Japan-China COLD WAR / China’s maritime aggression distorts international norms
The Yomiuri Shimbun
The Yomiuri ShimbunThis is the seventh installment in a series on the worsening relations between Japan and China.
On Dec. 5 last year, a dangerous incidenterupted in the South China Sea between the USS Cowpens, an Aegis-equipped missile cruiser, and a Chinese warship. The two vessels came close to a collision in international waters.
According to the U.S. Defense Department, the Chinese ship drew near to the Cowpens, as if to cut into the path of the U.S. vessel. The Chinese warship remained on course despite warnings from the Cowpens of a dangerously close approach.
The U.S. vessel heaved to an emergency halt, narrowly averting a collision with the Chinese vessel. The two ships were only about 100 yards, or 90 meters, apart.
The Dec. 5 incident was the third of its kind to be triggered by China in reaction to U.S.military operations in the South China Sea. In April 2001, a midair collision occurred between a U.S. Navy EP (Electronic Patrol) reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese F-8 fighter. Another incident followed in March 2009 when the USNS Impeccable, an ocean surveillance ship, encountered obstructive conduct by five Chinese warships including a naval information-gathering vessel.
At the time of the Dec. 5 incident, the Cowpens is believed to have been monitoring the Liaoning, China’s only aircraft carrier, which was engaged in a military exercise. According to a U.S. government source, the Chinese Navy vessel involved in the near-collision deliberately attempted to collide with the Cowpens in what was not just a case of a dangerous near-miss.
During a press conference on Dec. 19, U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel expressed strong apprehension about China’s aggressive action toward the Cowpens. “That’s the kind of thing that’s very incendiary. That could be a trigger or a spark that could set off some eventual miscalculation,” he said.
China’s aggressive behavior was built on its own interpretation of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Beijing has argued, “We oppose any party carrying out any military acts in our exclusive economic zone without permission.”
The U.N. treaty defines the exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, as a zone over which a sovereign state can claim rights over the research and exploitation of marine resources in an area stretching 200 nautical miles, or about 370 kilometers, from the shoreline of the state.
The convention requires signatories to pay “due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State.” However, there is a clear line drawn between EEZs and territorial waters over the freedom of the seas.
Under the pact, a belt of waters extending up to 12 nautical miles, or about 22 kilometers, from the shoreline of a coastal state is regarded as part of the nation’s sovereign territory. Meanwhile, the convention grants any country the freedom of navigation and aviation in the EEZ, as well as the right to conduct such activities as laying submarine electric cables and pipelines. It follows that the pact imposes no restrictions on military activities in the EEZ, including warship navigation aimed at gathering information in the zone.
However, China treats its EEZ in nearly the same way as its territorial waters, declaring it to be “oceanic national land” or “state-controlled waters.” Beijing also defended its obstructivebehavior toward U.S. forces by insisting that “the U.S. surveillance missions conducted in our EEZ are the root of military security problems in the sea and in the air space between China and the United States.”
The assertions made by China over its “oceanic national land” are most conspicuously evident in its territorial disputes with some neighbors over the South China Sea. The Paracel Islands are claimed by China, Vietnam and Taiwan, and the Spratly Islands by China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei and Taiwan.
China has drawn nine short lines on the map at various points near the edges of the South China Sea. Although these line segments do not touch each other, they effectively add up to a “nine-dashed line” extending from China’s southern coast in a gigantic U shape. China asserts that the area enclosed by the dashed line belong to its sovereign territory. In recent years, China has been aggressive in sending personnel from its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to conduct activities aimed at protecting what it describes as its “territory.”
The Hainan provincial government then enforced a law in January requiring foreign ships operating within the dashed line to apply for permission.
Japan, the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have urged China to abide by international law. However, China cannot be expected to abandon its strategy for expanding maritime activities, based on its seemingly arbitrary interpretation of international regulations. “It’ll be no easy task to persuade such an overconfident major power only through reason,” said Hirotaka Watanabe, director of the Institute of International Relations, an institution affiliated with the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.
China’s tendency to interpret international practice in an arbitrary manner is also evident in its abrupt action taken in November to establish an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea, where the Senkaku Islands are located. The move was followed by Beijing’s coercive demand for foreign airplanes to abide by instructions issued by its authorities. These actions are comparable to those taken by China in the South China Sea.
For Japan, the exacerbation of friction between China and some of its Asian neighbors is of grave concern. A report issued by a Defense Ministry research institute warns of such a risk. “The role of the People’s Liberation Army is expanding to areas of ‘military operations other than war’ [MOOTW] and non-traditional security fields, such as the protection of maritimerights and interests,” the National Institute for Defense Studies said in its “China Security Report.”
The report concluded that “the cooperation for protecting China’s maritime interests between the PLA and its maritime law enforcement agencies is likely to strengthen not only in the South China Sea but also in the East China Sea.”
‘Cabbage strategy’ deployed
China’s “cabbage strategy” is a powerful tool in its campaign to control Scarborough Shoal, which is at the center of an ongoing standoff with neighboring nations.
In 2012, China placed the disputed territory under its effective control by sending fishing boats to waters around the area. These ships were then surrounded with fisheries patrol boats, offshore patrol vessels and naval vessels. China defended its actions by asserting these vessels were sent to protect the fishing boats.
Zhang Zhaozhong, a naval rear admiral of the Chinese Navy and a professor at the PLA’s National Defense University, discussed the tactics in a program broadcast by China Beijing TV Station. “We’re carrying out the ‘cabbage strategy.’ If they want to visit the shoal, [Philippine] ships must ask for permission from our naval, offshore and fisheries patrol boats one by one,” he said. His remark was an analogy to the trouble of trying to remove cabbage leaves a layer at a time.
China’s approach in this respect is aimed at creating many faits accomplis until rights and interests can eventually be secured. This method is also known as “salami tactics.” That is, China is trying to acquire thin slices of salami one by one. By the time other countries take notice, the country will have consumed the whole salami.
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