Jamil Maidan Flores: Challenging China in the South China Sea
Why is China so bellicose in the South China Sea? I don’t believe it’s because it wants to hog all the wealth that lies under the waves.
I think it has more to do with a historical trauma and a perceived geostrategic threat. The historical trauma is the “Century of Humiliation” that China suffered between 1838 and 1948 when it was near zero as a naval power. Because of this weakness it was forced to conclude peace with invading Western powers on humiliating terms.
Never again! That’s what China says as it builds its blue-water navy at an exponential rate. Thus it prepares itself for what it perceives to be a looming geostrategic threat: the possibility of another era of humiliation, this time not necessarily in terms of a foreign invasion. It could be in the structure of a naval embargo of its seaports.
The backbone of the Chinese economy lies in the factories and business centers of its coastal cities. Starve those cities of their imports and block their exports with an embargo and you’ve crippled the Chinese economy.
Nobody has voiced that threat. It’s a Chinese perception based on history and geography — reinforced by the reality of US rebalancing to East Asia. China has been responding to that perceived threat by behaving as it does in the South China Sea. At times it acts the bully elbowing out smaller nations. At times it comports itself as the military upstart with hegemonic ambitions. But deep down it’s just another state seeking to ensure its long-term survival by acting on its own perceptions of the real world.
Hence, it wouldn’t be right to demonize China for what it’s doing in the South China Sea. But it would be harebrained to let China have its way, for it has chosen the wrong means to ensure against being humiliated again. It has resorted to draconian methods that injure the interests of neighbors and destabilize the region to the extent of risking war.
How to deal with China then? Fortunately China is not only a naval power. It’s also an economy in need of partners. US allies like the UK and Australia have shrugged off American disapproval and joined China’s version of the World Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
China can be a difficult economic partner, as some African countries have found out. There are, however, other ways of engaging China peacefully, including cooperation in addressing non-traditional security threats like piracy off Somalia, and natural disasters.
But in the South China Sea, China must be challenged, as it’s being challenged today by Asean diplomats negotiating with China toward a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. They’re pressing for brisker substantive talks in the face of Chinese stonewalling.
More straightforward, Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs Luhut Panjaitan recently spoke of bringing the issue of China’s claim to waters near Indonesian-owned Natuna Island before an international court.
The US challenge has been largely in the form of freedom of navigation operations: US naval ships advance to within 12 nautical miles of China’s artificial islands to demonstrate that these are international waters, over which China has no valid claim. This is a risky challenge but arguably necessary, even imperative, lest China begin to believe that no one has the will to confront it militarily.
The strongest challenge to China’s expansionary maneuvers, however, is still the Philippine’s legal submission before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague questioning the validity of China’s nine-dash line claim.
Although China refuses to take part in the arbitration, and has announced it won’t comply with any decision of the court, the fact remains that whatever the court decides will become international law. Already the court has thrown out China’s position that it lacks jurisdiction on the case. If the court’s ultimate finding were against China, it could serve as basis for a draft UN General Assembly resolution that could be tabled against China year after year.
The decision would be unenforceable, but it could be used by other nations to bludgeon China in international forums. It would encourage rival claimants, Vietnam for example, to bring their own cases before an international tribunal.
The beauty of challenging China through litigation is that China can’t effectively reply with fire drills. Under intense diplomatic pressure, it may even be prompted to conclude a legally binding Code of Conduct with Asean. Or to negotiate with rival claimants, this time in good faith.
Thus international law provides tremendous soft power to small nations — even in the South China Sea.
Jamil Maidan Flores is a Jakarta-based literary writer whose interests include philosophy and foreign policy. The views expressed here are his own. He may be contacted at jamilmaidanflores@gmail.com.
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