Saturday, May 28, 2016

South China Sea: After Chabahar, Tap Malacca Strait

"The South China Sea functions as the throat of the Western Pacific and Indian oceans - the mass of connective economic tissue where global sea routes coalesce. Here is the heart of Eurasia’s navigable rimland, punctuated by the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar straits. More than half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through these choke points, and a third of all maritime traffic worldwide. The oil transported through the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean, en route to East Asia through the South China Sea, is triple the amount that passes through the Suez Canal and fifteen times the amount that transits the Panama Canal.
In addition to centrality of location, the South China Sea has proven oil reserves of seven billion barrels, and an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. If Chinese calculations are correct that the South China Sea will ultimately yield 130 billion barrels of oil (and there is some serious doubt about these estimates), then the South China Sea contains more oil than any area of the globe except Saudi Arabia. Some Chinese observers have called the South China Sea “the second Persian Gulf.”
"If there really is so much oil in the South China Sea, then China will have partially alleviated its “Malacca dilemma” — its reliance on the narrow and vulnerable Strait of Malacca for so much of its energy needs coming from the Middle East. And the China National Offshore Oil Corporation has invested $20 billion in the belief that such amounts of oil really do exist in the South China Sea. China is desperate for new energy. Chinese oil reserves account for only 1.1 percent of the world total, while it consumes over 10 percent of world oil production and over 20 percent of all the energy consumed on the planet. It is not only location and energy reserves that promise to give the South China Sea critical geostrategic importance; it is the territorial disputes — mainly because of the oil and natural gas that might lie nearby in the intricate, folded layers of rock beneath the sea. Brunei claims a southern reef of the Spratly Islands. Malaysia claims three islands in the Spratlys. The Philippines claims eight islands in the Spratlys and significant portions of the South China Sea. Vietnam, Taiwan, and China each claim much of the South China Sea, and all of the Spratly and Paracel island groups.
So, India can’t afford to over step in its Malacca Plan. It needs slow and speedy steps as it did in the case of Chabhar."



After Chabahar, Tap Malacca Strait


By Sunil Dang
Amid news of Indian Premiere sealing the deal for commissioning Chabahar — a historical rendezvous — during his visit to Iran, we came across another Chinese ‘String of Pearls’ Plan which it has innovated these days through Bhutan. The two nations are engaged in secret talks to settle down their border dispute. So, in a tit-for-tat response, the Indian government decided to give back the Dutch Therapy which china deserves. Chabahar would not only establish Indian access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, it would help New Delhi negate any Pak sponsored terrorist activity. But, the government can take this initiative to its zenith by trying to restrict Chinese access in the South China Sea. It is possible if the Indian government get hold in Malacca Strait by repeating Chabahar there.
It is said that in today’s world, if you want to destabilize any country, poke tension among its neighbours and choke its energy resources. In regard to Malacca Island which provides China and its other neighbor countries an access to the Middle East and African countries, Eighty percent of Japanese and 39 percent of Chinese oil imports pass through the Indian Ocean route from the Middle East. Chinese firms also have billions of dollars of investments in East Africa, concentrated primarily in the oil and gas, railways and roads, and other mining sectors.
The South China Sea functions as the throat of the Western Pacific and Indian oceans - the mass of connective economic tissue where global sea routes coalesce. Here is the heart of Eurasia’s navigable rimland, punctuated by the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar straits. More than half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through these choke points, and a third of all maritime traffic worldwide. The oil transported through the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean, en route to East Asia through the South China Sea, is triple the amount that passes through the Suez Canal and fifteen times the amount that transits the Panama Canal.
In addition to centrality of location, the South China Sea has proven oil reserves of seven billion barrels, and an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. If Chinese calculations are correct that the South China Sea will ultimately yield 130 billion barrels of oil (and there is some serious doubt about these estimates), then the South China Sea contains more oil than any area of the globe except Saudi Arabia. Some Chinese observers have called the South China Sea “the second Persian Gulf.”
If there really is so much oil in the South China Sea, then China will have partially alleviated its “Malacca dilemma” — its reliance on the narrow and vulnerable Strait of Malacca for so much of its energy needs coming from the Middle East. And the China National Offshore Oil Corporation has invested $20 billion in the belief that such amounts of oil really do exist in the South China Sea. China is desperate for new energy. Chinese oil reserves account for only 1.1 percent of the world total, while it consumes over 10 percent of world oil production and over 20 percent of all the energy consumed on the planet. It is not only location and energy reserves that promise to give the South China Sea critical geostrategic importance; it is the territorial disputes — mainly because of the oil and natural gas that might lie nearby in the intricate, folded layers of rock beneath the sea. Brunei claims a southern reef of the Spratly Islands. Malaysia claims three islands in the Spratlys. The Philippines claims eight islands in the Spratlys and significant portions of the South China Sea. Vietnam, Taiwan, and China each claim much of the South China Sea, and all of the Spratly and Paracel island groups.
So, India can’t afford to over step in its Malacca Plan. It needs slow and speedy steps as it did in the case of Chabhar.

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