SNAPSHOT
Despite being close neighbours historically, the longstanding territorial dispute over parts of the South China Sea has stirred up an anti-China sentiment in Vietnam.
Vietnam’s potentially strong defence collaboration with India and Russia, coupled with US’ lifting of the arms embargo, is set to enhance the country’s defence capabilities greatly.
China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner, and the communist parties that lead both countries have historically been close. But the two neighbours are also locked in long-standing territorial disputes over parts of the South China Sea. Anti-China sentiment is strong among the Vietnamese population, and Beijing’s increasingly assertive actions in the South China Sea in recent years have sparked public anger and protests. In 2014, at least three Chinese nationals were killed when rioting broke out in Vietnam after Beijing sent an oil rig into contested waters.
This February and April, the deployment of long-range HQ-9 SAMs (200 km) and 16 J-11Bs to Woody Island in the South China Sea has also evoked a diplomatic protest from Vietnam. Today, Sino-Vietnamese relations are again hitting a low point, particularly due to the South China Sea dispute. Meanwhile, Vietnam’s external threat has always been China.
The first recorded Chinese invasion of Vietnam was back in the second century BC, when Emperor Qin Shi Huang expanded his newly united China into the reaches of northern Vietnam. This state of affairs, with the Chinese more or less exercising suzerainty over a Vietnamese client kingdom, lasted until 1884 when the French became the new colonial masters in Southeast Asia.
In 1978, Vietnam, tiring of the instability caused on the Vietnamese/Cambodian border by the Khmer Rouge government in power since 1975, launched an offensive into Cambodia and took Phnom Penh. Deng Xiaoping, China’s diminutive leader, had good reason by late 1978 to view Vietnam’s victory in the American War (1959-75) as a threat to China’s security. Vietnam had clearly chosen the Soviet Union – China’s main enemy – as its patron, was actively oppressing Vietnam’s Chinese minority, had committed violent border provocations, and in November had invaded Cambodia to eradicate China’s Khmer Rouge clients.
In 1979, 10 years after Ho Chi Minh’s own life had come to an end, his suspicion was tested, with 2,00,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) along with 400 tanks amassed on Vietnam’s northern border ready to invade. A further million mobilised, and Deng personally seeking Jimmy Carter’s assurance that the United States would not interfere in the forthcoming war, there was every indication that Beijing had far more ambitious goals in mind, most probably complete invasion and occupation of Vietnam.
However, fully aware of Vietnam’s combat-experienced modern air defence system, which shot down 10,000 American aircraft (helicopters and jets), the PLA kept its aircraft grounded.
Therefore, on 17 February 1979, the People’s Republic of China invaded Vietnam in an effort to punish Hanoi for its actions in Cambodia, and for its association with the Soviet Union. The PLA’s military objective was to concentrate its troops against the regional capital of Long Son, a strategic point controlling access to the Red River Delta and Hanoi. Within a few days, the Vietnamese were surrounded, and on 2 March, the PLA closed in for the kill. During the three days of ruthless house-to-house fighting, the Chinese wiped out the Vietnamese Elite Gold Star Division and reduced Long Son to rubble.
On 5 March, the capture of the high ground south of the city opened up the vital Red River Delta to invasion. Surprisingly, Beijing then announced that enough punishment had been administered and ordered a withdrawal that was completed in 10 days. The seizure of Lang Son, the PLA was poised to move into the militarily more hospitable terrain of the Red River Delta, and thence to Hanoi. The war made clear that their Soviet patron would not fight to defend them. The USSR’s only contribution to the conflict was a supply airlift. Deng had bluffed and called, and the Soviets folded. However, another of Deng Xiaoping’s strategic objective remained unfulfilled when Vietnam announced that they would not remove any forces from Cambodia.
Obviously, the PLA accomplished its mission, but the Vietnamese had taught the Chinese a lesson on the battlefield, which resulted in 7,000 PLA personnel killed in action. In one example of the deadliness of Vietnamese Guerrilla tactics, a Vietnamese female sniper killed eight PLA tank commanders. When the commanders’ outraged crewmen caught her, they pinned her to the ground and crushed her beneath the treads of their tanks.
The lessons of the war allowed Deng to sweep out the ossified Maoist old guard and embark on the modernisation and professionalisation of the PLA. The result today is technologically advanced, operationally sound and strategically sophisticated Chinese armed forces to match the country’s emergence as an economic giant.
Talking about their naval battles, Chinese navy completely outperformed Vietnamese in the “Battle of Paracels”, 1974, which allowed complete annexation of Paracels by the Chinese. The two navies once again fought in the “Battle of Spratlys”, 1988; history repeated itself when Chinese navy once again defeated Vietnamese, eventually giving them the control of seven reefs.
Role of India in modernising Vietnam’s military
India entered the fraught region of the South China Sea via Vietnam. It signed an agreement with Vietnam in October 2011 to expand and promote oil exploration in the South China Sea and then reconfirmed its decision to carry on as planned despite a Chinese challenge to the legality of Indian presence. Beijing told New Delhi that its permission was needed for India’s state-owned oil and gas firm to explore for energy in two Vietnamese blocks in those waters. But Vietnam quickly cited the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to claim its sovereign rights over the two blocks in question. India immediately decided to support Hanoi’s claims. More than 70 billion worth of Indian trade is routed through the South China Sea, and India has also rights to two oil drilling blocks off the Vietnam coast. Therefore, two nations have continued to cooperate on hydrocarbon exploration in the South China Sea, despite Beijing’s warnings.
Defence collaboration between India and Vietnam has intensified since Hanoi first demonstrated interest in the ‘Brahmos’. Amid concerns about Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea, Vietnam is seeking to bolster its defences to deter the People’s Liberation Army-Navy. A year ago, Vietnamese Defence Minister Phùng Quang Thanh was in New Delhi to sign agreements on defence cooperation and a Joint Vision Statement outlining a road map for increased defence collaboration. During a visit by former Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in 2014, New Delhi agreed to supply Vietnam with four maritime patrol vessels. Meanwhile, Indian Navy vessels continue to make regular port calls at Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay. Vietnam is increasingly at the centre of India’s “Act East” policy, which seeks to enlarge New Delhi’s footprint in East and Southeast Asia.
India, on its part, is also setting up a satellite tracking and imaging centre in southern Vietnam that will give Hanoi access to pictures from Indian earth observation satellites that cover the region, including China and the South China Sea. India will expand its military footprint in Vietnam, by expanding an existing programme to upgrade all existing Soviet-era military equipment used by Vietnamese, which includes thermal sights and fire control systems for armoured vehicles, T-54 and T-55, and upgrade of M-17/MI-8 helicopters, besides additional shipbuilding and missiles. In the past, India supplied spare parts to Vietnam for its Soviet-origin warships and overhauled MIG-21 fighter jets besides training its Navy to operate the Kilo-class submarines it imported from Russia. Furthermore, New Delhi will be helping Vietnam in the westernisation of two of its Petya-class frigates for an anti-submarine role.
India has already given a credit line of $100 million to Vietnam, which is being utilised for procurement of off-shore patrol boats for its border guards. Though India’s ties with Vietnam have been growing over the last few years, the sale of ‘Brahmos’ would be seen as a step too far that would antagonise China.
The ‘Brahmos’ has the distinction of being one of the deadliest cruise missiles to exist, primarily due to its supersonic cruising speeds and precision. Though the ‘Brahmos’ has a shorter range than other cruise missiles, it remains one of the fastest anti-ship cruise missile, capable of traveling at speeds of up to Mach 3.0 while sea-skimming to avoid detection. Both Moscow and New Delhi have pledged to only import the ‘Brahmos’ to states that are fundamentally “friendly to both India and Russia.” Vietnam fits the bill in that regard and had already been deemed to be a “friendly country” by a joint Indo-Russian supervisory council in 2011.
The conclusion of a ‘Brahmos’ deal with Vietnam would represent a major success for India’s defence industry. For Vietnam, the anti-ship variant would represent a potent deterrent tool. Hanoi has sought to offset its qualitative and quantitative disadvantages against China by investing in tool-enabling asymmetric strategies, including Kilo-class submarines. The ‘Brahmos’ may well be next.
Hanoi is also interested in India’s high-speed heavy weight torpedo ‘Varunastra.’ India’s overtures come shortly after the United States also lifted its longstanding ban on sales of lethal military equipment to Vietnam. New Delhi, for its part, wants to build relations with States like Vietnam that can act as pressure points against China. With this in mind, it has been helping Hanoi beef up its naval and air capabilities. For some in India, Vietnam can act as a counterweight in the same way Pakistan has been for China in India’s backyard.
Russian military assistance to Vietnam
Despite China’s protests, Russia continues to supply Vietnam with the highly sophisticated military hardware. Some of the notable imports are six Kilo class submarines, two battalions (12 launchers) of S-300PMU1 surface-to-air missile systems, which can track and engage dozens of targets at ranges of up to 75 miles, P-800 Onyx surface-to-surface cruise missile, intended for coastal defence and 46 Sukhois (Su-27 and Su-30).
Should Hanoi be concerned about Beijing’s growing military might?
The grim performance of the PLA in Sino-Vietnam war of 1979 played a key role in ending China’s focus on ground power at the expense of air power. The tenacity of Vietnamese infantry, often fighting with guerrilla tactics in inhospitable terrain, will probably deter the PLA from a major land incursion into Vietnam’s north. In an unlikely event, if China decides to punish Vietnam with another ground invasion in order to reduce serious losses from Vietnamese Guerrilla tactics, mechanised counterattacks and so on, the PLAAF would, no doubt, try to win air supremacy over the battlefield.
Chinese air power has already achieved significant firepower, and would be definitely used in conjunction with their invincible integrated air defence network, particularly its long-range SAMs (HQ-9-200 km), (S-300PMU2-200-300 km), (S-400-400 km), which would eventually threaten Vietnamese Sukhois within their own airspace from being shot down as well as in denying access to Chinese airspace.
Russian imported Vietnamese S-300PMU1 (75 miles or 120 km) long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems do pose a threat to PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force). Therefore, in order to destroy Vietnam’s S-300MPU1, China has developed J-16D multi-role fighter aircraft for “Wild Weasel” missions.
Wild Weasels are fighters designed to take on surface-to-air missile batteries in a SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence) role. Armed with anti-radiation missiles (which lock on and target radars by their electronic emissions) and electronic intelligence and electronic warfare jammers, they are designed to engage and suppress defences, opening the way for traditional air attacks. In combat operations, the J-16D would first use its jammers to disrupt the target and fire control of enemy air defences, before firing its long-range anti-radiation missiles, which are equally deadly against both mobile and fixed air defences. Once China succeeds in taking out Vietnam’s S-300PMU1, the entire Vietnam would be vulnerable to China’s aerial strikes (both from jets and missiles).
Talking about China’s DF-21C ballistic missile (1087 miles or 1750 km), which is capable of hitting entire Vietnam. The DF-21C has a 1,300-pound (590 kg) “bunker buster” deep-penetrating warhead and terminal guidance for increased accuracy. DF-21C missiles could be used to strike deeper within Vietnam’s interior against hardened command and control facilities; while DF-15C (620 miles or 998 km) carries a 2,100-pound (953 kg) high explosive warhead, designed to destroy airfields, radar sites, and military bases; with inertial and terminal guidance systems in DF-15C, they would be definitely unstoppable. Coming to Chinese cruise missiles, particularly, Dong Hai-10 described as “the assassin under the radar”. It uses several navigation systems, inertial, terrain contour matching to evade through. Vietnam should fear DH-10 since its ground version is launched from a wheeled transporter carrying three missiles at a time, capable of hitting as far as 2,500 km, about as far as the latest version of the Tomahawk, Block IV-E. While, Xian H-6K bomber carries seven cruise missiles – KD-20 (air launched version of DH-10).
Exacerbating the situation even further for Vietnam, since 2014, China has successfully conducted seven flight tests of HGV (Hypersonic glide vehicle). China’s test involved using the so-called “boost glide” method to get to hypersonic speeds. The test likely involved a hypersonic weapon strapped on top of a ballistic missile. The weapon was then boosted high into the atmosphere and glided back to Earth at hypersonic speeds (Mach 10-12).
Vietnam should rightly fear Chinese hypersonic weapons because they are extremely fast and impossible to shoot down. A hypersonic weapon launched from Guangxi, opposite Vietnam, travelling at Mach 10 could reach Hanoi in just a minute or so.
Talking about the ‘Brahmos’ cruise missile, the Chinese concerns, however, overestimates ‘Brahmos’ capabilities, while underestimating the power of the Chinese HHQ-9, mounted on Chinese Red Aegis (Type-52D), which is also supported by the most effective AESA (active electronically scanned array) radar. The main objective behind operating this deadly destroyer is not just to counter supersonic cruise missiles but also America’s 5th generation stealthy aircrafts (F-22, F-35 and B-2). The long range of HHQ-9 (200km) would allow Chinese to detect and destroy incoming ‘Brahmos’. Not to forget, each Type-52D destroyer carries 64 missiles. With nine of these vessels (three more under construction), the PLAN (Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy) can create a large air defence umbrella (200 km) over Chinese military operations. Moreover, Chinese Type-52D would also be supported by six Type-52C destroyers, which too carry 48 HHQ-9 missiles.
Conclusion
The last time China and Vietnam went to war was in 1979, which proved humiliating for China but very costly for Vietnam. In particular, Vietnam doesn’t want to go toe-to-toe with China in a capital- and technology-intensive war that might attrite away the expensive equipment that the VPA (Vietnam People’s Army) has acquired. Nevertheless, China must appreciate that Vietnam has bite.
The Vietnamese military, in its current configuration, is designed to deter Chinese adventurism. With the recent lifting of arms embargo from Vietnam by USA, we can expect that Vietnam will enhance these capabilities as the years go on, and as provocations in the South China Sea continue. Both PLA and VPN have come a long way since 1979. The VPA has increased the educational attainment of its officer corps, exposed its units to international training and experience, and provided them with significant equipment upgrades.
But, at the end of the day, PLA happens to be more professional, more technologically advanced, and better organised due to their recent military reforms, which have resulted in forming five Theatre/Joint Commands as well as massive modernisation being undertaken in all the branches of China’s armed forces. Therefore, through military reforms the idea of Chinese President Xi Jinping is to remake the PLA from a manpower intensive force to a smaller, technologically able and mobile force capable of combat and winning it beyond its geographical border/coast.
This piece was first published on Indian Defence Review and has been republished here with permission.
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