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As U.S. President Donald Trump’s 13-day tour of Asia comes to an end, it has been hard not to notice his repeated use of the term “Indo-Pacific,” rather than the more conventional “Asia-Pacific,” which was preferred by the Obama administration. On Sunday, we discovered the likely reason for his uncharacteristic semantic awareness.
That day, senior officials from America, Australia, India and Japan met in Manila to discuss resurrecting a regional coalition known as the Quadrilateral, or “Quad” for short. This informal alliance, first attempted in 2007 between the four maritime democracies, is designed to ensure the Indian and Pacific Oceans remain open and peaceful for trade routes, and possession of territories in the maritime areas determined by the rule of law. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe described it, in 2012, as “Asia’s democratic security diamond.”
Ostensibly, though, it is designed to curb Chinese militarization of the South China Sea and expansionism in the Indian Ocean. "Indo-Pacific," rather than "Asia-Pacific," thereby stresses the importance of both oceans and includes the normally misaligned India as a major security actor in the region.

An informal Quadrilateral Security Dialogue was held in 2007, but disbanded the following year when incoming Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, pulled the country out of the partnership, reportedly because of Chinese pressure.
Room for France or Britain?
Now it appears that Japan, the Quad’s leading proponent, is keen on enticing European allies to join the coalition. Foreign Minister Taro Kono said in an interview with the Nikkei Asian Review last month that he offered the foreign ministries of Britain and France the chance to form collaborative roles with the Quadrilateral. So far, neither London nor Paris has publicly commented on the apparent invitation.
This is not surprising. There is not yet confirmation that, following this week’s meeting, the Quad’s governments will commit to a formal alliance. Some analysts think they could agree to regular leaders’ summits or, perhaps, four-way military exercises. But there certainly appears to be British and French interest in becoming more engaged in Asian security affairs.
In May, the navies of America, Britain, France and Japan held an amphibious exercise off American islands in the Pacific. This was intended to show “support for the free passage of vessels in international waters,” an indication they are concerned about Beijing possibly restricting passage through the South China Sea, the South China Morning Post reported.
In December, Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said British forces would begin moving “back east of Suez,” a sign that after more than four decades it would strengthen its military presence in the Gulf, and the Indian and Pacific oceans. (Britain’s only remaining garrison in the Far East is in Brunei, a former colony. Still, since 1971 the UK has cooperated militarily with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore as part of the so-called Five Power Defense Arrangements.) Later, on a tour of Japan, Australia and New Zealand in July, Johnson insinuated that Britain would support opposition to Chinese expansionism when he said that two of the UK’s new aircraft carriers might be sent to the highly-contested South China Sea as a part of a freedom of navigation operation.
As for France, it has long considered itself an Indo-Pacific nation, given its numerous overseas departments and territories located in both the Indian and Pacific oceans. It has a permanent naval presence on Reunion, an island in the Indian Ocean, while it has longed engaged in joint military exercises with America and India in same the maritime area. (The India-French annual Varuna exercises started in 2001.) In the Pacific, France’s maritime naval zones are found in New Caledonia and French Polynesia.
Macron’s decisions
As early as 2008, then-Prime Minister François Fillon’s office published the “National Strategy for the Sea and for the Oceans,” a policy document that laid bare Paris’ desires for the future naval engagement. “France has decided to return to its historic maritime role,” it reads.
Another document, published in 2012 by the government, stated that “the center of geopolitical gravity is moving eastwards, highlighting the riparian nations of the Indian Ocean and Pacific.” It added: “The control of the maritime spaces is one of the keys of French power and influence on the international scene.”
But questions have been raised as to how committed Emmanuel Macron, who became president in May, is to Asia. Since then, however, it has become apparent that Macron is likely to bring France closer to its Indo-Pacific allies.
He met with Japan’s Prime Minister in September, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, and agreed to boost security and defense ties. Months earlier, he met Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull in Paris where he reaffirmed France’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific. Turnbull describedAustralia agreeing to purchase a fleet of new submarines from French naval contractor DCNS as “the largest and most ambitious military project in Australia's history.
Then, last month, India and France’s defense ministers met in New Delhi to commit to boosting military cooperation Indo-Pacific region, and for France to sell India military equipment, including fighter jets and submarines. “Recognizing the growing significance of maritime security in the Indo-Pacific and the need for greater maritime domain awareness, India and France will further expand information sharing arrangements,” reads a statement released after their meeting. Macron will visit India in December.
The China factor
But Britain and France will have to weigh up whether taking such an explicitly anti-China stance is worth the economic risk. Indeed, “Beijing is in a better position today to undermine the Indo-Pacific vision than it has ever been,” wrote Rohan Mukherjee, assistant professor of political science at Yale-NUS College in Singapore.
The UK is currently negotiating a difficult Brexit and trade with China is worth $74 billion, as of last year. London says it hopes China can become its second-largest trading partner within the decade.
France, though a major trading partner of China, appears more willing to irk Beijing. Macron, who was elected on a “globalist” platform, has railed against the “the disorder of globalization,” as he put it in a European Council summit in June. This has largely focused on China’s large trade deficit with the European Union (EU) and protecting Europe’s important industries from takeovers by Chinese firms.
Nonetheless, whether or not France and Britain official join a formal coalition with America, Australia, India and Japan (if such a formal pact does develop) there is little doubt that security ties with these nations will remain strong in the coming years and, if possible, London and Paris hope to find some room in the Indo-Pacific vision.