SOUTH CHINA SEA STRATEGY PAPER
AIM FORUM ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
First Philippine Holdings Caseroom
Asian Institute of Management, 10 October 2013
Roilo Golez
Former National Security Adviser
Former Six-Term Congressman and Chairman, House Committee on National Defense and House Committee on Public Order
Graduate, US Naval Academy at Annapolis
US Army Airborne School, Fort Benning, USA
A study of the current South China Sea situation must start with map below which shows in red line apparent bounds of the so-called the nine-dash line claim of China over most of the South China Sea. The blue line shows the Exclusive Economic Zones of the Coastal States of the South China Sea namely: China, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam.
The EEZ’s of the various coastal states are in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas or UNCLOS. China’s claim intrudes into the UNCLOS-recognized EEZs of the other Coastal States bounding the South China Sea.
The nine dash line of 1947
The nine-dash line is clearly shown in the preceding map. It was unilaterally declared in 1947 by the then Kuomintang government of the Republic of China under Chai Kai-Shek and adopted by the PROC in 1949 after the take-over of the communists under Mao Zedong.
In September 2013, China announced a change in their claim, making it a 10-dash line, with the 10th line East of Taiwan. The significance of the 10th dash is not clear. The PROC government did not provide an explanation, consistent with their lack of clear explanation of the original 9-dash line which suffers from absence of coordinates that normally accompany a claim whether sea or land.
And now the ten dash line of 2013. In my opinion, this does not affect the Philippine EEZ as the tenth dash is to the East of Taiwan.
My personal involvement in the South China Sea or Spratlys issue goes back a long way.
SPRATLYS, 1971
I was part of a secret mission that sometime in 1971 transported troops, weapons, equipment and supplies to the islands we occupied in Freedomland, now called KalayaanIsland Group.
OLD MAPS
To ascertain the veracity of China’s claim that they have history to back up their claims on the South China Sea,here’s an old map of what we now call South China Sea and adjacent seas. This is a map drawn in 1690 by the Italian navigator VINCENZO CORONELLI. Note that there is no reference to a China Sea or Mare dell Chine, unlike Mare Dell Indie to depict the Indian Ocean.
1690 MAP DRAWN BY ITALIAN VINCENZO CORONELLI
No reference to China Sea or Mare de Chine. There was Mare Dell Indie but no Chine!
And here’s another old map, done by Jesuit Pedro MurilloVelarde in 1744. It is called "Mapa de las Islas Philippinas" or Map of the Philippine Islands. It clearly shows Panacot, now called Scarborough Shoals or Bajo de Masinloc, as part of Philippine territory.
MAP OF THE PHILIPPINES BY PEDRO MURILLO VELARDE 1744
Scarborough Shoal, then called Panacot, is clearly shown as part of the Philippines
The Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
Article 55 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines the Exclusive Economic Zone or UNCLOS as “an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.” UNCLOS further states “The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”
And very importantly, UNCLOS states:
In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
And finally UNCLOS mandates the following:
In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of:
(a) artificial islands;
(b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and other economic purposes;
(c) installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone.
Two features in the South China Sea are well within the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines:
Accordingly, UNCLOS clearly states that China has no jurisdiction over Mischief Reef and Bajo de Masinloc or Scarborough Shoal as both are within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone or EEZ. China has no business exploiting natural resources or building structures!
MISCHIEF REEF
“In 1994, the PRC built the initial structures on stilts here while the Philippine Navy was not patrolling the area dueto a monsoon season. Since the reef is just 130 miles(209 km) away from Palawan, well inside the Philippines'EEZ, the Philippines
immediately protested this action. However, China rejected the protest and stressed that the structures were shelter forfishermen.”
The photo below shows how the original structure on stilts looked like when discovered in 1994.
With the assurance that the structures were just temporary shelters for Chinese fishermen, the controversy quieted down.
But in 1999, I flew over the area on board a Philippine Air Force C-130, which flew at less than 500 feet, and I saw many obviously Chinese workers busy with civil works. I announced this in the Philippine House of Representatives where I was serving as a three-term congressman, the chairman then of the committee on public order and security and vice chairman of the committee on national defense. In spite of my revelations in Congress and the resulting uproar in media, the Chinese did not stop their construction activities. In 1999, China completed their structures in Mischief Reef which was transformed into a military installation instead of shelters for fishermen.
This is what the Chinese built inside the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone in violation of UNCLOS.
SCARBOROUGH SHOAL OR BAJO DE MASINLOC
Now let’s look at Scarborough Shoal or Bajo de Masinloc, the Philippine legal term for the feature.
“On April 8, 2012, a Philippine Navy surveillance planespotted eight Chinese fishing vessels docked at the waters of Scarborough shoal. BRP Gregorio del Pilar was sent on the same day by the Philippine Navy to survey the vicinity of the shoal, and confirmed the presence of the fishing vessels and their ongoing activities. On April 10, 2012,BRP Gregorio del Pilar came to inspect the catch of the fishing vessels. The Filipino inspection team discovered illegally collected corals, giant clams and live sharks inside the first vessel boarded by the team. BRP Gregorio del Pilar reported that they attempted to arrest the Chinese fishermen but were blocked by Chinese maritime surveillance ships, China Marine Surveillance 75 (Zhongguo Haijian 75) and China
Marine Surveillance 84 (Zhongguo Haijian 84) . Since then, tensions started between the two countries.” (fromWikipedia)
“By July 2012, China had erected a barrier to the entrance of the shoal, and vessels belonging to the China Marine Surveillance and Fisheries Law Enforcement Commandwere observed in the nearby disputed shoal. Since then, the Chinese government vessels have been turning awayFilipino fishing vessels sailing to the area.” Thus thousands of Filipino fishermen have been deprived of the livelihood they have enjoyed and benefited from for hundreds, even thousands of years.
1999 Privilege Speech on Scarborough Shoal
Almost 14 years ago, in December 1999, I delivered a Privilege Speech in Congress on Bajo de Masinloc or Scarborough Shoal and made the following observations:
“Why would a military behemoth and an emerging economic power such as China be so preoccupied with microscopic Scarborough Shoal which rightly belongs
to us in the first place?”
“When US naval forces were still occupying Subic, the area was used for naval gunfire target practice by the US Navy. China did not make even a whimper. Obviously, the reason was that the US Navy was too big to handle. No less than the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea sealed off our territorial jurisdiction on Scarborough Shoal which is Situated well within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone.”
“The answer, Mr. Speaker, is military posturing. Scarborough Shoal is part of China’s military projection at the South China Sea.
“In Scarborough Shoal, China has found a perfect forward fortress at the east to back up its slow but nonstop political and naval march towards the north, where there are Korea, Japan, Taiwan, among others. China has unleashed a blob at the South China Sea, floating eastward, growing slowly, menacingly, nearly unopposed, devouring every speck, every shoal and reef along the way.
“Chinese military contingents are already positioned in various reefs, islets, and rocks of the South China Sea Region, particularly in the Spratlys and the Paracels. Scarborough Shoal is just one more step forward in their bid to secure full control of the world’s second busiest international sea lane."
And I concluded with this warning:
"Mr. Speaker, it is apparent from the foregoing that what the Philippines is facing is not a gentle, lovable Chinese panda, but a fire-breathing highly awakened Chinese dragon. It is a delicate, complex and crucial policy issue that we must resolve for the sake of the next generation. To me, it is a security threat that could overshadow all threats that we faced in the century that is about to end."
In that 1999 speech I also mentioned the following to further stress the strategic importance of the South China Sea:
“The US Energy Information Administration (US-EIA) has described the South China Sea Region as the world’s second busiest international sea lane, encompassing a portion of the Pacific Ocean stretching roughly from Singapore and the Strait of Malacca in the southwest, to the Strait of Taiwan in the northeast.”
“More than half of the world’s supertanker traffic passes through its waters”
“In sea commerce, the South China Sea also plays a crucial role, serving as a major water link. It is estimated that tanker traffic through the Strait of Malacca leading into the South China Sea is more than three times greater than the Suez Canal traffic, and well over five times more than that at the Panama Canal.”
“In addition, it contains oil and gas resources strategically located near large energy-consuming countries.
“The Spratlys alone sit atop 25-billion cubic meters of natural gas, 370,000 tons of phosphorous, and 105 billion barrels of oil with an additional 91 billion barrels of oil in the James Shoal. “
Still in that 1999 speech, I mentioned:
“Last March, buckling under pressure to stop increasing its presence in the Spratlys, China sent its Foreign Assistant Minister Wang Yi to this country. This was the first diplomatic act it initiated since 1995 when Filipino fishermen discovered Chinese installations at the Mischief Reef. That meeting, however, only demonstrated further China’s resolve to keep the Spratlys for itself. Wang Yi later admitted that they couldn’t share the facilities constructed in Mischief Reef.”
Today, the incumbent Foreign Minister of China Is the same Wang Yi who, as assistant minister, took a hard position on China’s land grab of Mischief Reef in 1995. This indicates we should expect more of the same.
Here’s an aerial photo of our Shoal. It is not small. Its area of around 150 square kilometers makes the Shoal as big as Quezon City, the country’s most populous city or around three times the area of Paranaque, my home city. China with its resources and engineering capability can easily convert our Shoal into a big naval station. Around its perimeter alone, more than 100 052D Class Chinese guided missile destroyers or DDGs can be berthed. Inside the 49 feet deep lagoon, more than 200 DDGs can be anchored (a destroyer has a draft of around 31 feet).
.
It is my considered opinion that China intends to convert our Shoal into a naval station the same way they did to the much smaller Mischief Reef. This is the danger that faces us within this decade.
A Chinese naval installation in Scarborough Shoal or Bajo de Masinloc will be a grave threat to the security of the Philippines and our allies, LIKE A DAGGER POINTED AT THE HEARTLAND OF THE COUNTRY.
South China Sea and Asia Pacific Region
Now let’s look at the South China Sea in relation to most of the Asia Pacific Area to appreciate that this situation cannot be addressed in isolation.
That is, other geopolitical factors inevitably must come into play.
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA:
THE South China Sea links the Indian Ocean to the vast Pacific Ocean.
It is a choke point. The power that controls the South China Sea can control the economy of major economic powers like China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines which is now considered an emerging economic power.
India must pass through the South China Sea to interact with China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Korea, Taiwan and Japan.
This may come as a shock to many but students of Sea Power Strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan know this:
China suffers from a very vulnerable geography. For years, in talk shows and speeches, I have been saying this.
China is surrounded in all directions and has a short coastline compared to its
landmass and population.
China’s naval assets have very restricted maneuvering space unlike those of
India, Japan, Indonesia, even the Philippines and of course the United States.
China’s Sea Lines of Communications or SLOCs are very vulnerable.
“Sea lines of communication (or SLOC) is a term describing the primary maritime routes between ports, used for trade, logistics and naval forces. It is generally used in reference to naval operations to ensure that SLOCs are open, or in times of war, as a hostile act, to close them.”
India’s Navy can blockade China’s trade passing through the Indian Ocean.
A small but deadly naval force based in Singapore can paralyze China’s sea bound trade West of the South China Sea.
Vietnamese submarines can wreak havoc on China’s Merchant Marine and even the PLA Navy.
A small squadron of Australian submarines positioned in the Southern periphery of the South China Sea can stop China’s seaborne trade there.
To the East, China can be blocked by Japan which has a potent Navy and Air Force considered among the most modern and powerful in the world.
And even the Philippines with a modest investment in military upgrading can interdict the Palawan Passage with a “Swarm” of small guided missile boats and an array of medium range land based mobile missiles hidden in thefastnesses of Palawan, Mindoro and Luzon.
A recent August 2013 Strategy Paper by The Australian Policy Institute on China's Maritime Dilemma generally supports my long held view on China’s weaknesses.
"The strategy behind China’s emerging naval capability is subject to considerable debate. Most of the commentary concentrates on the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) capability development. Some commentators argue that the PLAN has shifted its focus towards developing a ‘blue water navy’ to contest America’s maritime predominance in the Western Pacific. But, asDavid on The Strategist points out, the PLAN also continues to invest in defensive ‘anti-access/area-denial’ (A2/AD) for operations in its ‘ First Island Chain’. The common theme of these assessments is that China’s growing naval power should have us worrying.
"However, while the PLAN’s growing maritime capabilities potentially pose a challenge to the United States and countries in the Indo-Pacific region, it’s also important to consider the weaknesses in China’s maritime strategy. Indeed, I’d argue that provided the US and its allies and partners invest in smart counter-strategies, China will find it very difficult to overcome its maritime dilemmas and to coerce regional countries in accepting Beijing’s territorial claims."
TAIWAN DILEMMA:
"Let’s start with China’s ‘Taiwan Dilemma’. The conventional wisdom is that China has already ‘succeeded’ in its A2/AD strategy in the Taiwan Straits by raising the costs for third-party intervention prohibitively high, i.e. keeping US carrier battle groups at arms length. But even if the PLA manages to keep US forces out of a conflict through a ‘sea denial strategy’—which in itself is a very risky assumption given the importance of Taiwan in US Pacific strategy—it faces serious political and operational challenges in invading Taiwan. As I’ve argued elsewhere, Taiwan is systematically investing in its own ‘sea denial strategy’ and the PLA would need to physically destroy most of the island’s infrastructure prior to invasion, with disastrous consequences for China’s international and regional reputation. In short, the PLAN’s A2/AD approach in the Taiwan Straits might not translate into real political currency for Beijing’s leadership."
STRATEGIC CHOKEPOINT DILEMMA:
"Secondly, US naval strategists argue that the PLAN faces a ‘strategic chokepoint dilemma’. The moment the PLAN sails through the Taiwan Straits into the wider Western Pacific Ocean, it faces the combined naval power of the US Navy and her allies, particularly Japan. It couldn’t hope to establish a significant level of ‘sea control’ in this area. Moreover, as soon as the PLAN projects maritime power out of Hainan Island into the South China Sea to assert its claims in the ‘nine-dashed line’ it will face a reengaged US military as well as A2/AD ‘pockets’ of Southeast Asian countries. Just like the US Navy and other modern navies, the PLAN won’t be immune from sea denial capabilities such as submarines, anti-submarine warfare and anti-ship missiles."
MALACCA DILEMMA:
"Moreover, the Chinese Government has pointed to the country’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’—the PLAN’s inability to protect China’s energy transport in this strategic chokepoint. But given the geostrategic characteristics of the Malacca Strait—only 1.5 nm at its narrowest point and critical not just for China but the rest of Asia—military options for China are also very limited. Any attempt to project naval power to control this area will automatically draw China into conflict with regional heavyweights such as India, Indonesia and Japan—hardly a winning formula.
"Finally, Chinese strategists seem to be aware that the offensive use of naval power against its Asianneighbours will most likely not achieve any political objective; the opportunity costs of a war at sea are just too high. That’s probably why the most significant recent development in China’s maritime strategy has been the creation of a unified coast guard agency. This step potentially strengthens China’s capacity to use non-military vessels for coercive purposes in territorial disputes with Japan and Southeast Asian nations.
"But even this strategy has limits. Regional countries are upgrading their coast guards and other maritime agencies to level the playing field. They also cooperate, as in the case of Japan and The Philippines. In July, boats through a yen loan to help it to counter Beijing’s maritime assertiveness. Regional countries are also increasing their maritime surveillance capabilities to monitor and expose Chinese maritime behaviour to a domestic, regional and global audience. This fundamentally undermines Beijing’s attempt to restore its ‘soft power deficit’ accumulated over recent years.
“While China’s naval power projection will certainly grow in the future, it’s far from inevitable that the PLAN’s coercive potential will increase commensurately. Indeed, the PLAN’s current desire for big surface combatants and aircraft carriers runs counter to modern navies’ recognition that the future lies in a greater number of smaller, more dispersed and less vulnerable ships which operate as part of a joint force. I’m not yet convinced that China as a continental power has much to gain politically by investing in a very expansive, offensive blue water navy. And even if it does, the good news is that there’ll be lots of ways to offset the PLAN strategy."
In view of my long oft-stated observations on the geographical weakness of China, as buttressed by the foregoing Australia Strategy paper, I pose the question:
PLA NAVY – GETTING BIGGER BUT CAN ITBREAK OUT?
IN VIEW OF HER VERY ASSERTIVE AND AGGRESSIVE STANCE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, EAST CHINA SEA AND OTHER PARTS OF THE ASIA, CHINA HAS TRIGGERED A COALITION AGAINST ITSELF!
And the potential members of that emerging coalition are big boys.
Here’s a recent ranking of the world’s top military powers. It will be noted that many of them are from Asia and part of an emerging coalition.
RECENT RANKING MILITARY POWERS PER WAFF OR WORLD’S ARMED FORCES FORUM
Note the following military powers that have strong presence in Asia: US (#1), China (#2), Russia (#4), Japan (#6), India (#9), South Korea (#11), Canada (#16), Taiwan (#17), Australia (#19) and Singapore (#24).
The most significant development affecting the power alignment in Asia is the US Strategic Pivot to Asia-Pacific.
And this is how the projected US rebalancing looks like in terms of troop deployment.
May I quote some excerpts from the US Congressional Research Study entitled: ‘Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia’
According to the said paper, the US’s increased emphasis on the Asia-Pacific Region appears to have been prompted by four major developments:
The US congressional paper also explains the “Adjustments in U.S. Security Policy” as follows:
“The highest-profile new initiatives lie in the security sphere. (See Text Box.) The planned deployments of troops and equipment to Australia and Singapore represent an expanded U.S. presence. Moreover, the pledge that reductions in defense spending will not come at the expense of the Asia-Pacific or the Middle East signals the Administration’s desire to reorient the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) priorities. The most obvious implication, subsequently reflected in the DOD’s January 2012 “Strategic Guidance,” has been to minimize cuts in the size of the Navy, with reductions focused instead on Army and Marine ground forces.10 With the exception of the Korean Peninsula, Asia is seen mainly as a naval theater of operations, and the decision not to cut the Navy as sharply as other services reflects a shift in priorities that is unusual in year-to-year defense planning.
“The Defense Department is complementing these changes with perhaps equally far-reaching shifts in military-technological priorities in the U.S. defense posture, aimed at responding to potential future challenges as conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan recede. A number of initiatives are relevant to assessments of potential challenges in Asia, in general, and from China in particular. Among other things, the Defense Department’s Strategy Review endorsed the continued deployment of 11 aircraft carriers and reemphasized efforts to improve capabilities to defeat what planners describe as “Area Denial/Anti-Access” strategies, which are known to be a focus for China’s military.11”
And the congressional paper clearly defines the rationale of the Pivot:
The Rising Importance of the Asia-Pacific
“Underlying the “pivot” is the Administration’s belief that the center of gravity for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and economic interests is shifting towards Asia, and that U.S. strategy and priorities need to be adjusted accordingly. Since 2000, Asia has become the United States’ largest source of imports and second-largest export market after the North America region. (See Table 1.) As the world’s most populous area and fastest growing economic zone, Asia is expected to become even more vital for the U.S. economy in the future—an expectation that has led the Obama Administration to pursue the Trans-Pacific Partnership and to make Asian nations central to its National Export Initiative Greater trade flows through the Asia-Pacific (particularly the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea) have also reinforced greater U.S. security interests in the region, as have the major expansions of other local nations’ military forces, most notably China’s.”
The economic rise of Asia, and not just of China, is illustrated in the following Appendix from the congressional paper:
During the thirty years from1980 to 2010, as a destination for US exports, Europe declined from 44.1% to 37.0%, North America declined from 15.3% to 12.9% and the Middle East from 10.4% to 5.9%. However, Asia jumped dramatically from 15.9% to 33.3%.
As a source of imports, Europe declined from 48.8% to 37.4%, North America almost steady from 16.5% to 17.4% and the Middle East from 4.9% to 3.6%. However, Asia jumped dramatically from 16.9% to 31.4%.
And note the headline:
“The United States Air Force will dramatically expand its military presence across the Pacific this year, sending jets to Thailand, India, Singapore and Australia.”
“The U.S. military is encircling China with a chain of air bases and military ports. The latest link: a small airstrip on the tiny Pacific island of Saipan. The U.S. Air Force is planning to lease 33 acres of land on the island for the next 50 years to build a "divert airfield" on an old World War II airbase there.
“The Pentagon's big, new strategy for the 21st century is something called Air-Sea Battle, a concept that's nominally about combining air and naval forces to punch through the increasingly-formidable defenses of nations like China or Iran.
“An important but oft-overlooked part of Air-Sea Battle calls for the military to operate from small, bare bones bases in the Pacific that its forces can disperse to in case their main bases are targeted by Chinese ballistic missiles.”
The US Defense Secretary is busy crisscrossing the Asia Pacific Region. He embarked on a Southeast tour whichincluded the Philippines.
US Vice President Joe Biden dramatically articulated US policy in an occasion that projects the US realignment in Asia, on board the ultra modern Littoral Combat Ship USS Freedom deployed in Singapore to help guard one of the world’s most strategically important choke points, the Malacca Strait:
"I state without apology that we are a Pacific power. America is a Pacific resident power and we will remain so. The truth of the matter is our resident power status is the reason why this area of the world is able to grow and be stable.
"Our mere presence in the Pacific is in and of itself the basis upon which stability of the region is built. You are the glue that holds all this together."
Vice President Joe Biden, addressing the crew of USS Freedom, first in a new class of U.S. Navy ships based in Singapore. July 27, 2013
Even the US Senate entered the fray with a strongly worded resolution directed at China:
"The Senate condemns the use of coercion, threats, or force by naval, maritime security, or fishing vessels and military or civilian aircraft in the South China Sea and the East China Sea to assert disputed maritime or territorial claims or alter the status quo,"
"Whereas, in recent years, there have been numerous dangerous and destabilizing incidents in this region, including... Chinese vessels barricading the entrance to the Scarborough Reef lagoon in April 2012; ...and, since May 8, 2013, Chinese naval and marine surveillance ships maintaining a regular presence in waters around the Second Thomas Shoal, located approximately 105 nautical miles northwest of the Philippine island of Palawan."
China’s response through its Foreign Ministry was immediate, as reported by the Xinhua News Agency:
“China today said it opposes a US Senate resolutionon disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea as it wrongly blamed the country, disregarding facts.
“Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson HuaChunying said the resolution places blame on the Chinese side without regard for history and facts, "sending a wrong message."
The US Pivot to Asia has led some analysts to consider the scenario of an “unthinkable war” between the US and China. In an article carried by the LA Times, two think tank analysts drew this scenario. They are David C. Gompert, an adjunct senior fellow at Rand Corp. and who served as President Obama's principal deputy director of national intelligence and Terrence K. Kelly, the director of the Strategy, Doctrine and Resources Program at Rand's Arroyo Center. They stated:
“The specter of economic doomsday makes war between China and the United States as unthinkable as fear of nuclear doomsday made Soviet-U.S. war. Or does it? In fact, Chinese and American military planners are thinking in exquisite detail, as they are expected to do, about how to win such a conflict. The problem is that the specific plans being concocted could make hostilities less unthinkable, and two great powers with every reason to avoid war could find themselves in one.”
“Having been impotent against two U.S. aircraft carriers during the Taiwan crisis of 1996, the People's Liberation Army has concluded, as Chinese military writings show, that the best way to avoid another such humiliation is by striking U.S. forces before they strike China. While not seeking war, the Chinese especially dread a long one, in which the full weight of American military strength would surely prevail. So they are crafting plans and fielding capabilities to take out U.S. carriers, air bases, command-and-control networks and satellites early and swiftly.
“China now has the economic and technological heft such a plan requires, and it is China's top defense priority. The Chinese military is deploying vast numbers of missiles (including carrier killers), hard-to-find submarines, long-range sensors to track and target U.S. forces, anti-satellite weapons, digital networks to coordinate attacks and cyberwar weapons to crash U.S. networks. When the Department of Defense announced its "Asia pivot" last year, it made it clear that defeating such capabilities is now a major focus of the U.S. military.
“There are several sources of friction that could cause a showdown: Chinese harassment of Japanese vessels in the disputed East China Sea could dictate a U.S. show of force in support of its ally; U.S. naval forces could oppose a Chinese attempt to restrict freedom of the seas in the South China Sea; instability in North Korea could bring both China and the United States to consider intervening; China might contest the presence of U.S. ships or aircraft suspected of snooping off its coast; Taiwan could declare independence. In such situations, an incident or mistake could transform the logic of avoiding conflict into the logic of avoiding defeat.
XXX
“Although the China-U.S. agenda is jammed with pressing issues, from cyber espionage to currency rates, time must be found to improve procedures and channels to defuse crises and avert military miscalculation, lest the unthinkable becomes unavoidable. And political leaders in each capital should not wait for a crisis before scrutinizing war-fighting plans and insisting on ones that strengthen, not weaken, stability. Given the stakes, plans to win must not be allowed to make war more likely.”
JAPAN
And now let’s look at Japan, the No. 6 military power of the world.
JAPAN
Japan’s Minister of Defense, Itsuno Onodera, redefined Japan’s defense posture:
“Japan could be a key participant if conflict breaks out in Asia, the defence minister said on Monday, warning that China is seeking to exploit difficulties between allies.
“The comments by Mr Itsuno Onodera, who said Japan needs new equipment and must reconfigure itsdefence, come as Tokyo is embroiled in an ongoing spat with Beijing over disputed territory that has sparked warnings of a possible armed skirmish.
"The crisis that Japan faces now may lead to situations in which the country may have to be involved as a main player," Mr. Onodera told a symposium in the capital.”
Since last year, Japan’s hawkish Prime Minister ShinzoAbe has been advocating a very strong coalition, Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond which PM Abe defined as follows:
“I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific. I am prepared to invest, to the greatest possible extent, Japan’s capabilities in this security diamond.”
Japanese PM Abe went on an Asian tour which included the Philippines. Philippine President Benigno Aquino III formalized an agreement not just with words but with very tangible hardware for deployment in the West Philippines Sea: 10 coast guard ships.
“President Benigno Aquino III and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on Saturday pledged to pursue a common stance against maritime aggression in the Asian region amid their growing territorial disputes with China.
“We reviewed the security challenges that confront our nations and pledged to cooperate in advancing our common advocacy for responsible action from international players,” said Mr. Aquino, reading from a prepared statement following his meeting with Abe.
“In line with this strategic partnership, the two agreed to strengthen “maritime cooperation, which is a pillar of our strategic partnership,” according to Mr. Aquino.
“He thanked Japan for building 10 “multi-role response vessels” for the Philippine Coast Guard and providing communication systems for coast patrol through a yen credit facility.”
Read more:http://globalnation.inquirer.net/81729/aquino-abe-vow-common-stand-vs-china#ixzz2hehh3PRj
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Michael Reagan, political strategist and very influential son of President Ronald Reagan, the president of The Reagan Legacy Foundation and Chairman of the League of American Voters, wrote a well-circulated article “Japan won’t Be Bullied by China.” Here are some interesting excerpts:
“…that Japan will be launching its largest warship since WWII is good news among Americans who still place value on the thought of a free world guaranteed by the United States and its allies.
“According to The Associated Press, the new vessel is named Izumo — after the mythical location where the gods landed in Japanese mythology — and features a flat deck that bears a remarkable resemblance to that of an aircraft carrier. That deck is 820 feet long and will hold 14 helicopters, or, one assumes, a like number of vertical takeoff and landing aircraft.
“The Japanese say the ship is to be a part of the nation’s anti-submarine warfare and border surveillance efforts.
“While Americans don’t have a problem with the new Japanese vessel, China is not pleased.
“This is because a belligerent China has been asserting unilateral territorial rights throughout the South China Sea and parts of the Pacific. A newly assertive Japan is a Japan that won’t be pushed around by the Chinese dragon.”
And ABC reported the new Japanese warship in the following words:
“[S]ome experts believe the new Japanese ship could potentially be used in the future to launch fighter jets or other aircraft that have the ability to take off vertically. That would be a departure for Japan, which has one of the best equipped and best trained naval forces in the Pacific but which has not sought to build aircraft carriers of its own because of constitutional restrictions that limit its military forces to a defensive role.”
This is the destroyer IZUMO of Japan:
China’s response was predictable with this South China Morning Post news headline:
CHINA FREAKED OUT OVER JAPAN’S FLAT-TOPPED ‘DESTROYER’
The article noted the capabilities and technical specifications of the IZUMO:
“Japan's Izumo 'helicopter destroyer' is a flat topped ship — without catapults for fighter jets — that has size greater than that of other fixed wing carriers, notably Britain's HMS Invincible-class ships.
“The ship is designed to carry several helicopters, can be fitted for vertical lift off F-35Bs, and it's also worth mentioning that ships like the Izumo can be retrofittedfor linear take-off fighter jets, should the need arise.”
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