Thursday, November 16, 2017

FULL TEXT: Joint statement of the Phil & China @PhilstarNews Golez: Statement says: "addressing their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force" How come, per PRRD, Pres. Xi threatens war?



FULL TEXT: Joint statement of the Phil & China @PhilstarNews
Golez: Statement says: "addressing their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force" How come, per PRRD, Pres. Xi threatens war? https://t.co/9pSS9N4UqE
I quote from the Joint Statement, relevant to South China Sea dispute and joint development. I note that there is no mention of the Julyt 12, 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Ruling:
"13. Both sides note that the situation in the South China Sea has become generally more stable as a result of joint cooperative efforts between the Philippines, China, and other ASEAN Member States. Both sides welcome the implementation of the consensus between President Rodrigo Roa Duterte and President Xi Jinping to establish a Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea as a way to manage and prevent incidents at sea, enhance maritime dialogue and cooperation, and pursue a stable growth of bilateral relations. Both sides agree to strengthen maritime cooperation in areas such as marine environmental protection, disaster risk reduction, including possible cooperation in marine scientific research, subject to further consultations.
"14. Both sides may explore means to cooperate with each other in other possible maritime activities including maritime oil and gas exploration and exploitation, in
accordance with the respective national laws and regulations of the two countries and international law including the 1982 UNCLOS, and without prejudice to the
respective positions of the two countries on sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction. Both sides further agree to continue to actively advance consultations
and negotiations on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea and ensure the full and effective implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea (DOC) in its entirety.
"15. Both sides affirm that contentious maritime issues are not the sum total of the Philippines-China bilateral relationship. Both sides also reaffirm the importance of
maintaining and promoting regional peace and stability, freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the South China Sea as well as freedom of commerce and
other peaceful uses, addressing their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly
consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations and the 1982 UNCLOS. Both sides agree to continue discussions on confidence-building measures to increase mutual trust and
confidence and to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities in the South China Sea that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability."


FULL TEXT: Joint statement of the Philippines and China 

 18  258 googleplus0  0 
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, center, escorted by Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, reviews troops during a welcome ceremony at Malacanang Palace grounds in Manila, Philippines, Wednesday, Nov. 15, 2017. Li is on an official visit to the country. AP/Bullit Marquez
MANILA, Philippines — The Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China issued a joint statement following the official visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to Manila.
Li held a bilateral meeting with President Rodrigo Duterte and met with Senate President Aquilino Pimentel III and House Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez.
X

A total of 14 cooperation documents were signed during the meeting of Duterte and Li.
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Read the joint statement below.
1. Upon the invitation of H.E. Rodrigo Roa Duterte, President of the Republic of the Philippines, H.E. Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, paid an Official Visit to the Philippines from 15 to 16 November 2017.
During the visit, Premier Li Keqiang held a bilateral meeting with President Duterte, and had meetings respectively with the Honorable Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III and the Honorable House Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez. The leaders exchanged views on Philippines-China relations as well as regional and international issues.
Headlines ( Article MRec ), pagematch: 1, sectionmatch: 1
2. Both sides recognize that the bilateral relations have achieved positive turnaround and momentum through the joint efforts of both sides. Mutual trust has been increasingly deepened, practical cooperation resulted in meaningful gains, and maritime dialogue and cooperation has progressed. This brought forth tangible benefits for both sides and made significant contributions to peace, stability, and development in the region.
3. Both sides agree to advance Philippines-China relations in a sustained and pragmatic manner on the basis of mutual respect, sincerity, equality, and mutual benefit.
4. Both sides agree to enhance high-level exchanges. The two leaders will maintain close communication through bilateral visits, phone calls, letters, and meetings on the sidelines of multilateral occasions, so as to further deepen the growth of bilateral relations. The Philippines reaffirms its adherence to the One-China policy.
5. Both sides recognize the potential of the Philippine development plans and the Belt and Road Initiative, and their synergies with the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity.
6. Both sides agree to implement the Six-Year Development Program for Trade and Economic Cooperation (2017-2022), press ahead with cooperation in key areas of infrastructure, production capacity, investment, commerce, trade, agriculture, livelihood, culture and people-to-people exchange, and jointly formulate and implement a Program on Philippines-China Industrial Park Development.
7. Both sides agree to enhance cooperation in defense and law enforcement. The Philippines appreciates the assistance from China in the fight against terrorism in Marawi and in the construction of two drug rehabilitation centers in Mindanao. China reiterates its firm support and assistance to the Philippines’ fight against
terrorism and drug-related crimes, and the quick recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of Marawi City.
8. Both sides agree to speed up procedures to facilitate the implementation of projects such as the New Centennial Water Source – Kaliwa Dam Project, Chico River Pump Irrigation Project, the Philippine National Railways South Long Haul Project and the construction of the Binondo-Intramuros and Estrella-Pantaleon Bridges, in accordance with the related exchange of letters and agreements signed during the visit. Both sides agree to identify and facilitate the implementation of the second batch of priority cooperation projects. Both sides agree that infrastructure projects jointly undertaken will be subject to proper procurement process, transparency, and in compliance with relevant domestic laws and regulations, and international practices and standards.
9. Both sides acknowledge the potential cooperation in the areas of commerce, trade, investment, shipping, customs, trade facilitation, and quality inspection. China will continue to encourage and support Chinese enterprises to expand investment in the Philippines, import more quality products from the Philippines and upgrade the scale and quality of trade and investment between the two countries. Both sides will continue to provide an enabling environment for their enterprises to invest in each other’s country.
10. Both sides agree to strengthen cooperation on agriculture and fisheries. China is willing to support the Philippines to develop science and technology-driven agriculture, improve rice production capacity, and offer funding and technical support to the agriculture and fisheries industry of the Philippines.
11. Both sides agree to strengthen people-to-people cooperation in areas such as in education, culture, health, tourism, and sports. Both sides agree to strengthen
cooperation in tourism infrastructure development. Both sides are encouraged by the opening of new direct flights between secondary cities, and agree to support
more direct flights in order to increase two-way tourism.
12. The Philippines welcomes the establishment of a Chinese Consulate-General in Davao City. Proper arrangements for the diplomatic premises in both countries will be made in the spirit of the 1975 Joint Communiqué, on the basis of international practice and reciprocity, with priority for the most immediate concerns.
13. Both sides note that the situation in the South China Sea has become generally more stable as a result of joint cooperative efforts between the Philippines, China, and other ASEAN Member States. Both sides welcome the implementation of the consensus between President Rodrigo Roa Duterte and President Xi Jinping to establish a Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea as a way to manage and prevent incidents at sea, enhance maritime dialogue and cooperation, and pursue a stable growth of bilateral relations. Both sides agree to strengthen maritime cooperation in areas such as marine environmental protection, disaster risk reduction, including possible cooperation in marine scientific research, subject to further consultations.
14. Both sides may explore means to cooperate with each other in other possible maritime activities including maritime oil and gas exploration and exploitation, in
accordance with the respective national laws and regulations of the two countries and international law including the 1982 UNCLOS, and without prejudice to the
respective positions of the two countries on sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction. Both sides further agree to continue to actively advance consultations
and negotiations on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea and ensure the full and effective implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea (DOC) in its entirety.
15. Both sides affirm that contentious maritime issues are not the sum total of the Philippines-China bilateral relationship. Both sides also reaffirm the importance of
maintaining and promoting regional peace and stability, freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the South China Sea as well as freedom of commerce and
other peaceful uses, addressing their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly
consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations and the 1982 UNCLOS. Both sides agree to continue discussions on confidence-building measures to increase mutual trust and
confidence and to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities in the South China Sea that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.
16. Both sides reaffirm their cooperation in regional and multilateral organizations, and agree to strengthen coordination and cooperation under various multilateral
frameworks such as the United Nations (UN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Europe Meeting
(ASEM), among others, and stay in close communication and support each other on major issues of shared concern.
17. China congratulates the Philippines on the success of its chairmanship of ASEAN 2017 and its successful hosting of the ASEAN, ASEAN-China, ASEAN Plus Three,
and East Asia Summits. China expresses appreciation for the active and significant role played by the Philippines in promoting ASEAN-China relations, in particular,
and East Asia cooperation. The Philippines appreciates China’s support and assistance to the Philippines’ chairmanship of ASEAN and its contribution to
regional and global economic growth.
18. Both sides welcome the signing during the visit of various agreements and memoranda of understanding, as listed in the Annex.
19. Both sides agree that the successful visit of Premier Li Keqiang will contribute to the advancement of friendship between the Philippines and China, as well as the deepening of cooperation between the two countries.
20. On behalf of the Chinese government and people, Premier Li Keqiang appreciates the warm and friendly hospitality accorded by President Rodrigo Roa Duterte and the Philippine government and people.

Golez: CHINA WILL PROTECT SOUTH CHINA SEA? WILL THE FOX PROTECT THE CHICKEN IN THE CHICKEN COOP? IT'S FOX GOBBLING UP THE CHICKEN, SAME WAY CHINA GOBBLING UP SCS! 😂😂😂😡😡😡"China premier says will protect South China Sea freedom of navigation"



Golez: CHINA WILL PROTECT SOUTH CHINA SEA? WILL THE FOX PROTECT THE CHICKEN IN THE CHICKEN COOP? IT'S FOX GOBBLING UP THE CHICKEN, SAME WAY CHINA GOBBLING UP SCS!  ðŸ˜‚😂😂😡😡😡"China premier says will protect South China Sea freedom of navigation" 


China premier says will protect South China Sea freedom of navigation



BEIJING (Reuters) - China will firmly safeguard freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, Premier Li Keqiang said on Tuesday at a regional summit in Manila, state news agency Xinhua reported.

“Li said China is the largest country in the South China Sea and a major nation that uses the lanes in the sea, thus China shows more interest in safeguarding peace, stability, and navigation freedom in the South China Sea than any other country in the world,” Xinhua said.

Golez: CODE (COC) TO PROHIBIT ACTS ON REEFS, SHOALS, ETC, W/C CHINA RECLAMATION ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED, THUS MOOT & ACADEMIC FOR CHINA. CODE MAY EVEN WORK AGAINST PH INTERESTS.




Golez: CODE (COC) TO PROHIBIT ACTS ON REEFS, SHOALS, ETC, W/C CHINA RECLAMATION ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED, THUS MOOT & ACADEMIC FOR CHINA. CODE MAY EVEN WORK AGAINST PH INTERESTS. @inquirerdotnet Asean, China to start talks on code of conduct over sea dispute https://t.co/fd0Z3jFABe

The 2002 ASEAN-CHINA DECLARATION ON THE CONDUCT OF PARTIES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA called for the adoption of a Code of Conduct to establish how the parties should conduct themselves in the South China Sea, especially on territorial and sea matters, This 2002 Declaration provided the following (Paragraph 5):

"5. The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner."
China flagrantly violated the above with their massive reclamation projects and artificial island building. These are among the prohibited acts contemplated in the proposed Code of Conduct. For 15 years, China avoided discussions on the proposed Code of Conduct and now appears to agree only after completing their massive island building projects expected to be soon militarized.
What could happen with the Code of Conduct, once crafted and approved, is that it is the other countries, like the Philippines, that would be prohibited from doing certain acts, like improving and maintaining facilities, to our great disadvantage and jeopardy. While China would go scot free having achieved already their plan in the South China Sea aimed at militarizing the region to the detriment of the Philippines and other countries.
Therefore, the Code of Conduct will just favor China's fait accompli and will be against our national interest.


Asean, China to start talks on code of conduct over sea dispute
By: Jhoanna Ballaran - Reporter / @JhoannaBINQ
INQUIRER.net / 12:41 PM November 13, 2017

This July 20, 2011 file aerial photo, taken through the window of a closed aircraft, shows Pag-asa Island, part of the disputed Spratly group of islands, in the South China Sea located off the coast of western Philippines. (AP FILE PHOTO)
The leaders of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) and China are set to announce on Monday the beginning of talks over the long-overdue code of conduct (COC) on the disputed South China Sea (SCS), citing the importance of maintaining stability in the region.
In a draft statement obtained by INQUIRER.net, the Asean and China are expected to adopt “in its entirety” the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the disputed waters adopted by the foreign ministers of Asean member countries and China in August.
According to the document, the Asean is “pleased to announce that as a next step, Asean Member States have agreed to officially commence negotiations with China on the COC.”
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“While the situation is calmer now, we cannot take the current progress for granted. [It is] important that we cooperate to maintain peace, stability, freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the SCS, in accordance with international law, including the 1982 [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea],” the draft statement also read.
“It is in our collective interest to avoid miscalculations that could lead to escalation of tensions. We therefore reiterate our commitment to fully and effectively implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC) in its entirety,” it added.
The details of the framework are still unknown as it has not been made public yet.
The Asean welcomed the developments between the bloc and China on the issue, calling it an “important milestone” in the parties’ relation.


“Trust that we will continue this positive momentum and work towards a substantive and effective COC,” the draft statement noted.
The Asean also said it is looking forward to the “early conclusion” of the COC.
The statement is expected to be read at the 20th Asean-China summit to be attended by leaders of the Asean member states with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. The meet is part of the 31st Asean Summit and Related Summit currently being held in different venues in Manila.
The call for the Asean and China to come up with a COC has increased as tensions arise between and among the states—including Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei—claiming parts of the disputed sea, which China wholly claims.
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The Philippine has questioned China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea before the United Nations-backed arbitral tribunal in The Hague and scored a victory against China.                      /kga
Check out our Asean 2017 special site for important information and latest news on the 31st Asean Summit to be held in Manila on Nov. 13-15, 2017. Visit http://inquirer.net/asean-2017.





Wednesday, November 15, 2017

These 5 Things Could Challenge China's Rise 1. Geography: Limited open-ocean access 2. US: advantages in GDP, military, alliances 3. The Rise & Return of Other Major Powers: Japan, India 4. Separatism: Tibet, Xinjiang5. Economic Stability slowing down



These 5 Things Could Challenge China's Rise
1. Geography: Limited open-ocean access
2. US: advantages in GDP, military, alliances
3. The Rise & Return of Other Major Powers: Japan, India
4. Separatism: Tibet, Xinjiang5. Economic Stability slowing down
https://t.co/mIwwVWwvEE via scout media
I quote from the article:
1. CHINA'S ENORMOUS JOB CREATION NEEDS: "During his presidency, George W. Bush famously asked Hu Jintao, then president of China, what kept him up at night. Hu replied that it was job creation: how would he be sure that he could provide employment for the twenty-five million people entering the workforce every year?"
"Hu’s China was a different era. The “peaceful rise of China” has given way to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and, at the 19th Party Congress last month, Xi Jinping unequivocally stated that China will now be “moving closer to center stage.”
"Today, displays of Chinese confidence abound, from the South China Sea to its first overseas military base, from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, to the Belt and Road initiative, the architecture of China’s global footprint is increasingly revealed. How much has changed for China’s leadership? Despite a climate of outward confidence, there is still much that troubles the minds of China’s highest governing circles.""
"As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gets back to business following an illuminating Party Congress, we’ve picked five items that are keenly on their minds: geography, the United States, the rise and return of other powers, “separatism” and economic stability."
THESE 5 THINGS COULD CHALLENGE CHINA'S RISE 
1. GEOGRAPHY: YET CHINA’S OPEN-OCEAN ACCESS IS REMARKABLY LIMITED. FROM THE EAST, SHIPS MUST PASS THROUGH STRAITS BORDERED BY POTENTIALLY HOSTILE ENTITIES—JAPAN AND TAIWAN. FROM THE WEST, ACCESS TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA IS ESSENTIALLY RESTRICTED TO THE STRAIT OF MALACCA, SUNDA STRAIT AND LOMBOK STRAIT.
"What motivates Chinese expansion and assertiveness? While much has been written on fishing rights, hydrocarbon resources, and historic territorial claims, less explored is a more comprehensive theme: unfavorable strategic geography.
"China is now world’s largest trading nation; its continued prosperity relies on open sea lines of communication. Yet China’s open-ocean access is remarkably limited. From the east, ships must pass through straits bordered by potentially hostile entities—Japan and Taiwan. From the west, access to the South China Sea is essentially restricted to the Strait of Malacca, Sunda Strait and Lombok Strait.
"In combating this strategic vulnerability, often characterized by the “Malacca Dilemma,” China’s massive naval construction, island building in the South China Sea, and Belt and Road initiative should be viewed as a singular policy. Take energy. China imported oil to meet approximately 64 percent of its need in 2016, a figure projected to grow to 80 percent by 2035, according to the International Energy Agency. It is no coincidence that the Belt and Road’s flagship project—the China Pakistan Economic Corridor—is centered on transportation-and-energy infrastructure from Gwadar to Xinjiang, diversifying China’s supply routes. Where China invests, its military follows. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recently opened its first overseas base in Djibouti, itself located off a strategic choke point, and a move that builds upon PLA Navy’s Indian Ocean deployments and contributions to anti-piracy operations. A succinct strategy emerges, illuminating China’s whole-of-government approach to “active defense.”
"China’s global expansion is often viewed as a sign of developing strength. It should also be a recognition of growing insecurity reflected in its expanded global interests. That the success of Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” largely flows through a few maritime chokepoints, undoubtedly gives Chinese leaders pause.
2. THE UNITED STATES: THE UNITED STATES RETAINS ADVANTAGES OVER CHINA IN TERMS OF REAL GDP, MILITARY CAPABILITY, GLOBAL ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS, AND SHEER EXPERIENCE OF POWER PROJECTION BOTH IN ASIA AND AROUND THE WORLD.
“One day, sooner or later, America will certainly let go of the West Pacific places and withdraw back home, just like it has had to let go of other regions in the world.” — Mao Zedong, Founder of the People’s Republic of China
"Whether U.S. policymakers like it or not, the CCP’s vision includes the displacement of the United States in Asia. What has changed is that China is now not only an Asian power, but a major global actor. As referred to in our first section, the resource needs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) cannot be met from within China’s borders. The rise of the Chinese military will track the needs of Chinese trade and will eventually require substantial global capabilities. However, China must proceed to build up both its economy and its military in the shadow of the dominant superpower, the United States, without provoking a response that could imperil China’s rise."
"The United States retains advantages over China in terms of real GDP, military capability, global alliances and partnerships, and sheer experience of power projection both in Asia and around the world. However, the United States is a distracted giant, with competing national priorities. China’s leadership must already navigate with caution when rising within the shadow of a Pax Americana. What China’s leadership fears is that the United States might make some unpleasant conclusions about the nature of China’s rise, and China’s challenge to U.S. leadership. Two possibilities include surrounding China’s periphery with missile defense, or economic retaliation."
"China’s leadership has identified a “period of strategic opportunity” in which the rise of China is likely to be uncontested. While China appears bold or “assertive” in its initiatives from South China Sea island-building to the Belt and Road, these are calculated risks, designed to advance China’s ambitions without provoking the United States beyond what the PRC can handle."
3. THE RISE AND RETURN OF OTHER MAJOR POWERS: THE PRC WILL HAVE TO CONTEND NOT ONLY WITH THE UNITED STATES, BUT WITH A CONSTELLATION OF OTHER MAJOR STATES, MANY OF WHICH ARE BEGINNING TO BAND TOGETHER TO BALANCE THE PRC OUT OF CONCERN OVER CHINA’S ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AMBITIONS
"The potential trajectory of U.S.-China relations has been compared by Henry Kissinger to the rise of Germany and its clash with Britain during World War I. However, as an American scholar explained at Oxford several years ago, there is a crucial difference between the rise of China and Germany. The German state was coming to power amidst collapsing empires on the European continent: both the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empire were in decline. China, however, comes to power surrounded by other strong and rising nations."
"In short, China’s rise is not taking place within a vacuum. The PRC will have to contend not only with the United States, but with a constellation of other major states, many of which are beginning to band together to balance the PRC out of concern over China’s economic and military ambitions. Moreover, each of these states has a comparative geographical advantage over the PRC, which further complicates China’s geographical dilemmas."
"The Indian Ocean Region, a region on which China depends for trade flows and energy resources, is home to a rising India, which will project military and economic power in conjunction with the United States, Australia, Japan and other democratic stakeholders. Japan may not be a rising nation, but it is a strong one, and its U.S. alliance notwithstanding, could arguably hold its own in a fight with the PRC. Indonesia is a rising power, approaching the one trillion dollar mark in GDP, building up its naval forces, and party to maritime disputes, which may push it towards a balancing camp vis-à-vis China. Russia, while demographically troubled and economically stagnant, remains a military power par excellence. While China-Russia military and economic cooperation is substantial at present, Russia’s long-term alignment to Chinese interests is uncertain, further reminding us that China’s rise takes place within a multitude of nations that are powerful and potentially dangerous to the PRC."
"Fears of American-led “encirclement” or “containment” have been present in the Politburo since the founding decades of the PRC. Today, other substantial powers are acting on their own in ways that will strengthen their position regarding Chinese economic and military power. While China’s spokespeople and general public often attack American collaboration with other Asian countries as ‘Cold War thinking” and seem to genuinely miss that China’s own actions and territorial claims drive opinion and collective action against the PRC, there is no doubt that the gathering collaboration of other major actors is one of the core problem sets that troubles the CCP."
4. SEPARATISM
“Formosa, the Pescadores, the Four Northeastern Provinces, [Manchuria], Inner and Outer Mongolia, [Xinjiang], and Tibet are each a fortress essential for the nation’s defense and security. The separation of any one of these regions from the rest of the country means the disruption of our national defenses.” — Chiang Kai-Shek, China’s Destiny, 1947
"Chinese budgets on internal security are similar to its military—an insight into the pressures of internal stability. From Xinjiang to Tibet, Hong Kong to Taiwan, China’s fear of domestic fracture persists even as Chinese focus on the outside world increases. China’s 2015 Military Strategy emphasizes the “formidable task” of maintaining “political security and social stability,” citing Tibetan and Uighur independence movements. Moreover, CCP thinking on “separatism” is continually suspicious of, in their own words, “anti-China forces [that] have never given up their attempt to instigate a ‘color revolution’ in this country.”
"What the CCP does in one region is noticed in others. The failure to faithfully implement the “One China, Two Systems” policy in Hong Kong reverberates in Taiwan: speaking with numerous Taiwanese citizens in 2014, one author found that there was concern over “香港化,” or “Hong Kong-ization,” a realization that any eventual unification with the mainland implies the loss of any promised freedoms."
"As Hong Kong’s “Umbrella Movement” reveals, a local identity is emerging in the city. Demographic transformation is even more visible in Taiwan. In 2016, 59 percent of Taiwan residents claimed exclusive Taiwanese identity, up from 18 percent in 1992, and only 3 percent identify as Chinese. CCP hopes of economic integration have not led to political assimilation."
"Why go through the trouble? Politically, “national rejuvenation” cannot be achieved without complete unification. This also holds true strategically. Taiwan is key to the first island chain, and its control would make China masters of the near seas. According to a Chinese military manual, “As soon as Taiwan is reunified with Mainland China, Japan’s maritime lines of communication will fall completely within the striking ranges of China’s fighters and bombers.” Here, political and strategic incentives align. In Xinjiang, as well, internal and external security are linked. China Pakistan Economic Corridor, China’s main bid for land-based access to the Indian Ocean Region and its energy resources, hinges not only on troubled Pakistan but on China’s continued control of its northwest province. Despite massive Han immigration to Xinjiang and Tibet, only 6 percent of the population of the PRC is located in the Western half of the country, where non-Han ethnic identities remain strong, despite suppression campaigns."
5. ECONOMIC STABILITY: CHINESE ECONOMIC GROWTH IS SLOWING DOWN.
"Chinese economic growth is slowing down. The CCP is in the midst of what economists call an “economic rebalance,” which means that it is shifting its economic engines from an export-driven to consumer-driven model. On top of this, China faces a very large and growing debt burden, concentrated in State Owned Enterprises. While the government has a number of fiscal and monetary tools at its disposal, China may soon have a credit crisis on its hands as asset bubbles pop or debt burdens become unsustainable. Despite calls for reform over stimulus, real structural reform has yet to take place, as evidenced by the continuous sprawl of ghost cities, ongoing support for inefficient companies, and persistence of nonperforming and special-mention loans. The continuance of the status quo will only make the transition harder as stimulus loses its potency and debt burdens grow."
"New initiatives such as Made in China 2025 are designed to move China up the value chain, and a global quest for technology acquisitions, both in the United States, and especially in Europe, shows that the CCP is looking for ways to ensure it makes the transition, increasing productivity, and avoiding an economic downturn. However, this is a herculean task that will occupy CCP brainpower for years to come."
Conclusion
"China’s rise exists in the midst of major problem sets that will make the completion of the CCP’s “national rejuvenation” difficult. While the rise of China marks a historic shift in the world’s balance of power, it is also possible that the balance of power overall will eventually turn against the PRC as more and more nations come to understand the meaning of Xi Jinping’s “China Dream.” In addition to gathering reactions to Chinese military buildup and economic coercion, countries have begun to react against China’s export of its domestic ideologies. We have tried to lay out some of what the PRC already does fear. There are also things which China should fear. Namely, that the wider world begins to make hard decisions about the nature of China’s aspirations, and that it begins to look for options to check or prevent a world marked by Chinese “comprehensive national power.” What the CCP should fear is that its “period of strategic opportunity” ends, and that the world wakes up.
"
Dr. Jonathan Ward is the founder of Atlas Organization, a consultancy on China, India and the Indo-Pacific Region. He received his PhD in China-India relations from the University of Oxford and his undergraduate degree from Columbia University. He speaks Chinese, Russian, and Arabic, and has traveled widely in China, India, and the Indo-Pacific Region.
Reed Simmons is an officer in the U.S Navy. He is a graduate of Harvard University. The views and opinions expressed herein by the author do not represent the policies or position of the U.S Department of Defense or the U.S Navy, and are the sole responsibility of the authors.


These 5 Things Could Challenge China's Rise 

  By Jonathan Ward and Reed Simmons During his presidency, George W. Bush famously asked Hu Jintao, then president of China, what kept him up at night. Hu replied 

F/A-18 Super Hornet
An F/A-18 Super Hornet lands on the deck of the USS Ronald Reagan in the South China Sea September 30, 2017. (Photo: REUTERS/Bobby Yip, 247Sports)

By Jonathan Ward and Reed Simmons
During his presidency, George W. Bush famously asked Hu Jintao, then president of China, what kept him up at night. Hu replied that it was job creation: how would he be sure that he could provide employment for the twenty-five million people entering the workforce every year?
Hu’s China was a different era. The “peaceful rise of China” has given way to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and, at the 19th Party Congress last month, Xi Jinping unequivocally stated that China will now be “moving closer to center stage.”
Today, displays of Chinese confidence abound, from the South China Sea to its first overseas military base, from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, to the Belt and Road initiative, the architecture of China’s global footprint is increasingly revealed. How much has changed for China’s leadership? Despite a climate of outward confidence, there is still much that troubles the minds of China’s highest governing circles.
As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gets back to business following an illuminating Party Congress, we’ve picked five items that are keenly on their minds: geography, the United States, the rise and return of other powers, “separatism” and economic stability.
Geography
What motivates Chinese expansion and assertiveness? While much has been written on fishing rights, hydrocarbon resources, and historic territorial claims, less explored is a more comprehensive theme: unfavorable strategic geography.
China is now world’s largest trading nation; its continued prosperity relies on open sea lines of communication. Yet China’s open-ocean access is remarkably limited. From the east, ships must pass through straits bordered by potentially hostile entities—Japan and Taiwan. From the west, access to the South China Sea is essentially restricted to the Strait of Malacca, Sunda Strait and Lombok Strait.
In combating this strategic vulnerability, often characterized by the “Malacca Dilemma,” China’s massive naval construction, island building in the South China Sea, and Belt and Road initiative should be viewed as a singular policy. Take energy. China imported oil to meet approximately 64 percent of its need in 2016, a figure projected to grow to 80 percent by 2035, according to the International Energy Agency. It is no coincidence that the Belt and Road’s flagship project—the China Pakistan Economic Corridor—is centered on transportation-and-energy infrastructure from Gwadar to Xinjiang, diversifying China’s supply routes. Where China invests, its military follows. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recently opened its first overseas base in Djibouti, itself located off a strategic choke point, and a move that builds upon PLA Navy’s Indian Ocean deployments and contributions to anti-piracy operations. A succinct strategy emerges, illuminating China’s whole-of-government approach to “active defense.”
China’s global expansion is often viewed as a sign of developing strength. It should also be a recognition of growing insecurity reflected in its expanded global interests. That the success of Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” largely flows through a few maritime chokepoints, undoubtedly gives Chinese leaders pause.
The United States
“One day, sooner or later, America will certainly let go of the West Pacific places and withdraw back home, just like it has had to let go of other regions in the world.” — Mao Zedong, Founder of the People’s Republic of China
Whether U.S. policymakers like it or not, the CCP’s vision includes the displacement of the United States in Asia. What has changed is that China is now not only an Asian power, but a major global actor. As referred to in our first section, the resource needs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) cannot be met from within China’s borders. The rise of the Chinese military will track the needs of Chinese trade and will eventually require substantial global capabilities. However, China must proceed to build up both its economy and its military in the shadow of the dominant superpower, the United States, without provoking a response that could imperil China’s rise.
The United States retains advantages over China in terms of real GDP, military capability, global alliances and partnerships, and sheer experience of power projection both in Asia and around the world. However, the United States is a distracted giant, with competing national priorities. China’s leadership must already navigate with caution when rising within the shadow of a Pax Americana. What China’s leadership fears is that the United States might make some unpleasant conclusions about the nature of China’s rise, and China’s challenge to U.S. leadership. Two possibilities include surrounding China’s periphery with missile defense, or economic retaliation.
China’s leadership has identified a “period of strategic opportunity” in which the rise of China is likely to be uncontested. While China appears bold or “assertive” in its initiatives from South China Sea island-building to the Belt and Road, these are calculated risks, designed to advance China’s ambitions without provoking the United States beyond what the PRC can handle.
The Rise and Return of Other Major Powers
The potential trajectory of U.S.-China relations has been compared by Henry Kissinger to the rise of Germany and its clash with Britain during World War I. However, as an American scholar explained at Oxford several years ago, there is a crucial difference between the rise of China and Germany. The German state was coming to power amidst collapsing empires on the European continent: both the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empire were in decline. China, however, comes to power surrounded by other strong and rising nations.
In short, China’s rise is not taking place within a vacuum. The PRC will have to contend not only with the United States, but with a constellation of other major states, many of which are beginning to band together to balance the PRC out of concern over China’s economic and military ambitions. Moreover, each of these states has a comparative geographical advantage over the PRC, which further complicates China’s geographical dilemmas.
The Indian Ocean Region, a region on which China depends for trade flows and energy resources, is home to a rising India, which will project military and economic power in conjunction with the United States, Australia, Japan and other democratic stakeholders. Japan may not be a rising nation, but it is a strong one, and its U.S. alliance notwithstanding, could arguably hold its own in a fight with the PRC. Indonesia is a rising power, approaching the one trillion dollar mark in GDP, building up its naval forces, and party to maritime disputes, which may push it towards a balancing camp vis-à-vis China. Russia, while demographically troubled and economically stagnant, remains a military power par excellence. While China-Russia military and economic cooperation is substantial at present, Russia’s long-term alignment to Chinese interests is uncertain, further reminding us that China’s rise takes place within a multitude of nations that are powerful and potentially dangerous to the PRC.
Fears of American-led “encirclement” or “containment” have been present in the Politburo since the founding decades of the PRC. Today, other substantial powers are acting on their own in ways that will strengthen their position regarding Chinese economic and military power. While China’s spokespeople and general public often attack American collaboration with other Asian countries as ‘Cold War thinking” and seem to genuinely miss that China’s own actions and territorial claims drive opinion and collective action against the PRC, there is no doubt that the gathering collaboration of other major actors is one of the core problem sets that troubles the CCP.
Separatism
“Formosa, the Pescadores, the Four Northeastern Provinces, [Manchuria], Inner and Outer Mongolia, [Xinjiang], and Tibet are each a fortress essential for the nation’s defense and security. The separation of any one of these regions from the rest of the country means the disruption of our national defenses.” — Chiang Kai-Shek, China’s Destiny, 1947
Chinese budgets on internal security are similar to its military—an insight into the pressures of internal stability. From Xinjiang to Tibet, Hong Kong to Taiwan, China’s fear of domestic fracture persists even as Chinese focus on the outside world increases. China’s 2015 Military Strategy emphasizes the “formidable task” of maintaining “political security and social stability,” citing Tibetan and Uighur independence movements. Moreover, CCP thinking on “separatism” is continually suspicious of, in their own words, “anti-China forces [that] have never given up their attempt to instigate a ‘color revolution’ in this country.”
What the CCP does in one region is noticed in others. The failure to faithfully implement the “One China, Two Systems” policy in Hong Kong reverberates in Taiwan: speaking with numerous Taiwanese citizens in 2014, one author found that there was concern over “香港化,” or “Hong Kong-ization,” a realization that any eventual unification with the mainland implies the loss of any promised freedoms.
As Hong Kong’s “Umbrella Movement” reveals, a local identity is emerging in the city. Demographic transformation is even more visible in Taiwan. In 2016, 59 percent of Taiwan residents claimed exclusive Taiwanese identity, up from 18 percent in 1992, and only 3 percent identify as Chinese. CCP hopes of economic integration have not led to political assimilation.
Why go through the trouble? Politically, “national rejuvenation” cannot be achieved without complete unification. This also holds true strategically. Taiwan is key to the first island chain, and its control would make China masters of the near seas. According to a Chinese military manual, “As soon as Taiwan is reunified with Mainland China, Japan’s maritime lines of communication will fall completely within the striking ranges of China’s fighters and bombers.” Here, political and strategic incentives align. In Xinjiang, as well, internal and external security are linked. China Pakistan Economic Corridor, China’s main bid for land-based access to the Indian Ocean Region and its energy resources, hinges not only on troubled Pakistan but on China’s continued control of its northwest province. Despite massive Han immigration to Xinjiang and Tibet, only 6 percent of the population of the PRC is located in the Western half of the country, where non-Han ethnic identities remain strong, despite suppression campaigns.
Economic Stability
Chinese economic growth is slowing down. The CCP is in the midst of what economists call an “economic rebalance,” which means that it is shifting its economic engines from an export-driven to consumer-driven model. On top of this, China faces a very large and growing debt burden, concentrated in State Owned Enterprises. While the government has a number of fiscal and monetary tools at its disposal, China may soon have a credit crisis on its hands as asset bubbles pop or debt burdens become unsustainable. Despite calls for reform over stimulus, real structural reform has yet to take place, as evidenced by the continuous sprawl of ghost cities, ongoing support for inefficient companies, and persistence of nonperforming and special-mention loans. The continuance of the status quo will only make the transition harder as stimulus loses its potency and debt burdens grow.
New initiatives such as Made in China 2025 are designed to move China up the value chain, and a global quest for technology acquisitions, both in the United States, and especially in Europe, shows that the CCP is looking for ways to ensure it makes the transition, increasing productivity, and avoiding an economic downturn. However, this is a herculean task that will occupy CCP brainpower for years to come.
Conclusion
China’s rise exists in the midst of major problem sets that will make the completion of the CCP’s “national rejuvenation” difficult. While the rise of China marks a historic shift in the world’s balance of power, it is also possible that the balance of power overall will eventually turn against the PRC as more and more nations come to understand the meaning of Xi Jinping’s “China Dream.” In addition to gathering reactions to Chinese military buildup and economic coercion, countries have begun to react against China’s export of its domestic ideologies. We have tried to lay out some of what the PRC already does fear. There are also things which China should fear. Namely, that the wider world begins to make hard decisions about the nature of China’s aspirations, and that it begins to look for options to check or prevent a world marked by Chinese “comprehensive national power.” What the CCP should fear is that its “period of strategic opportunity” ends, and that the world wakes up.
Dr. Jonathan Ward is the founder of Atlas Organization, a consultancy on China, India and the Indo-Pacific Region. He received his PhD in China-India relations from the University of Oxford and his undergraduate degree from Columbia University. He speaks Chinese, Russian, and Arabic, and has traveled widely in China, India, and the Indo-Pacific Region.
Reed Simmons is an officer in the U.S Navy. He is a graduate of Harvard University. The views and opinions expressed herein by the author do not represent the policies or position of the U.S Department of Defense or the U.S Navy, and are the sole responsibility of the authors.
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