments. A senior U.S. official later explained that Washington sought to “lower the temperature” over Scarborough Shoal. Yet at the same time, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter postponed a visit to China, and the Stennis carrier strike group returned to the South China Sea just days after leaving, where it was very publicly visited by Carter and his Philippine counterpart, Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin. Notwithstanding Carter and other U.S. leaders repeatedly committing to “fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows,” Washington then reportedly canceled a FONOP near Mischief Reef. Meanwhile, U.S. Pacific Air Forces openly reported conducting flights by four A-10 Warthogs “in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal,” but Carter refused to confirm them before Congress. Amid these recriminations, a press story suggested that the White House had “muzzled” military leaders from speaking out against Chinese activities in the South China Sea, yet Pacific Command’s Admiral Harry Harris immediately denied the story’s veracity. What could possibly explain all these seeming inconsistencies?
Only one hypothesis seems to connect all these dots — and it makes the administration’s actions look coherent and strategic. A close reading of public statements suggests that earlier this year U.S. officials became aware of a potential Chinese plan to conduct reclamation at Scarborough Shoal. Around this time, press reports noted that Admiral Harris traveled to Washington for Scarborough-related discussions with other senior U.S. national security leaders, where they seem to have devised a sensible plan for deterring China at Scarborough. This plan relied on demonstrating not only that the United States would stomach some risk of military escalation to prevent reclamation there, but also that Washington would avoid overt public pressure and give Beijing a face-saving way to climb down the escalation ladder. U.S. intentions were likely plainly communicated to the Chinese behind closed doors. Since then, rumors have swirled that this pressure may have convinced Beijing to reevaluate its original plan for Scarborough, at least for the time being.
If this narrative is accurate, then we have a logical explanation for why the United States would send A-10s to Scarborough and a carrier strike group to the South China Sea while cancelling a FONOP. After all, while U.S. freedom of navigation operations are important signals for general deterrence, they have not deterred China from specific reclamation activities. Moreover, the most likely FONOP, one near Mischief Reef, would probably involve the conduct of normal military operations within 12 nautical miles of the reef, which could have triggered a major public reaction from Beijing. On the other hand, deploying multiple U.S. combat aircraft to a disputed feature is a highly unusual move, and the choice of the durable A-10 could signal the United States was prepared to take a hit.
Despite these strong U.S. moves, the A-10 flights near Scarborough Shoal were conducted with remarkably little publicity, particularly compared to the numerous leaks that preceded recent FONOPs. Avoiding a public spat with Beijing may have been important to give China an off-ramp to forgo reclamation at Scarborough. The Mischief Reef FONOP can always be conducted at another time once tensions have subsided. In the same vein, the so-called “gag order” on the military may have simply been an internal agreement to avoid public disclosure of this plan to maximize Beijing’s “political maneuvering space.”
If this reading of events is accurate, then the administration deserves credit for learning some important lessons from recent policy failures. First, it clearly communicated U.S. interests before Chinese activity began, rather than waiting for a Chinese fait accompli. Second, it practiced immediate deterrence by signaling that “specific actions will have specific consequences,” instead of trying to rely only on heretofore ineffective general deterrence. Third, and perhaps most important, Washington demonstrated that it was willing to accept some risk, by placing U.S. forces near Scarborough and elsewhere in the region to conduct operations continuously. Fourth, rather than drawing public red lines, the administration communicated its declaratory policy quietly — speaking softly but carrying a big stick, while still preserving some flexibility.
None of this suggests that competition over Scarborough Shoal is over. Only time will tell whether Beijing ultimately presses ahead to occupy or reclaim Scarborough. The full story may not be clear for some time, but after the failed negotiations in 2012, it appears Washington has adjusted its policies the second time around. Maintaining the status quo will require continued U.S. attention using this same sort of measured strategic approach. There may be tense exchanges ahead, but at least for now, reclamation at Scarborough Shoal is a dog that hasn’t barked.

Zack Cooper is a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Jake Douglas is a research assistant at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Image: U.S. Air Force photo by Capt. Susan Harrington