SAF operation details

Salvador Corrales 12:18pm Feb 2  "I AM RESPONSIBLE."....POLICE DIRECTOR & SAF COMMANDER GETULIO NAPENAS By Cesar Liporada: Posting an interesting detail made by one who is "incognito" in a response to Randy David's column. Apparently, the author is with the military and is in the know of what actually happened in Mamasapano: "Instead of using the deaths of the 44 SAFs, CIDGs, CAFGUs, CVOs to spread misinformation; SPREADING MISINFORMATION IS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE 44 SAF MEMBERS DEATH FOR MORE DEVIOUS PURPOSES, SOW MORE DISTRUST IN SOCIETY AND EXTEND THE HIPOCRISY OF RAW POLITICAL GAIN; INSTEAD OF HONORING THE DIGNITY AND VALUE OF THE 44 SAF’S DEATH, SPREADING MISINFORMATION IS THE OPPOSITE: A COMPLETE DISRESPECT AND DISCRACE OF THEIR MEMORY!... BUT FIRST, LET ME TRY TO CRACK THIS!!! ALL THESE FROM DIFFERENT REPORTS... QUICK INFO: 1. Mamasapano is a 5th class municipality in Maguindanao Province;  2. Datu Odin Sinsuat, Shariff Aguak and Mamasapano, have Army forward bases: 45th Infantry Battalion, 601st Infantry Brigade and 2nd Mechanized Brigade; 3. 6th Infantry Division is located at Camp BGen Gonzalo H. Siongco, Awang, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao; Maguindanao is under the jurisdiction of the 6th Infantry Division; 4. 84th Special Action Company (84th SAC) is the primary force; 37 men were used for the mission; a company is 80-250 troopers; objective: Search and Destroy (S&D); 5. 55th Special Action Company (54th SAC) is the secondary force; objective: blocking force; 6. 45th Special Action Company (45th SAC) reinforcement; 7. Brgy. Tukanalipao, Mamasapano is the location of 3 MILF command bases: 106th, 105th and 118th Base Commands; 105th Base Command is headed by Ustadz Zacaria Guma; 118th Base Command is headed by Ustadz Wahid Tondok. 8. Brgy. Pidsandawan, Mamasapano is the location of Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and terrorists Zulkifli bin Hir (aka Marwan) and Afghan-trained Abdul Basit Usman and Private Armed Groups (PAG); 9. Zulkifli bin Hir (aka Marwan) is a member of the Central Committee and bomb expert from Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), funded by Al-Qaida terrorist group;  10. Abdul Basit Usman is a local bomb expert from Abu Sayyaf; 11. MNLF has its own troops stationed at and around Mamasapano; 12. CIDG (Criminal Investigation and Detection Group) 13. CAFGU (Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit) 14. CVO (Citizens Volunteer Organization) TIME LINE: 2002-2015 (Warrants out to capture or neutralize Zulkifli bin Hir’s (aka Marwan) and Usman; Many attempts have been tried but failed; 2015 January 24; Confirmed location of terrorists; Oplan Wolverine, planned years ago, is an ultra-secret law enforcement operation ready to spring into action) 2015 January 24, Saturday 2200: - Spec Ops ‘Oplan Wolverine’ a go; - 84th SAC and 55th SAC starts moving towards their target's location; hazy, but 45th SAC on stand-by. Total of 392 troopers. 2015 January 25, Sunday 0230-0300: - 84th SAC and 55th SAC plus CIDGs entered Mamasapano municipality, helped by Cafgus and local police contacts; - Troops on guard duty from the Army’s 45th Infantry Battalion saw the SAF entering the encounter area; however, they were not informed of the objective;(OPERATIONS SECRECY ENFORCED!) 0400-0415: - Esmael Hashim, chairman of Brgy. Tukanalipao, Mamasapano and other villagers,  noticed the arrival of ‘armed men’; tried to verify with MILF 105th Base Command; MILF 105th Base Command answered back no MILF tactical maneuvers in area; - 84th SAC arrived undetected at Zulkifli bin Hir’s (aka Marwan) hideout at Brgy. Pidsandawan, Mamasapano, neutralized Marwan, took pictures and cut of a finger for DNA examinations; others with Marwan were injured: Ben Said, a Tausug, and one Saad, believed to be a Malaysian; - simultaneously, 84th SAC tried to neutralize Abdul Basit Usman; however,Marwan’s and Usman’s PAGs engaged 84th SAC in heated battle; - 84th SAC radioed “Mike One, bingo!” to Police Director Getulio Napeñas and Chief Superintendent Noel Taliño at Tactical Command Post (TCP); 0415-0430: - BIFF awakens and rushes to scene of the firefight; - 84th SAC engages Marwan’s and Abdul Basit Usman’s PAGs and BIFF; - 84th SAC lost 8 men in the initial encounter; starting to have casualties; 0430-0500: - MILF 105th Base Command, Brgy. Tukanalipao, heard bursts of gunfire from direction of Brgy. Pidsandawan, Mamasapano, edge of Liguasan marshland; thought the firefight was accidental; - 84th SAC engages in tactical withdrawal from Brgy. Pidsandawan towards Brgy. Tukanalipao to rendezvous with 55th SAC; 0500-0600 - BIFF 1st Brigade initiating ambush and pinning down 84th SAC at Sitio Inunug, Brgy. Pidsandawan; - Police Director Getulio Napeñas at TCP called General Pangilinan, 6th Infantry Division to inform him SAF was inside the area of Mamasapano tohunt down Marwan but did not inform the General with more details; (OPERATIONAL FAILURE BEGINS) 0600-0630: - 84th SAC running out of ammo, some began desperate plans to escape; (NOT ENOUGH AMMO MEANS 84th SAC NOT PREPARED FOR A PROLONGED ENCOUNTER; MAYBE, TO RELY ON 55TH SAC, AS BLOCKING FORCE, FOR PROTECTION AND ANY PROLONGED ENCOUNTERS) - some 55th SAC slowly maneuvering to the general direction of Brgy. Pidsandawan to aid 84th SAC; majority of 55th SAC remains at rendezvous site at Brgy. Tukanalipao; 0630-0700: - In another part of Brgy. Tukanalipao, villagers and community leaders, after morning mosque prayers, “noticed armed men approaching” and alerted MILF105th Base Command; (MISENCOUNTER STARTS) - MILF 105th Base Command, Brgy. Tukanalipao proceeded to check the movements of “armed men approaching”; 55th SAC maneuvering for a defensive perimeter; - 55th SAC and the MILF 105th Base Command spotted each other near the 55th SAC rendezvous point, an open plain of cornfield;  - 55th SAC and MILF 105th Base Command begin maneuvering in defensive-offensive positions; 55th SAC noticed movements in their flanks but did not engage in out-flanking maneuvers; (TACTICAL FAILURE BEGINS; PROLONGED ENCOUNTERS WITH REBELS NEED MILITARY OPERATIONAL TACTICS, NOT LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONAL TACTICS) - 84th SAC almost decimated; not able to link up with 55th SAC; manywere wounded; - Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) informed and convened; 0700-0800: - 55th SAC SI Ryan Pabalinas radioed for reinforcements to Police Director Getulio Napeñas and Chief Superintendent Noel Taliño at Tactical Command Post (TCP); minor engagement starts, MILF 105th Base Command flanking at perimeters; 0800-0900 - 55th SAC and MILF105th Base Command’s starts major engagement; 55th SAC hopeful reinforcements would arrive soon; - MILF 105th Base Command, attacking and continuously flanking at perimeters; - BIFF and PAGS joins in attacks of 55th SAC; - Police Director Getulio Napeñas at Tactical Command Post (TCP) radioed 45th SAC for reinforcement; 45th SAC tried to penetrate and reinforce 55th SAC;  - Police Director Getulio Napeñas called PNP OIC Deputy Director General Leonardo Espina for reinforcement; - PNP OIC Deputy Director General Leonardo Espina called Western Mindanao Command Chief General Guerrero, his classmate at the PMA, to ask for reinforcements; 0900-1000:  - Reinforcements from MILF 106th and 118th Base Commands pouring in and developing 105th Base Command’s pincer movements; 55th SAC virtually surrounded; - 55th SAC’s ammo running low;  - 45th SAC tried to penetrate from different routes but failed; - Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) negotiating for a ceasfire; MILF ground forces were already in the heat of battle; 1000-1100: - 45th Infantry Battalion’s tanks and trucks carrying heavily armed troops were ready to move out in support, once instructions given; However, no details given: location of the encounter? how many friendly forces? who were they fighting?; hampered by lack of information and details, as well as debating the ceasefire agreement; - CCCH arrives at MILF 105th Base Command, Mamasapano; tried its best to halt the fighting; - 55th SAC had suffered massive casualties; but fighting still on-going; 1100-1200: - After being briefed, troops from 45th Infantry Battalion and 2nd Mechanized Brigade were able to assemble at the highway leading towards Brgy. Tukanalipao; - only one member of 55th SAC managed to escape and reach 45th SAC; 1500: - 45th Infantry Battalion and tanks of the 2nd Mechanized Brigade arrived in Brgy. Tukanalipao and saved one SAC platoon (maybe 45th) that was trapped inside MILF area and extract the casualties;  - A belated ceasefire was formally established by Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH); 1500-1700:  - 84th SAC and 55th SAC destroyed; casualties retrieval operation starts for dead and injured; CONCLUSION: 1. The operation was “ill-conceived” according to Western Mindanao Command (Westmincom) chief Lieutenant General Rustico Guerrero and 6th Infantry Division chief Major General Edmundo Pangilinan; 2. The operation factored in law enforcement objectives but not comprehensive enough; it did not factor in the military and political nature of the objective; 3. The operation had a commendable infiltration plan (the killing of known terrorist Marwan as a result), but had a very poor exfiltration or extraction plan; nor did it have a Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) plan; 4. The operation placed at great risk the relationship fostered between the government and the MILF through the BBL; 5. The operation was a clear case of insubordination to the commander-in-chief, who had given prior instructions to Police Director Getulio Napeñas, commander of SAF, since last year, with constant reminders, for “maximum coordination”; 6. The operation had a precursor, earlier attempts to capture Marwan since May 2014 were abandoned when firefights occurred; since the January 25 mission cannot run its course without inevitably leading to a firefight, the SAFs were not prepared for a prolonged firefight: not enough ammunitions, poor extraction and no SERE plans; 7. The operation was the 'CALL' AND RESPONSIBILITY of Police Director Getulio Napeñas, commander of SAF; Napeñas did NOT COORDINATE WITH THE PRESIDENT, NOT COORDINATE WITH DILG SECRETARY MAR ROXAS, NOT COORDINATE WITH PNP OIC DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL LEONARDO ESPINA, NOT COORDINATE WITH THE MILF, NOT COORDINATE WITH  CCCH... Intentions and actions are almost similar, without one, the other finds it hard to exist, and both justifiably judged right or wrong. Was there intention on the part of the MILF's commands in Mamasapano to purposely attack the SAF's position? Was there real intention by the MILF commands in Mamasapano to tolerate the presence of the BIFF and other terrorists nearby? If yes to both, then by all means, we must use the full force of our military forces to apprehend or eliminate those responsible, once and for all!!! THEREFORE, IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT IT WAS NAPENAS RESPONSIBILITY!!! IT IS HIS AND ONLY HIS RESPONSIBILITY! HE ADMITTED "I AM RESPONSIBILE"; TO THINK OTHERWISE AT THIS MOMENT IS ABSURD! SO ALL PERSONS (EXCEPT THE LEGIT ONES WHO ARE TRYING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS) PURPOSELY SPREADING INFLAMMATORY SPEECHES, EXAGGERATIONS, MISINFORMATION, OR JUST PLAIN STUPID COMMENTS, MORESO FROM PAID HACKS, DUMB JOURNALISTS AND REPORTERS...PAK U ALL! AND THOSE IN BINAY'S CAMP IMPERSONATING CONCERNED CITIZENS AND MANIPULATING THE DEATHS OF SAFs, CIDGs, CAFGUs, CVOs TO SATISFY POLITICAL GAINS... PAK U MORE!!! AND ANYONE WHO ANSWERS THIS POST WITH STUPID COMMENTS, PAK U TOO IN ADVANCE!!! RESPECT OUR HEROES DEATH! CHECK AND VERIFY FACTS NOW!... I praise your intellectual and balanced appreciation of facts, Prof. Randy David! Mabuhay ka bosing! But just to make a slight correction to your statement -  ................................................................................................................................ 'He has admitted knowing of the Jan. 24 operations against Marwan and Usman before it was carried out, and, clearly, he had approved it' ................................................................................................................................. That was clearly answered in the Q&A that followed PNoy's speech on 28 January 2015: 1. Categorically stating that the missions started since 2002, and since May 2014, there was 'actionable' intelligence of Marwan's location; therefore, he knew about it and approved it SINCE LAST YEAR! 2. Categorically answered no one asked him last January 24 "Sir, can we proceed with the mission?"; the time and place was the judgement call of Police Director Getulio Napeñas, commander of SAF; and if he does, he must coordinate; 3. "It is almost like a rhetorical question 'Puede ba naming hulihin tong pinapahuli ng korte? Puede ko bang sabihing hindi?". 4. "If they will wait for me for every action, then they should have to contend with all the other things that occupy my attention, kailan kaya nating mahuhuli ang kriminal?"