TIME TO GET REAL ON CHINA POLICY
The Pioneer
At a time when China’s relations with the US is at a low ebb, China-Japan relations and China’s ties with some Southeast Asia countries are strained, one of the aims of the Modi Government’s Act East policy is to intensify India’s engagement with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan, Australia and countries like Vietnam, with whom China has territorial disputes.
India’s decision to sell its sophisticated Akash missile defence system to Vietnam will also enhance its strength vis-à-vis China in this region, as Beiijing has in the past objected New Delhi’s engagement in oil and gas exploration activates in South China Sea. Prime Minister Modi’s desire to work with the US and other countries, to ensure peace and security in the South China Sea and India’s participation with the US and Japan in the trilateral Naval exercise in June 2016 in the West Philippine Sea has been seen as a big move to put pressure on China.
The Modi Government’s inclination to accelerate bilateral ties with Taiwan is a very timely move at a time when the Democratic Progressive Party Government, under the leadership of President Tsai Ing-wen, is asserting its position against China and has shown deep interest in expanding ties with India. It was in this context that the recent visit of a three-member women’s parliamentary delegation from Taiwan to India assumed huge significance.
The Modi Government has indeed given a new life to the relationship. While India has shown its willingness to foster economic, cultural and people-to-people ties with China, it has equally reflected its self-confidence to take bold steps to protect its national interests.
TIME TO GET REAL ON CHINA POLICY
Beijing's warnings to India over the Lama’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh underlines the fact that political efforts on part of both countries have not made much headway. This raises fundamental questions about the future of strategic relationship between the two countries
The divide between India and China is widening by the day. The latest development in this regard is China’s objection to the upcoming visit of the Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh on April 4. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang has said that the visit will cause serious damage to the peace and stability of the border region and China-India relations.
On the other hand, the Indian Government has brushed off China’s objection, with Union Minister of State for Home Kiren Rijiju, saying that “the Dalai Lama is going to visit Arunachal Pradesh as a religious leader and there is no reason to stop him as his followers are demanding he should come.”
Of course, this is not the first time when the Middle Kingdom has made pandemonium about such a high-profile visit to Arunachal Pradesh. However, Beijing’s stand on the visit of the Dali Lama has underscored the fact that political efforts that the two countries have taken in the past — towards addressing the core issue of unresolved border dispute — has not made much headway, thereby reducing strategic differences between New Delhi and Beijing.
This, in turn, raises a fundamental question about the future of a strategic relationship between India and China. In fact, we have seen how the first meeting of the strategic dialogue, which was held in Beijing on February 22, largely failed to foster an understanding on the strategic interests and concerns of the two countries.
While both, Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar and China’s State Councillor Yang Jiechi expressed a strong sense of commitment to maintaining the relationship; China completely doused India’s concerns on many burring issues. For instance, China asked for “sold evidence” to designate Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) chief Masood Azhar as a global terrorist at the United Nations 1267 regime. Beijing also overlooked New Delhi’s concern about the proposed China-Pakistan economic corridor passing through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which violates India’s sovereignty.
On the issue of India’s membership to the Nuclear Suppler Group (NSG), China’s response has been lukewarm. In January, Beijing took a dig at the Obama Administration, saying, “NSG membership cannot be a farewell gift for countries to give to each other.” Though during the strategic dialogue, China said that it had an open approach to India’s membership, given Beijing’s obsession about increase in India’s international stature as a member of the NSG and given adverse impact on Beijing’s relations with its all whether friend, Islamabad, sections of the Indian strategic elites are not much optimistic about a possible shift in China’s stand on India’s entry into the NSG.
At a time when there is an increasing yearning for the expansion of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the view of a new emerging global order, with India, Japan, Brazil, Germany and the G4 being the main contenders for UNSC permanent membership, China has remained non committed on supporting India’s case for UNSC permanent membership.
China’s admiration for India’s assistance programme in Afghanistan was indeed a welcome development for the bilateral relations and the two countries also focused on exploring the possibility of carrying out joint development projects. Engagement between India and China will certainly help effectively deal with the menace of terrorism in Afghanistan and beyond, especially when both countries are having high security threat from the Islamic State (IS).
However, it is also true that meaningful and durable counter-terrorism cooperation between India and China would not be possible unless China takes a strong stand against Pakistan for providing the breeding ground for terrorist activities in South Asia and elsewhere. China’s behaviour towards India has, therefore, only reinforced the fact that the rise of China is not going to be different from the rise of other powers in the past.
This in-turn requires India to make some fundamental changes in its approach towards seeking peaceful and friendly ties with China and surely, under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi, India’s policy towards China has taken several steps in this regard. While the Modi Government has increased political efforts to engage China, New Delhi has equally focused on countering the assertive posturing of Beijing.
This can be gauged from the fact that while the Indian Government hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2014, and Prime Minister Modi went to China on a three-day state visit in 2015, and also to take part in the G-20 meeting in 2016, with the aim of strengthening the ties, India has strongly criticised the recent incidents of intrusion of Chinese forces into the Indian territory. Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh in 2015, to participate in its 29th Statehood day of the State, reflected India’s self-confidence to negate China’s claim on the State.
The Modi Government has aimed at transforming ties with neighbouring countries under the Neighbourhood First policy. There has indeed been a remarkable shift in the perception of India’s neighbours towards it. The launch of the ‘Monsoon Programme’ too is aimed at enhancing the level of cooperation between India and the Indian Ocean coastal countries. These steps will help contain China’s clouts in South Asia.
At a time when China’s relations with the US is at a low ebb, China-Japan relations and China’s ties with some Southeast Asia countries are strained, one of the aims of the Modi Government’s Act East policy is to intensify India’s engagement with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan, Australia and countries like Vietnam, with whom China has territorial disputes.
India’s decision to sell its sophisticated Akash missile defence system to Vietnam will also enhance its strength vis-à-vis China in this region, as Beiijing has in the past objected New Delhi’s engagement in oil and gas exploration activates in South China Sea. Prime Minister Modi’s desire to work with the US and other countries, to ensure peace and security in the South China Sea and India’s participation with the US and Japan in the trilateral Naval exercise in June 2016 in the West Philippine Sea has been seen as a big move to put pressure on China.
The Modi Government’s inclination to accelerate bilateral ties with Taiwan is a very timely move at a time when the Democratic Progressive Party Government, under the leadership of President Tsai Ing-wen, is asserting its position against China and has shown deep interest in expanding ties with India. It was in this context that the recent visit of a three-member women’s parliamentary delegation from Taiwan to India assumed huge significance.
The Modi Government has indeed given a new life to the relationship. While India has shown its willingness to foster economic, cultural and people-to-people ties with China, it has equally reflected its self-confidence to take bold steps to protect its national interests.
(The writer is an ICSSR Doctoral Fellow, UGC Centre for Southern Asia Studies, Pondicherry University)
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