REP. BATERINA. Mr. Speaker.
THE DEPUT Y
SPEAKER (Rep. Abueg). Distinguished Majority Floor
Leader.
REP. BATERINA. The next Member who would want to stand up for the Privilege Hour is
the Honorable Roilo Golez of the Lone District of Parañaque City. May I move
that he be recognized, Mr. Speaker.
THE DEPUTY
SPEAKER (Rep. Abueg). The Gentleman from the Lone
District of Parañaque is recognized to avail of the Privilege Hour.
PRIVILEGE SPEECH
OF REP. GOLEZ
REP. GOLEZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, my distinguished
colleagues. The Spratlys issue has been
an on and off issue for the country and our long-term policy appears to be
unclear. What makes it so complex is the fact that we are arrayed with our
ASEAN neighbors, particularly Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, against the giant
power of the region, China.
I'd like to share with you some
of my observations and views. And let me go direct to the point since we are
all generally familiar with the background.
The issue in the Spratlys is oil.
Lots and lots of oil. Roughly around US$ 3 Trillion worth of oil plus natural
gas and other mineral resources. And
China's huge military might is apparently to clobber its tiny neighbors,
including the Philippines, to dominate the vast oil deposits believed to be in
the Spratlys.
This is according not only to a
study of a Commander H.R. Sanguinett of the British Royal Navy, but also
several well documented studies, namely: one
by a Lieutenant
Michael Studeman, intelligence officer of the U.S. Navy; a study prepared by
the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly, United Nations; and
study of the Centre for International and Strategic Studies of York University,
Canada.
In his article "Calculating
China's Advances in the South China Sea, Identifying the Triggers of
'Expansionism'", Lieutenant Studeman's analysis of the Mischief reef
situation is very interesting, to wit and I quote:
"A more assertive policy to
satisfy energy concerns helps explain Beijing's actions in the Southwest
Spratlys where the oil prospects were good. But in 1995, Beijing decided to
occupy Mischief Reef, in the Philippines claim zone, where the oil potential
was relatively meager. Beijing seemed to
be throwing political capital to the wind by penetrating deeply into the
Philippine EEZ. Why?
"The best explanation involves
China's perceptions of economic threats and its desire to preempt foreign
exploration that would leave it a net loser in terms of territory and
resources. China's occupation of Mischief Reef was not a bolt from the blue; it
was preceded by a chain of events that began with a falling-out with the
Philippines over hydrocarbon exploration in the northeast region of the
Spratlys.
"Joint development talks
between China and the Philippines over gas-rich Reed Bank broke down in early
1994; in May, Manila decided to grant a
six-month oil exploration permit to Alcorn Petroleum and Minerals. The Philippines was interested in collecting
seismic data on the seabed southwest of Reed Bank. Manila hoped the contract would remain a
secret, but news of the collaboration
soon leaked. Beijing swiftly issued a statement
reasserting its sovereignty over the area covered by the license and ignored
Manila's belated invitation to become partner in the project. Manila
back-pedaled on the diplomatic front for weeks, but the damage had been done.
By secretly licensing an exploration effort, the Philippines had appeared to
engage in unilateral efforts to exploit the natural resources of the Spratlys.
"Stung by Manila's
'betrayal,' China decided to advance eastward for better surveillance coverage
of any Philippine-sponsored oil exploration. Mischief Reef is the lower-middle
section of the Alcorn concession; a presence there would also strengthen
China's hand were petroleum ever to be discovered in the area. The Chinese post
on the Mischief Reef was discovered by Filipino fishermen in February 1995, the
advanced state of its buildings indicating that the construction had begun in
the fall of 1994, just a few months after Manila's 'faux pas.' China had quietly
advanced onto the reef because it believed physical occupation was the only
method by which Chinese interests could be protected. Beijing's own misstep was
not in foreseeing that this characteristically 'defensive' response would be
interpreted as offensive."
A Congressional inquiry on this
is mandatory to determine whether the previous administration's alleged
"faux pas" precipitated the 1995 Mischief Reef incident or the
Chinese just used this as a convenient excuse.
The York University study entitled
"The Implications of Hydrocarbon Developments in the South China
Sea") reported that, and I quote: "The Chinese in 1989 sent a survey
vessel through the South China Sea and estimated that the Spratlys held
deposits of 25 billion cubic metres of natural gas, 370,000 tons of phosphorous
and 105 billion barrels of oil with an additional 91 billion barrels of oil in
the James Shoal area.." At current oil prices, the oil deposits alone
would amount to around 3 Trillion U.S. Dollars and this is equivalent to 40 years
of the Philippine's current Gross National Product.
Is China prepared to kill for
this kind of oil deposits? -- Definitely, according to the study of the UN
General Assembly Special Political Committee prepared in 1995. This report
cited the one-sided encounter between naval forces of China and Vietnam, one of
the claimants to parcels of the Spratlys, to wit: "in 1988, the Spratly
Islands saw the first armed conflict over the islands in 14 years. On March 14,
forces from the PRC and Vietnam did battle, sinking two Vietnamese naval
vessels and leaving as many as 74 Vietnamese dead (numbers vary from source to
source). Following this engagement, the Vietnamese claimed that the Chinese
forces would not let them salvage their equipment or rescue their men."
This is something that the
leaders of the AFP, particularly the Navy, must ponder in assessing how the
Chinese Navy would respond in case of a confrontation.
The United Nation study further
states and I quote: "As for the threat posed by the PRC, the nations of
the area are convinced that the actions of China are dangerous. They have
stated in a government document that the islands in the South China Sea would
provide 'sheng cun keng jian', which translates into 'survival space', not a
very far cry from the German word 'lebensraum'... In February of this year, the
PRC claimed Mischief Reef, part of the Kalayaan group of islands claimed by the
Philippines. Not only were those reefs claimed, but structures have now been
built upon them. Surveillance pictures of these structures look like photos of
military installations found on other islands."
And that is the United Nations
study report. By the way,
"Lebensraum" was the term used by Germany in their push for more
space prior to the Second World War.
Incidentally, the U.N. Special
Political Committee is usually assigned political, regional issues such as the
Palestinian question, destabilization of Lebanon or the war in Eritrea. It
appears that meriting the Committee's attention indicates the subject's gravity
from a global standpoint.
In his published study, U.S. Navy
Lt. Studeman observes that China is using its People's Liberation Army-Navy
(PLAN) to "colonize" the Spratlys and sees the following pattern:
"Sensitive to its power projection weaknesses and fearing negative
political reactions stemming from a military presence in the maritime heart of
Southeast Asia, China disguised the naval missions sent to the Spratlys in late
1987 and early 1988 as scientific expeditions. They involved oceanographic
research vessels and warship escorts, which subsequently deposited 'scientists'
and building materials on a number of reefs. Portraying its actions as
'non-aggressive,' China claimed that the United Nations Education, Scientific
and Cultural Organization had approved the construction of weather research
stations on the cays in question.
This defensible justification
provided a convenient pretext for an increased naval presence and helped
forestall a direct confrontation with Vietnamese forces during the early stage
of occupation."
When the Vietnamese sent aircraft
and warships to monitor the Chinese activities, especially Chinese naval
vessels, a series of brushes ensued culminating in the encounter in mid-March
1988 resulting in the sinking of a Vietnamese auxiliary and heavy damage to a
Vietnamese LST, and, worse, the loss of more than 70 Vietnamese lives.
This pattern of justifications
and apparent ruses, calling the Chinese activities in the Mischief Reef as
fishing-oriented, followed by monitoring by Philippine aircraft and warships,
look very similar to the 1988 confrontation with Vietnam. That's why DFA
Secretary Siazon should summon again the Chinese Ambassador for further
clarification on the activities of the Chinese at Mischief Reef, because I
believe that the Philippines is being misinformed and misled by the Chinese.
Lt. Studeman warned about a
Chinese article published in 1988 that states the following: "In order to
make sure that descendants of the Chinese nation can survive, develop, prosper
and flourish in the world in the future, we should vigorously develop and use
the oceans. To protect and defend the rights and interests of the reefs and
islands
within the Chinese waters is a sacred mission...
The Spratly Islands not only occupy an important strategic position, but every
reef and island is connected to a large area of territorial water and an
exclusive economic zone that is priceless." And that is a quotation from a Chinese
article published in 1988.
It is projected that China,
previously a net exporter of oil as late as 1990, will need to import around
1,200,000 barrels of oil a day by the year 2000. China is obviously thirsting
for the Spratlys' nearly 200 billion barrels of oil believed to be deposited in
the area as estimated by the Chinese Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources.
Using their superior forces and
technology, the Chinese have converted several of the reefs into garrisons and
virtual mini-bases for their warships. Now, they have a chain of fortified
reefs over a 120-nautical mile line pointing eastward like a dagger at the
Palawan Passage and encircling the islands claimed by the Philippines, as well
as acting as an observation post over the Reed Bank. These fortified reefs
include the Fiery Cross Reef, Chigua Reef, Johnson Reef, Gaven Reef, etc. and
the last target appears to be the Mischief Reef.
If unchallenged, the Chinese
apparently intend to construct huge concrete structures similar to those
already existing in the aforementioned reefs.
To appreciate what the Chinese have done so far, slowly, quietly but
successfully, may I present the following summary of the kind of
structures, installations and provisions they
already have, and I got this from my own sources, Mr. Speaker :
In the Fiery Cross Reef which is
the largest installation, they have the following: they have an Observation - Communication
post, maritime and survey post, a garrison forces, under which command are a
radio detachment, a radar detachment and an oil and maintenance detachment with
total force of 200. The structures are composed of a helicopter-parking apron,
a one-thousand-ton dock, a two-story barrack and a 500 square meter vegetable
yard. The expansion of construction is still going on. Combat readiness stockpile
of material includes 103 days of foodstuffs, 469 tons of fuel 1360 tons of
fresh water and 90 tons of drinking water. This force is equipped with
satellite data transmission system and naval automatic command network.
Mr. Speaker, I have a photo of
this installation and I am very impressed with the kind of concrete structures
that they have, that are very similar to the concrete structures that we would
see in the Muntinlupa penitentiary.
In Cuarteron Reef, they also have
concrete structures composed of a permanent blockhouse and supply platform. And
I have here an enumeration of the kind of provisions and supplies that they
have (The reserves of material include 82 days of grain, 5 tons of fuel and 380
tons of water.) and it is stationed with the 2nd garrison company.
Johnson Reef, (It is constructed
with a permanent blockhouse and a supply platform, and stationed) with a
garrison force.
Dongmen Jiao, with the fourth
garrison company and a blockhouse also, concrete blockhouse. (It is constructed with a permanent
blockhouse and a supply platform and stationed with the 4th garrison company.)
Gaven Reef, with a garrison
force.
Subi Reef, with some
communication equipment and helicopter-parking apron. (The force is equipped
with a 100 watt HTIW412 radio communicator.)
And of course, the Mischief Reef
now with four groups of building with a total of 13 high rise houses on which
satellite disks are installed by the Chinese.
And in a number of shoals and
reefs, they have already installed markers of sovereignty, survey points,
markers, buoys, etc. etc., in order to establish the future claim on these
reefs and shoals.
Sabina Shoal - A marker of sovereignty was installed in May 1987 and no
person is stationed on it.
London Reef - China installed a marker of sovereignty in May 1987 and no
person is stationed on it.
Alicia Annie - China installed a survey point in June 1987 and no person
is stationed on it.
Discovery Small - China installed a marker of sovereignty in July 1992
and no person is stationed on it.
Pennsylvania - China installed buoys and steel frames and no person is
stationed on it.
Eldad Reef - China installed a buoy and no person is stationed on it.
Jackson Atoll - China installed a buoy and no person is stationed on it.
Second Thomas Shoal - China installed a floating marker and no person is
stationed on it.
First Thomas Shoal - China installed a marker and no person is stationed
on it.
Half Moon Shoal - China installed a marker of sovereignty and no person
is stationed on it.
Mr. Speaker, the Philippines must
deal with this issue with utmost prudence and firmness. We should exhaust all
diplomatic channels and I note that the Executive Branch is already doing this.
We should also act with prudence because of the capability of the Chinese to
use force as demonstrated in their 1988 naval encounter with Vietnam. This
policy of using force was observed by Cmdr. Sanguinett of the British Royal
Navy, and I quote: "Then, at the meeting of the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress in 1992, the Law on the Territorial Waters and their
Contiguous Areas was passed. This law formalized and articulated China's claims
to territorial and maritime jurisdiction
over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and authorized
the PLA Navy to use force to protect its sovereignty."
Notwithstanding this, it is noted
that the Chinese have mellowed in their heretofore confrontational stance. In
the York University paper, the author made this observation in relation to the
1994 incident, again, with Vietnam:
"Tensions were reduced in
November when the Chinese and Vietnam leaders met in Hanoi and agreed to
'refrain from all acts that make things more complicated or broaden conflicts'.
The most significant event in this stand-off was the Chinese refusal to resist
the Vietnam expulsion of the Chinese Navy research ships out of the Crestone
Concession (the disputed oil exploration project). This is probably because the
Chinese did not want to frighten the ASEAN states. Moreover, as Westerners are
on board, the Chinese may be willing to show restraint in order not to frighten
off investors. Another explanation is that the Chinese Navy did not have enough
ships in the area at that time to effectively challenge the Vietnamese. Regardless
of their rationale, this new found willingness to enter into multilateral
negotiations over such a nationally sensitive issue bodes well for eventual
peaceful resolution to the dispute."
Mr. Speaker, we can learn from
the Vietnamese who have shown persistence and fortitude in fighting for their
claims. Vietnam, a nation hardened by decades of fighting giant powers, has
been engaged in near skirmishes with China in spite of the mauling they
received from the Chinese Navy in 1988. Just last September, it was China that
protested Vietnam's move to grab a few reefs.
Of course, we do not have their naval vessels and
cannot afford to be as confrontational.
In a separate House Resolution, I
have proposed the review of our One China Policy. With our national interest as
the principal consideration, a thorough public debate should be undertaken
taking into consideration the economic, commercial, political and security
aspects of said policy, always taking the long-term view. If only present trade
and investment statistics are to be considered, the picture appears very clear:
Trade with Taiwan is around three (3) times that of China, although China trade
is growing much faster at 36 % versus 20 % for Taiwan trade. Taiwan investments
are much, much higher at a factor of 50 to 1.
Mr. Speaker, I hope that the
Spratlys situation will improve with the expected bilateral talks between
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and China's President Jiang Zemin during the
current APEC talks. But some quarters are not so optimistic and I hope they are
wrong. I also hope that however bleak the prospects are, avenues will be opened
for Joint Development Agreement (JDA). As the York University paper suggests,
"there are four main reasons states may be willing to enter into JDAs.
First, the desire, in each state, to produce hydrocarbon resources outweighs
the desire to win a boundary dispute, or some other item on the national agenda
of each of the states. Second, the states already have close relations or they
see the opportunity, in the JDA, to demonstrate trust, amity and friendship
which will lead
to closer relations. Third, where one or more state
does not possess the technological expertise for offshore development and the
others see the opportunity to gain by selling such technology to the others. And finally, when all lack sufficient
management capacity, then by pooling resources in a JDA would allow all to
effectively exploit their offshore resources."
Mr. Speaker, I conclude by
adopting the proposed Joint Development Agreement (JDA) as a workable, just and
amicable settlement of the Spratlys issue.
Thank you very much, my dear
colleagues. Thank you very much, Mr.
Speaker.
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