EDSA 1986 Reminiscences

EDSA I: THE MILITARY
A cool psywar expert rules the war room

First posted 05:09am (Mla time) Feb 22, 2006
By Roilo Golez
Inquirer



EDSA 1 twenty years ago: Roilo Golez witnessing history in the War Room of Camp Crame, third day of the EDSA drama while Minister Enrile and General Ramos lead the action.


IT WAS AN easy drive through the main gate of Camp Aguinaldo on Feb. 22, 1986. There were no people yet although there were many fully armed soldiers at the Defense Ministry building.

I was immediately besieged by media people. Since I was then Postmaster General, I was asked: "Are you here as the emissary of Malacañang?" I didn't respond, waved off the cameras and microphones and went to the office of Minister Juan Ponce Enrile.

Inside were Commissioner Ramon Farolan, in fatigue battle gear, looking very aggrieved and retired Armed Forces Chief of Staff Romeo Espino. Their presence surprised me as both were identified with Marcos.

I got down to business immediately and asked Enrile: "Mr. Minister, are you serious about your declaration to break away from Marcos?" Enrile and I had shared many moments in previous days. I valued him as a mentor. He replied: "Yes, Roilo."

I looked at his eyes, saw the steely determination and told him: "In that case, I am going to announce my resignation as Postmaster General." I then went out and the media people again ganged up on me and I announced my resignation, giving them a copy of my resignation letter.

One reporter led me to a Volkswagen that turned out to be a Radio Veritas mobile. There, I read my resignation letter live for national broadcast. Officially, I became the first senior government official to break away from Marcos after Enrile and AFP Vice Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos.

On Sunday morning, General Ramos mounted a makeshift stage just outside Camp Crame, and asked me to join him when he saw me in the crowd. I witnessed his virtuoso performance as a psywar expert, announcing the names of people who had defected to his side to boost troop morale.

As the crowd started to build up, a civilian chopper hovered overhead. Ramos quipped, "Atin yan! (That's ours!)" to the delight and cheers of the crowd.

In the afternoon, as Marcos' tanks moved toward Ortigas Avenue, I got a call from Irwin Ver, a "mistah" -- member of the Philippine Military Academy Class of 1970 to which I originally belonged before I went to the US Navy Academy at Annapolis.

"Mistah, why don't we meet somewhere and talk. Please be assured we have no intention of arresting Enrile. We are not maltreating him," said Irwin, chief of the presidential guards and son of Armed Forces Chief of Staff Fabian Ver.

Tanks were just posturing

I replied, "Mistah, compadre (I was one of the baptismal godfathers of Irwin's first-born Bien-Bien), it's too late for that talk now. Why don't you just stop those tanks from moving to prevent bloodshed?"

Irwin said in a very somber tone: "Mistah, those tanks are just posturing. I assure you they will stop." And we ended our Mistah-to-Mistah talk, agreeing that after the episode was over, we would talk over dinner.

In the evening, General Ramos' office was crammed with civilians. One of them was Armida Siguion-Reyna, Minister Enrile's sister, who came with husband Nards and lots of friends. They brought a lot of siopao (steamed dumplings).

Inside the War Room, General Ramos was already receiving a fresh batch of defectors, very young, good-looking lieutenants from the Ranger Regiment. Ramos was announcing this to the media to project a momentum building up against Marcos.

It was very effective. At the same time, he warned his Camp Crame security group about the possible attack of a rabidly pro-Marcos commando group consisting of civilians trained in Tanay, Rizal, under the command of a young politician from the north.

Palace is like a cemetery

I called up a young officer in the Presidential Security Command at the Palace and engaged him in a casual, probing conversation. We were very close to each other, but found ourselves in opposite camps. I told him we were in a festive mood in Crame, had plenty of food. He said it was very quiet in the Palace ("It's like a cemetery here") and not much food.

The highlight of the morning on Feb. 24 was the defection of the Philippine Air Force attack helicopters under Col. Antonio Sotelo. This was followed later by an announcement that Marcos had left already, igniting cheers in the Camp Crame ground (which led to the famous Ramos jump). It was a false alarm. An angry Marcos all of a sudden appeared on TV.

It became very tense in the Crame headquarters. Monitored radio conversations of the pro-Marcos forces sounded like they were starting to train their artillery on Camp Crame. We were sitting ducks with only the roof on our heads.

General Ramos gave instructions for civilians to clear the building. I went down to escort my wife Natty outside and stoically kissed her goodbye but she was unaware what was happening.

A foreign correspondent saw me at the ground floor and frantically asked: "What's this I heard that the tide is shifting in favor of Marcos and you guys are losing control?" I answered "No!" tongue in cheek.

Let the shells fall

At the War Room, someone suggested, "General Ramos, sir, I think we should transfer to the second floor because we only have the weak roof as our protection when those shells fall." But Ramos very coolly said: "No, we stay here because all our communications are here and they are very important. We stay until the shells start falling. I am sure the first rounds won't hit us!"

Some guys started laying down anti-bomb blankets on the desks for cover. There was not enough room for all of us there so we just shrugged our shoulders and waited for the shells to fall.

But the shells never came. The guns remained silent because the other side, now we know, refused to heed the orders. We could monitor the Army commanding general asking what was happening, why the orders to fire were not being followed.

Then all clear was given and we all breathed a sigh of relief.

Later that day, a chopper counterattacked and fired a rocket at Malacañang. After the reports and the cheers from us in Crame, I called my friend at Malacañang. My friend said they were terribly shaken. They were obviously demoralized and I told my friend, "Take care of yourself."

The Ramos counter-attack culminated with the decision to seize Channel 4. Capt. Phil Plaza was one of those tasked to lead the attack. There was radio silence as we excitedly awaited the outcome and cheered when we learned it was a success. All of sudden there was Maan Hontiveros on TV and there was pandemonium in the War Room. But when Plaza returned, he looked like they lost, because his face was bloodied. A bullet hit the wall he was using as cover and the shattered concrete hit his face.

'I am sorry Mr. President'

That day also, I was in the small group in the War Room when Marcos called up Enrile. Marcos was starting to negotiate. We, Rene Cayetano and the others, could hear only half of the conversation and Enrile just kept on saying, "Yes, sir. Yes, Mr. President..." as the phone crackled.

Rene and I were telling Enrile, don't believe him sir. But we were so happy when Enrile finally said, "I am sorry Mr. President, it is too late for that now. All preparations are now being finalized for a new government." After the conversation, Enrile told us that Marcos was proposing power sharing, that Marcos was willing to stay as ceremonial president and Enrile would run the government. Enrile rejected the offer.

Later that night, a delegation arrived from the Cory group led by Ramon Mitra. Rene Cayetano and I listened as they discussed with Enrile the formation of the new government. But things were moving so fast.

Close to midnight, Col. Tirso Gador, one of the key troop commanders in Crame, was emotionally talking on the phone. He was very angry that the oath-taking of Cory Aquino would not be in Camp Crame but in Club Filipino.

He asked angrily, "Why father, you do not trust us? We are here prepared to die for her and you don't trust us?" I understood the person on the other line was Fr. Joaquin Bernas, who advised against a Cory oath-taking in Crame to avoid the appearance that the military was the one handing over power to the new President.

What a day the 24th had been with the shifting tides of the conflict! That was the most stressful day for those in the War Room.

Tanks pull out

Early on Tuesday, Feb. 25, there was a report of a column of tanks coming in from the North through the North Diversion Road.

General Ramos asked: "OK, what do we do now?"

Col. Gregorio Honasan replied: "We will take care of them, sir. It is very easy to stop a column of tanks in narrow roads." But that became unnecessary. The tanks were moving out to defend Malacañang. The Marcos government also had collapsed.

In the afternoon, I got a late message that Col. Arturo Aruiza, senior military aide of Marcos, was trying to reach me and offering to negotiate. Colonel Aruiza was a friend, my company commander when I was a plebe in PMA. He gave a phone number for me to call. When I called, the phone just kept on ringing. That's when I got convinced that they were already abandoning the Palace.

I never had the chance to talk to Colonel Aruiza after EDSA I. He died years ago and I will forever wonder what it was he wanted to tell me to help bring an end to the drama. But that gesture, whatever it was, came too late. Greater forces, human and divine, took control to end the Marcos regime and take the nation to another destiny.