Post-Ukraine, The "Asia Pivot" Is More Important Than Ever
Vladimir Putin’s annexations of Crimea and troop massings on the Ukrainian border are being closely watched in Beijing. China’s leaders are observing the “success” of Russian maneuvers, combined with the weakness of the West’s retaliatory sanctions, as they calculate their own expansionist actions in the East China Sea and South China Sea. For much of the last decade, China has taken an aggressive posture with its neighbors, particularly Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, making claims of sovereignty over uninhabited islands for which it has little historic claim. Until recently, conventional wisdom presumed that Beijing had no real intention of invading the islands, fearing an unwanted backlash. However, given events in Ukraine, one can no longer be sure that propaganda is the extent of China’s interest. Obama’s so-called “pivot to Asia” – a policy first outlined in a 2011 article by Hillary Clinton, designed to consolidate American power after a decade in the Middle East – cannot come soon enough. China is America’s greatest strategic rival, andWashington needs to send a firm message that Beijing’s hostilities towards its neighbors will not be tolerated.
China’s antagonistic stance towards Japan over the Senkaku Islands, and towards the Philippines and Vietnam over the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands (China’s sovereign claims are most plausible with the latter), can equally be viewed as an affirmation of its growing naval power, and as a challenge to Washington. China is picking on countries with which the U.S. has strategic alliances, none more so than Japan, after unilaterally declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone over the disputed Senkakus. Tokyo has shared a mutual defense agreement with Washington since 1952, and the U.S. has traditionally served as the balancing power and keeper of peace in the western Pacific. However, the future of that role may be in doubt, as the administration seeks to strip the defense budget by nearly 20%, including a reduction of the active duty Army to levels not seen since World War II.
For full disclosure, I have argued for the breakup of Ukraine, and the ceding of Crimea and even other pro-Russian parts of Eastern Ukraine to Moscow, as a strategic concession to ensure Ukraine’s future as an indisputable part of the West. (The loss of Crimea will now tip Ukraine’s electoral balance in favor of pro-Western parties). Ideally that would have resulted from negotiation, rather than Putin’s invasion of Crimea, which he can now view as a victory. However, China’s aggression towards Japan, and to a lesser extent Vietnam and the Philippines, bears no comparison. The islands have neither ethnic Chinese populations, nor any history of internationally recognized oversight by China.
Within the Asia pivot – if it happens – there are distinct, peaceful actions the U.S. can take, to shore up its allies, and head off Chinese aggression. Increasing the frequency of military exercises with Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines, will send a firm message that the U.S. is not going anywhere. The recent “Iron Fist” annual exercise with Japan, which took on new importance in its February 2014 incarnation, can be made biannual. Washington is also in the process of increasing troop rotations in the Philippines, as it has recently begun doing in Australia. Both are positive trends. Backing this up with tough language affirming commitment to American allies will help as well. The proposed military budget cuts should avoid the Pacific theater as much as possible. If drawdowns from U.S. bases in Japan and Korea must occur, as an alternative the American Navy should boost its presence in Hawaii and Guam. China is a naval power, but feels hemmed in by the “first island chain” of Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines – all U.S. allies. At a minimum, the U.S. must reinforce its presence in the “second island chain” of American Pacificterritories.
The U.S. has been the leading superpower in Asia since 1945, and its record of balancing power in the region is one of success. Between 1895 and 1945, Japan and China fought each other twice, at a cost of tens of millions of lives (mostly Chinese), and nearly 100 million refugees. Japan and Russia also fought twice. While obviously war in the region did not end after the U.S. entered the scene – the Korean and Vietnam Wars loom large, both part of the broader Cold War – but never since have two Asian powers fought each other. Further, the post-1945 U.S. security guarantee has presided over near-unanimous, unprecedented, economic growth from Japan, to China, to Taiwan, to Singapore, and nearly all points in between. This is no accident. When countries are at peace with their neighbors, and do not have to divert resources to build up their militaries, they can grow economically. Because the America is located far across the Pacific from Asia, the Asian countries (rightly) view the U.S. as an unthreatening, unbiased arbiter, making the seas safe for commerce without imperial designs. Not so China. This is what makes China’s aggression towards its neighbors all the more ominous.
Putin may continue to annex Russian-speaking regions in East Ukraine, which will indirectly strengthen the rest of Ukraine, and also correct some of the historical accident that are that country’s existing borders. But the U.S. needs to make extra sure that China does not mistake Moscow’s actions for America’s weakness. The U.S. owes it to its allies, and to the remarkable record of peace and prosperity that Asia has experienced over the past decades, to ensure that its presence as an Asian superpower continues.
