Wednesday, August 26, 2015

US Releases Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy -

ASIA PACIFIC

US Releases Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy

By Cody M. Poplin
 Wednesday, August 26, 2015, 4:10 PM
Last week, the Pentagon released a new Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy document outlining the Department's plan for ensuring the freedom of the seas and the broader security of the region. While the strategy is careful to not exclusively focus on the rise of China, the country's central role in U.S. strategic thinking is hard to miss, and the military touted the report as the "most comprehensive assessment of land reclamation activities in the South China Sea" to date. The document rejects Chinese sovereignty claims over disputed islands in the South China Sea, asserts that the United States will enhance its "force posture and persistent presence" in the region while "building the capacity' of allies and partners, and explicitely supports India's "Act East" policy as a "strategic convergence" with the U.S. re-balance, embracing India as a "net provider of security in the Indian Ocean region and beyond."
The report notes that at present the United States maintains 368,000 military personnel in the Asia-Pacific region, and that over the next five years, the U.S. Navy will increase the number of ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet by approximately 30 percent. The report also says that by 2020, 60 percent of U.S. naval and overseas air assets will be based in the Pacific. The Department is also set to procure 395 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters over the next several years, "many of which will be deployed to the Asia-Pacific region." 
The newly released strategy document is especially interesting when compared with the first public Chinese Military Strategy white paper, which was released by the PRC in May. That paper outlined an "active defense posture" and asserted the importance of a larger Chinese naval presence capable of operating farther from its shores. The strategy document also called for the creation of a new "cyber force" to meet the growing cyberthreats the People's Liberation Army expects to encounter. 
The new U.S. Asia-Pacific maritime security strategy document begins:
Recognizing the growing complexity of the Asia-Pacific region and its maritime domain for the security of the United States, the Department is focused on safeguarding freedom of the seas, deterring conflict and coercion, and promoting adherence to international law and standards. As it does around the world, the Department will continue to fly, sail, and operate whereever international law allows, in support of these goals and in order to preserve the peace and security the Asia-Pacific Region has enjoyed for the past 70 years. 
Recognizing the growing complexity of the Asia-Pacific maritime domain, this report outlines four lines of effort the Department is employing in order to preserve security in this vital region. First, we are strengthening our military capacity to ensure the United States can successfully deter conflict and coercion and response decisively when needed. Second, we are working together with our allies and partners from Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean to build their capacity to address potentialchallenges in their waters and across the region. Third, we are leveraging military diplomacy to build greater transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation or conflict, and promote shared maritime rules of the road. Finally, we are working to strengthen regional security institutions and encourage the development of an open and effective regionl security architecture. Together with out inter-agency colleagues and regional allies and partners, the Department is focused on ensuring that maritime Asia remains open, free, and secure in the decades ahead. 


 
The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy 
4
 
ACHIEVING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
 
The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy 
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ACHIEVING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
or decades, the Asia-Pacific region has remained free from major conflicts, allowing nations to continue enjoying the benefits of the maritime domain. However, the security environment is changing, potentially challenging the continued stability of the region. Rapid economic and military modernization, combined  with growing resource demands, has exacerbated the potential for conflict over long-standing territorial disputes. In addition, non-traditional threats such as weapons proliferation, human and other illicit trafficking, piracy, and natural disasters continue to pose significant security challenges. On the other hand, we have seen a number of positive trends in recent years as well, including the peaceful resolution of some maritime disputes in the region. 
[1] Competing Territorial and Maritime Claims 
 
 There are numerous, complex maritime and territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific region. The presence of valuable fish stocks and potential existence of large hydrocarbon resources under the East and South China Seas exacerbate these complicated claims. A United Nations report estimates that the South China Sea alone accounts for more than 10 percent of global fisheries production. Though figures vary substantially, the Energy Information Administration estimates that there are approximately 11 billion barrels and 190 trillion cubic feet of proved and probable oil and natural gas reserves in the South China Sea and anywhere from one to two trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, and 200 million barrels of oil in the East China Sea. Claimants regularly clash over fishing rights, and earlier attempts at joint development agreements have faltered in recent years. 
 
U.S. allies and partners are seeking U.S. leadership and engagement in maritime Asia. 
 
The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy 
6
 
ACHIEVING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
 Although the United States takes no position on competing sovereignty claims to land features in the region, all such claims must be based upon land (which in the case of islands means naturally formed areas of land that are above water at high tide), and all maritime claims must derive from such land in accordance with international law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. The United States has a strong interest in ensuring all claimants seek to address and resolve their issues peacefully, without conflict or coercion. We also encourage and support the efforts of claimant States to pursue diplomatic and other peaceful efforts to resolve the issues of sovereignty. In the East China Sea, we continue to acknowledge 
 Japan’s
 administration of the Senkaku Islands and oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine it. In the South China Sea, we urge all parties to pursue peaceful means of resolving their disputes, which includes diplomacy as well as third party dispute settlement, such as the 
Philippines’
 submission of its claims for arbitration in accordance with the dispute resolution procedures in the Law of the Sea Convention. We also urge all parties to take action to implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) and take steps towards early conclusion of a meaningful Code of Conduct (CoC), which  would provide agreed upon rules of the road to reduce tension among claimant States. 
South China Sea 
South China Sea territorial and maritime disputes revolve around three primary issues: (1) competing territorial claims among claimants, (2) competing maritime claims among claimants, and (3) excessive maritime claims asserted by some of the claimants. Regarding competing territorial claims, there are six claimants to the land features in the South China Sea: Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.  There are three primary disputes over territorial sovereignty. The first is dispute among China, Taiwan, and  Vietnam over the sovereignty of the Paracel Islands, which China has occupied since 1974. The second is a China- Taiwan-Philippines contest over Scarborough Reef. The third is multi-claimant dispute over the Spratly Islands,  which includes more than 200 geographic features. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim sovereignty over all of the Spratly land features, while Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines claim sovereignty of only certain land features in the island group. Vietnam and Malaysia have yet to delimit fully their maritime claims in the South China Sea. 
The United States has a strong interest in ensuring all claimants seek to address and resolve their competing sovereignty claims peacefully, without conflict or coercion. 
 
The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy 
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ACHIEVING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
Regarding competing maritime claims, claimants assert a combination of sovereignty, resource-related sovereign rights, and jurisdictional claims to the maritime areas located within the South China Sea. Some of these claimants have clarified the nature and breadth of their maritime claims, but others have not. For example, although 
Indonesia’s
 claimed Exclusive Economic Zone extends into the South China Sea, the Indonesian government does not currently recognize 
China’s
 so-called 
“Nine
-Dash 
Line”
 (which overlaps with that EEZ) and so does not consider itself a claimant in any South China Sea-related maritime dispute. Regarding excessive maritime claims, several claimants within the region have asserted maritime claims along their coastlines and around land features that are inconsistent with international law. For example, Malaysia attempts to restrict foreign military activities within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and Vietnam attempts to require notification by foreign warships prior to exercising the right of innocent passage through its territorial sea. A number of countries have drawn coastal baselines (the lines from which the breadth of maritime entitlements are measured) that are inconsistent with international law, including  Vietnam and China, and the United States also has raised concerns with respect to 
 Taiwan’s
 Law on 
The United States encourages all claimants to conform their maritime claims to international law.
 
 
The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy 
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ACHIEVING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone’s
 provisions on baselines and innocent passage in the territorial sea.  Although we applaud the 
Philippines’
 and 
 Vietnam’s
 efforts to bring its maritime claims in line with the Law of the Sea Convention, more work remains to be done. Consistent with the long-standing U.S. Freedom of Navigation Policy, the United States encourages all claimants to conform their maritime claims to international law and challenges excessive maritime claims through U.S. diplomatic protests and operational activities. China has not clearly defined the scope of its maritime claims in the South China Sea. In May 2009, China communicated two Notes Verbales to the UN Secretary General stating objections to the submissions by Vietnam and Malaysia (jointly) and Vietnam (individually) to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The notes, among other things, included a map depicting nine line segments (dashes) encircling waters, islands and other features in the South China Sea and encompassing approximately two million square kilometers of maritime space.  The 2009 Note Verbales also included 
China’s
 assertion that it has 
“indisputable
 sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil 
thereof.”
 
China’s
 actions and rhetoric have left unclear the precise nature of its maritime claim, including whether China claims all of the maritime area located within the line as well as all land features located therein.
2
 
East China Sea 
Since the 1972 reversion of Okinawa and other Ryukyu Islands from the United States, Japan has administered the Senkaku Islands. In April 2012, the Governor of Tokyo announced plans to purchase three of the five islets from private Japanese owners, prompting the Government of Japan to purchase the three islands in September 2012 in anattempt to prevent sparking a crisis. However, China interpreted the action as an attempt to change the status quo and protested the move, re-kindling tensions between the neighboring countries. Regarding the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the East China Sea, China has voiced a claim to an extended continental shelf that extends beyond the midpoint between China and Japan (i.e., in an area more than 200 nautical miles from China but within 200 nautical miles of Japan). The unresolved maritime boundary continues to create tensions over access to fish and hydrocarbon resources in that area.  Through a persistent military and law enforcement presence and the announcement in November 2013 of a new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, which the United States does not recognize, China continues to engage in actions that appear designed to challenge Japan's administration of the Senkaku Islands. China has sent Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) ships (and less often, aircraft) on a regular basis to patrol near the Senkaku Islands, including within 12 nautical miles from the islands. Japan has responded, sending increased patrols by the Japan Coast Guard to support its administration of the islands.  As President Obama noted in Tokyo last year and reiterated earlier this year during Prime Minister 
 Abe’s
 visit, 
“our
 treaty commitment to 
 Japan’
s security is absolute, and Article 5 covers all territories under Japan's administration, including the Senkaku 
Islands”
 
 – 
 a point that Secretaries Carter and Kerry also reaffirmed with their Japanese counterparts on Monday, April 27, 2015, during the 
“2+2”
 meeting in New York. We will continue to oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine 
 Japan’
administration. 
2
 
On December 5, 2014, the State Department issued a study examining 
China’s
 Maritime Claims in the South China Sea in its Series, Limits in the Seas No. 143.
 

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