Power grab: Xi Jinping has not hesitated to seize power in China and on the world stage Special to WorldTribune.com

Power grab: Xi Jinping has not hesitated to seize power in China and on the world stage

Special to WorldTribune.com

Parris H. Chang

In the wake of Xi Jinping’s leadership ascendancy since the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, Beijing’s aggressive posture in the Asia-Pacific region has become clearly discernible. China’s steady thrust into the South China Sea and sudden establishment of an air defense identification zone near Japan underline Xi’s ambition about China’s domination of Asia.

Unlike his predecessor Hu Jintao, who nominally presided over the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), but made decisions collectively with the regime’s top policy-making body, the seemingly mild-mannered Xi commands and rules the PSC. He heads and commands all the leadership organs of the Party, state and military.

In addition, he has amassed powers through newly established functional bodies, including the National Security Commission, the Leading Working Group on Overall Reform, and the Leading Working Group on Cyber-Security and Information Security. By heading these functional leadership bodies, Xi exercises direct control and acquires additional power over economy and information/ideology, which Xi’s two PSC colleagues, Premier Li Keqiang and Liu Yunbau, were primarily responsible.

Previously, the CCP leadership was noted for factional politics and wrangle. Leaders representing the interests of China’s military-industrial complex and the “oil lobby” were actively involved in the leadership consensus-building process regarding not only China’s foreign and security policy, but economic and trade policy as well.

Changes have taken place in the context of Xi’s rise. In the name of anti-graft, he has engineered the purge of corrupted senior officials. The campaign to take down “tigers and flies” also serves to remove political rivals as well as to enhance his hold on power.

The disgrace of Zhou Yungkang, an ex-member of the PSC, and the regime’s security czar and head of the oil lobby prior to his retirement in November 2012, carries immense political implications. Zhou came under house arrest since 2013 to face questions on charges of corruption and other serious wrongdoings by a special task force set up by the Party’s anti-graft watchdog body, prior to the formal announcement of his investigation at the end of July.

In March, Chinese authorities seized assets worth more than 90 billion Yuan from Zhou’s family members and associates, and took into custody more than 300 of Zhou’s relatives, protégés and political allies. Zhou’s associates and protégés in the oil lobby, notably Jiang Jiemin, former chairman of China’s National Petroleum Co., and other chieftains in the energy sectors and the state owned enterprises were removed.

On June 30, the Party hunted down a big “tiger” in the PLA, Gen. Xu Caihou, formerly a member of the CCP Politburo and Vice-Chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC) during 2004-2012, who was in charge of the PLA daily affairs, and known to be former party leader Jiang Zemin’s protégé and spokesman.

Xu was expelled from the party at a Politburo meeting chaired by Xi on June 30. Reports indicate Xu’s four principal assistants and dozens of ranking PLA officers he promoted or appointed are also under investigation.

Likewise, Gen. Guo Pohsiung, a Politburo member and Vice-Chairman of the CMC, another big “tiger,” is also under investigation. Guo and his son, another PLA officer, have been detained for questioning, but their offences are yet to be made public. Scores of the PLA officers who were appointed or promoted by Xu and Guo have been removed from their positions. Xi Jinping has seized the opportunities to reward or co-opt supporters by promoting them or appointing them to the key posts that have become vacant.

Corruption is a problem that pervades the PLA. Notwithstanding the constraints on anti-corruption enforcement and political risks involved in blackening the PLA image in a big campaign, Xi described corruption as a “do-or-die struggle” and warned that widespread graft in the military poses as much of a threat to China’s security as the United States. Hence, he is determined to push an all-out offensive against the vested interests and embark on a concerted and sustained campaign against the corruption.

In so doing, Xi has apparently elevated his leadership authority in the PLA and in the nation. On four separate occasions in March, April and July, scores of commanding officers in China’s seven military regions, four major departments in the PLA headquarters, Air Force, Navy, and the 2nd Artillery, have pledged their support and loyalty to CMC Chairman Xi Jinping’s leadership and policy.

Xi reigns supreme in the 7-member PSC — the regime’s topmost policymaking — much like the present-day “emperor” with 6 “assistants.”

According to China-watchers, Xi has made all the major strategic decisions virtually single-handedly. With Xi in command, his “China dream” poses a serious challenge to the U.S. domination of Asia-Pacific.

During the past decade, the U.S. has recognized China’s steady rise in economic and military power as well as its growing role in international affairs, and has repeatedly urged Beijing to be an international “responsible stakeholder” and cooperate with the U.S. to manage and solve the regional and global problems.

On the other hand, however, Chinese officials disapprove the advice, viewing it as a sinister ploy to impair China’s rightful place in the world and to strengthen the international order dominated by the U.S.

Xi Jinping is a staunch Marxist and a revisionist, determined to challenge the Pax Americana and bring changes to the existing international order and its rules of game. He has called for a new model of great powers relationship, a parity in the Sino-U.S. relations, and demanded Washington to respect China’s core interests, including termination of the arms sales to Taiwan.

In an international gathering at Shanghai in May, Xi was audacious enough to propose a new Asia security concept — ideas for a new order in Asia, with China at the center, and the exclusion of the U.S.

Xi is also taking the lead to work with the leaders of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) nations to set up a new international bank to help the world’s developing countries. As an alternative and challenge to the U.S.-led International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the BRICS bank will be based in Shanghai, and China will put up 40 percent of the bank’s initial capital $100 billion.

Xi Jinping’s China dream is that China would build the world’s largest economy and strongest military. He believed that, as the U.S. is in decline, China will eventually supplant the U.S. as the global “champion nation.”

Can the U.S. pivot to Asia strategy contain and check China’s expansionism? Most analysts are concerned with the stark imbalance between end and means in the U.S. strategy. To implement and carry out the objectives of the “pivot,” the U.S. must have sufficient financial resources and an ability to use military means purposefully.

• Parris Chang is a professor emeritus of political science at Pennsylvania State University and President of the Taiwan Institute for Political, Economic and Strategic Studies.