This can be a very good guide for the Philippine arms acquisition program.
Arms trade pattern. per article
New players,
Arms trade pattern. per article
New players,
New Game?
By the The TNO and The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) programme Strategy & Change. They analyze global trends in a dynamic world affecting the foundations of our security, welfare and wellbeing.
Arms tradE
One aspect of trade is much more strategic in character than any other: this is the trade in armaments. If, as von Clausewitz said, '[w]ar is the continuation of politics by other means', then the arms trade can be also be viewed as a continuation of politics in the economic area. Countries select their arms suppliers very carefully given that they often have to rely on suppliers’ services and support for many years. Their views on the security environment, possible future conflicts, quality, friendliness and assessed reliability of suppliers all play an important role in the selection process.
In short, arms-buying countries want to rely on suppliers that they consider friendly or at least neutral toward them. Price and performance characteristics sometimes play a subordinate role to political and strategic considerations. Sometimes large arms deals serve as a substantial stepping stone toward a closer political relationship between a supplier and a buyer, and might lead to a closer relationship in other areas as well.
This is why we look at main arms suppliers for all BRICS+ countries. Table 6 indicates three main arms suppliers to each BRICS+ country, which are listed in the top row. The number in parentheses indicates the share of all arms over the period 2000‒2011 that came from that supplier.
One aspect of trade is much more strategic in character than any other: this is the trade in armaments. If, as von Clausewitz said, '[w]ar is the continuation of politics by other means', then the arms trade can be also be viewed as a continuation of politics in the economic area. Countries select their arms suppliers very carefully given that they often have to rely on suppliers’ services and support for many years. Their views on the security environment, possible future conflicts, quality, friendliness and assessed reliability of suppliers all play an important role in the selection process.
In short, arms-buying countries want to rely on suppliers that they consider friendly or at least neutral toward them. Price and performance characteristics sometimes play a subordinate role to political and strategic considerations. Sometimes large arms deals serve as a substantial stepping stone toward a closer political relationship between a supplier and a buyer, and might lead to a closer relationship in other areas as well.
This is why we look at main arms suppliers for all BRICS+ countries. Table 6 indicates three main arms suppliers to each BRICS+ country, which are listed in the top row. The number in parentheses indicates the share of all arms over the period 2000‒2011 that came from that supplier.
sTraTeGy 
chaNGe REPORT 39
brIcs+ aND Global ecoNomIc GoverNaNce
Brazil
|
China
|
india
|
indonesia
|
south korea
|
russia
|
turkey
|
south aFriCa
|
France (31%)
|
Russia (86%)
|
Russia (77%)
|
Russia (29%)
|
USA (74%)
|
Ukraine (87%)
|
USA (33%)
|
Germany (63%)
|
USA (17%)
|
France (7%)
|
Israel (5%)
|
Netherlands (25%)
|
Germany (12%)
|
Czech Republic (8%)
|
Germany (28%)
|
Sweden (19%)
|
Germany (14%)
|
Switzerland (3%)
|
UK (4%)
|
South Korea (19%)
|
France (8%)
|
Germany (4%)
|
Israel (10%)
|
UK (9%)
|
taBle 6 main armS SupplierS to BricS+ countrieS (For 2000-2011) Source: Sipri armS tranSFerS DataBaSe, http://WWW.Sipri.org/DataBaSeS/armStranSFerS.
This table reveals some interesting facts. First, among BRICS+ countries only Russia has been a substantial supplier of armaments to other BRICS+ countries (with the exception of South Korea, a large supplier to Indonesia). Second, all BRICS+ can be clearly split in two groups: the first one include Brazil, South Korea, Turkey and South Africa, who rely on Western countries as suppliers; and the second one of China and India, for whom Russia is a dominant supplier. Indonesia is somewhere in between, with Russia and South Korea competing with the EU countries.
It should be also noted that this table reflects aggregate results for the last 12 years. Given that many countries want to develop their domestic defense industry and become significant arms suppliers on their own (Turkey and South Korea, for example) it might look quite different in a few years’ time. For example, China has been quite successful in this respect and has significantly cut purchases of Russian weapons in recent years.
This table reveals some interesting facts. First, among BRICS+ countries only Russia has been a substantial supplier of armaments to other BRICS+ countries (with the exception of South Korea, a large supplier to Indonesia). Second, all BRICS+ can be clearly split in two groups: the first one include Brazil, South Korea, Turkey and South Africa, who rely on Western countries as suppliers; and the second one of China and India, for whom Russia is a dominant supplier. Indonesia is somewhere in between, with Russia and South Korea competing with the EU countries.
It should be also noted that this table reflects aggregate results for the last 12 years. Given that many countries want to develop their domestic defense industry and become significant arms suppliers on their own (Turkey and South Korea, for example) it might look quite different in a few years’ time. For example, China has been quite successful in this respect and has significantly cut purchases of Russian weapons in recent years.
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