INTERVIEW/ Michael Green: Concerns about China's rise boost support for U.S. rebalance to Asia
A top Asia expert at an influential Washington-based think tank said an overwhelming number of “strategic elites” in the Asia-Pacific region support the U.S. rebalance policy because they are concerned about China's growing influence.
A survey of 402 nongovernmental policy experts in 10 countries and Taiwan, conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in March and April, found that an average of 79 percent of respondents supported the U.S. goal of rebalance to Asia.
“If it weren’t for China, that number would be much lower,” CSIS Vice President Michael Green told The Asahi Shimbun, which helped to conduct the survey, in a recent interview.
Green cautioned that China’s increasing economic might “does not mean that China can create a kind of autarchic economic system in Asia.”
Green also pointed out a shift in South Korean views on its neighboring countries.
“Now they have a much more benign view of China even though they are very pro-U.S.,” he said. “Another shift is they’re now much more negative about Japan than before.”
Referring to the simmering tension between the United States and Japan over Tokyo’s cautious handling of the Ukraine issue, Green urged Japan to stand firm with other G-7 countries on sanctions against Russia.
“If it doesn’t, the implications for the East China Sea are bad, but the implications for the larger solidarity of the West when lots of countries, not just China, are challenging not only the U.S. primacy but the primacy of the neo-liberal order, that’s really bad for Japan,” he said.
Excerpts from his interview follow.
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Question: The survey found overwhelming support, about 80 percent, for the U.S. rebalance all through the region. Is this a reflection of the concern about China’s rise?
Green: I think it is. Frankly speaking, if it weren’t for China, that number would be much lower.
The regional states are critical of rebalance, but they want it to work. Overwhelmingly, they want the United States to be the primary power in Asia. This is a stark difference from the previous polls.
Why? Because when there’s no major power challenging the United States, then they worry the United States will use its power to influence their culture or their economy. But when you have a big power like China using coercion, then there’s no room to complain about the Americans.
The other thing that’s quite striking is when asked about how to characterize the rebalance, nobody in the region says it’s too confrontational toward China except the Chinese. Everybody else in the region wants this to work. I think that is one important lesson for Beijing from this survey.
Q: The most popular characterization of rebalance was the “right policy but insufficient resources and implementation.” How can the United States mitigate this skepticism about the implementability of the rebalance?
A: Number one is they need a consistent and comprehensive explanation of an Asia strategy that is optimistic but not overly idealistic.
Secondly, they need to be more energetic on trade, and especially the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) free trade agreement, and that doesn’t mean in summits in Asia, but it means also with Congress.
I spoke recently with a very senior official from the region, who was in Washington, not Japanese, trying to understand what’s the administration’s plan for the TPA (trade promotion authority). This very senior official said he came away from a week in Washington completely confused.
Finally, the rebalance or pivot was very personality-dependent. It really depended on who was doing it. And it’s not clear now who’s doing it after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and others, who were associated with the rebalance, are gone.
It’s not that senior people have to take more trips, but they have to really think through carefully and craft their message. They have to develop personal relationships with their counterparts that can sustain hard times.
Q: In contrast with the overwhelming support for the U.S. rebalance, the survey found that on the question: “Which country will be your most important economic partner 10 years from now?” China scored 56 percent, while the United States got only 28 percent. Why?
A: I think it reflects the trend, but not the reality, if you will. In other words, any assessment of China, even with slowing economic growth, would take account of a consumer class that’s growing. It’s already half a billion people.
With the development of the west and northeast of China, the number of people coming into the consumer class is going to grow even if the economy slows down. For exporters, that’s unmistakable.
Even though trade with China, for many of these countries, will increase faster than trade with the United States, and since the Chinese economy, or trade with China, is increasingly part of a global production network and financial flow, the increase does not mean that China can create a kind of autarchic economic system in Asia.
Q: Compared with the previous survey in 2008-09, it seems that polarization has been further developed between the countries that found more importance in China, such as Australia and South Korea and the other group of countries, which chose the United States over China. They are Japan and India. What is your view?
A: That is one striking result, and it raises the question whether U.S. allies can deepen their economic ties with China and, at the same time, deepen their security ties with the United States.
I think Singapore, as a trading state, is used to this idea of having a strong economic partnership with one country and strong security partnership with another. But for Australia and (South) Korea, it’s somewhat new.
For (South) Korea, I think, it is quite striking because the last time, when the Koreans were asked about not just economic interdependence with China, but also China’s threat, they were much more focused on China as a threat. Now they have a much more benign view of China even though they are very pro-U.S.
Another shift is they’re now much more negative about Japan than before. Many in Washington, and especially Japan, have been troubled by these dynamics, but the biggest danger is that China misunderstands and thinks (South) Korea is in play. If you look at our survey results, you see very strong Korean support for U.S. leadership in Asia, only topped by American and Japanese experts.
Q: One view is that Koreans think that the region is moving toward a de facto “G-2” construct, or the U.S.-China condominium. Do you agree?
A: I think the calculation among foreign policy experts in Seoul has been that this “G-2,” or a U.S.-China bipolar condominium, is a reality. I hear many, many Korean experts talk about a U.S.-China strategic relationship or a “new model of great power relations.” The Koreans seem to have internalized that as the assumption behind their strategy.
For the (South) Korean government, it solves their dilemma which is, on the one hand, they want to have closer ties with China economically and politically after a very bad relationship under former President Lee Myung-bak. At the same time, (President) Park Geun-hye is very pro-U.S. and wants to strengthen the U.S.-Korea alliance.
I think the Blue House has had a very simple formula, and they think the way you do these both is to keep Japan at more of a distance.
But I think what the Koreans have learned is that for the United States, this kind of approach comes as very counterproductive. It’s very bad for the U.S. interests. I think they’re adjusting. I think this tilt of Koreans to China has reached its limit for now, and (South) Korea will slowly come back.
This has especially been true since Beijing pressured (South) Korea--without success--to sign on to an anti-alliance statement at the Shanghai Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in May.
But, of course, the United States needs Japan also to be extremely careful on sensitive history issues, and not make the situation even worse.
Q: You told me that when you gave a briefing on the survey results on the territorial disputes to one of those ambassadors in Washington, D.C., he was disturbed by the very high level of willingness of each country, especially Japan and China, to resort to the use of force if diplomacy fails. What should we read into this result?
A: I think one of the most striking results was that Japanese experts are quite willing to resort to force. The numbers were almost identical for both Japan (81 percent) and China (83 percent).
What does that mean? I mean, in some ways, it’s a useful message for the Chinese to know that there’s resolve in Tokyo (to retake the islands using military force), and that’s important to deterrence.
I don’t think that many other countries in South or Southeast Asia will be too alarmed at that result. For the most part, I think that the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and others would like Japan to be firm.
About the unresolved historical issues, we asked, “Will it be a source of diplomatic problem or military conflict?” Basically the Japanese consensus was these will remain diplomatic problems. But the Chinese respondents, almost twice as many as the Japanese, said that it could lead to military conflict. This is alarming.
I think the Japanese respondents’ resolve is important to deterrence, and the Japanese respondents’ expectation that this will remain a diplomatic problem is important.
Q: According to the survey, the most significant obstacle for community building in East Asia is a “failure to resolve territorial issues.” What is your comment?
A: I think that’s important. I mean, five years ago, both our survey and most literature about East Asia community building focused on a lack of common political systems, different levels of economic development, but not security challenges.
This time, what’s striking is that the major obstacle is viewed as security challenges, especially territorial disputes. What that shows you is that the intensification, especially by the Chinese side, of military coercion has become the main concern for the whole region.
The region is worried about Japan, (South) Korea or Malaysia; they’re worried about China. There is a connection between that and the desire for the continued U.S. primacy.
The fact that the Chinese have demonstrated, since our last survey in 2008-09, an increasing willingness to use their military and economic coercive power is maybe the defining change from our last survey.
Q: What do you think Japan should do to deal with the tension with China over the Senkaku Islands issue?
A: I think before Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came to power, the Japanese position was very unpredictable and, especially at the leadership level, unclear. I think Mr. Abe has been very clear, and that resolve is one of the most critical elements, because resolve will deter China from trying to do what it is doing to Vietnam.
But Japanese resolve alone is not enough because the Chinese strategy is an effort to divide the United States and Japan. How? By provoking Japan to be too strong (and) by trying to create a situation where the Americans worry about Japan pulling us into a fight.
The Chinese work very hard, working overtime in Washington and around the region, to try to convince the Americans that Japan--the Abe administration--is dangerous and that the United States has to contain Japan.
Q: Is it working?
A: No. I think that’s clear in President (Barack) Obama’s statement on Article 5 (of the Japan-U.S. security treaty being applied to the defense of the Senkaku Islands) and opposition to unilateral coercion in Japan.
But what’s worrisome is the Chinese were shocked by that statement and very angry. I say that’s worrisome because what that reveals is the Chinese thought it was working. We need to think about not just the message on the U.S.-Japan alliance in Japan, but also we need to think very hard about how the message is being read in China.
Q: Next on democratic values. You mentioned that U.S. foreign policy elites are walking away from democratic values. What’s happening?
A: Well, there is no doubt that American elites and the American public want a world that looks more like us. That has rule of law, democratic norms and so forth. That has been an indispensable part of our Asia strategy for over 100 years.
The most shocking result for me in this survey is the complete drop of the American experts on the promotion of these values. More than 80 American experts on Asia policy answered this survey. The drop is enormous.
Q: Why do you think it turned out to be that way?
A: I think it is not about Asia. I think there are several things at play. One is the Middle East. The elections and democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq have been hard. In Egypt, it’s been a huge disappointment, the Arab Spring.
The American experience in the Middle East has been that the democratic process, the democratic transitions are disastrous everywhere, and when the United States intervenes, we get burned, and we should just not get involved. So part of this is based on the Middle East experience, which is really seared into the American consciousness.
The second reason is because Obama doesn’t talk about this. This is not a theme for Obama the way it was for (Bill) Clinton and (George W.) Bush. You don’t hear the president, National Security Adviser Susan Rice, Secretary of State John Kerry or Vice President Joe Biden talking about democratic values in Asia, the way Clinton and Bush did.
It’s a huge strategic blindside or mistake for the United States because when you look at the rest of the region, except for China, they’re all moving in the direction of seeing rule of law, women’s empowerment, elections, human rights.
It’s in their interests. Not in a revolutionary way, but step by step based on consensus. That’s the direction every country we surveyed is going, except for China.
We are in this strange situation where the American respondents were at the bottom of the list when asked about the importance of these values sometimes even below China.
Q: Speaking of values and principles, the Ukraine issue is causing some frictions and creating tensions between the United States and Japan because the United States thinks that Japan is trying to promote its own interests on the Northern Territories and/or energy imports, walking away from the principles, such as territorial integrity or noninterference.
A: I think the Abe, or the Japanese, government has an inherent dislike of any sanctions against countries that produce natural gas or oil. The Japanese government never liked sanctions on Burma (Myanmar), never liked sanctions on Iran, doesn’t like sanctions on Russia. That’s a kind of residual mercantilism, kind of, still.
But in this case, Japan has got to stand with the G-7. If it doesn’t, the implications for the East China Sea are bad, but the implications for the larger solidarity of the West when lots of countries, not just China, are challenging not only the U.S. primacy but the primacy of the neo-liberal order, that’s really bad for Japan.
By the way, the payoff for Japan, Russia is not going to do that much for the Japanese government. It’s not going to, I mean, there may be an LNG deal, there may be some Northern Territories deal, but (Russian President Vladimir) Putin is not in the business of giving up territory. Putin is in the business of rebuilding the former Soviet Union.
The last thing he’s going to do is to make some compromise on the Northern Territories right now.
In terms of the Chinese, the Chinese will use Putin. The Chinese will use Putin to make Japan a little nervous and to make the United States a little nervous. But Putin is not going to form a new Cold War alliance with China.
Tokyo has got to consider not only the consequences of not standing with the G-7, which are bad, but also what’s the upside of trying to maintain the same strategic relationship with Russia?
The upside is going to be pretty limited. Putin is not going to help counter China, and he’s not going to give up territory. That’s just not who Putin is.
Q: What Japanese government officials are saying is that they are not naive enough to think that Putin is going to make a favorable deal on the Northern Territories issue if Japan takes a nuanced position over the Ukraine issue. Their intention is, they say, to avoid pushing Russia toward China, and to prevent China and Russia from getting together and coming at Japan and the United States.
A: Yeah, so that’s a very, sort of, simplistic “one plus one equals two” strategic view of the problem. Look, Russia and China are going to move closer together because it’s convenient for them both.
But China is going to put the brakes on it because China is not ready to confront the United States and doesn’t want to be accountable for what Putin does. In the United Nations Security Council, China abstained. They didn’t support the Russians. They don’t want to be too implicated.
The Russians, they’re going to be limited in what they do with China because in the Russian Far East, there are 7 million Russians next to 1.3 billion Chinese. And the Russian population is shrinking.
The strategic conditions that allow Japan to steadily develop relations with Russia will be there.
But if there is not a very strong, cohesive, coherent and unified message from the G-7 now, and if Russia actually starts breaking up Ukraine, beyond Crimea, and starts interfering even in Latvia and Estonia, then that will create an enormous pressure on Japan and ruin Japan’s strategy.
Q: How could it be bad for the East China Sea situation?
A: It’ll be bad in two ways. Number one, it will demonstrate that when the Russians or the Chinese--continental, hegemonic powers--use coercive military pressure in a gray area to seize territory, sovereign territory, from another country, the West, so to speak, or the democratic countries, break apart.
That’s bad because it means if China uses a similar tactic in the East China Sea or the South China Sea, Europe won’t be there. Maybe the United States won’t stand there.
These regional--Central Europe or East Asian--uses of coercion need a global response from the G-7 countries of the democracies. If Putin gets away with this and Japan is not part of it, it demonstrates that when these powers use coercion to change the status quo, there is not global solidarity.
The second problem for Japan is if Japan breaks ranks, the Obama administration will be very angry, and everyone will know. It will reopen the possibility for China to use its wedge strategy and to convince the Americans the Japanese aren’t reliable.
The Chinese will use it. The Chinese aren’t going to say that Japan should be more tough on Russia. They don’t care. But the Chinese will notice the sudden lack of trust again in U.S.-Japan relations and will try their strategy again, “You can’t trust the Japanese.”
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Michael Green is senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and an associate professor at the Georgetown University. He served as senior director for Asia at the National Security Council under the Bush administration until 2005.
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