El Indio: A Chinese Dilemma
Chinese naval soldiers stand guard on China’s first aircraft carrier Liaoning, as it travels towards a military base in Sanya, Hainan province, in this undated picture made available on Nov. 30, 2013. (Reuters Photo)
China has a problem. It has claimed virtually all of the South China Sea and has too pugnaciously asserted that claim, which has no basis in international law, logic or common sense. Having unwisely overreached, China now stares at the horns of a dilemma.
And China has nobody to blame but itself. It has said too many things too emotionally about its “core interest” in the South China Sea. It has carried out too many maneuvers that rival claimants feel are threatening.
In 2008, when the West was distracted by financial turmoil, China began intensifying para-military patrols in the South China Sea.
Since then it has harassed Philippine and Vietnamese vessels, on one occasion an Indian battle ship. Twice, in mid-2012 and mid-2013, China engaged the Philippines in a tense standoff over shoals. China has also demanded that citizens of neighboring countries secure a permit from the Hainan provincial government before fishing in the South China Sea.
But what China can do with impunity is not without limits.
When it looked like China was going to declare an ADIZ in the South China Sea, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa minced no words in telling the Chinese that Indonesia will not countenance that move. China has not brought up the matter since then.
In recent months China boosted its military activities in the southern part of the South China Sea — these were executed so far south that they were too close to the Natuna Islands for Indonesia’s comfort.
Not coincidentally, Indonesia reinforced its military presence on and around the Natuna Islands. In the face of media speculation that trouble may be brewing, China announced that it had no quarrel with Indonesia over the Natuna Islands. Minister Marty Natalegawa confirmed that “between Indonesia and China, there are no outstanding or overlapping maritime territorial disputes.”
Both are right, of course. But there’s a potential dispute: glance at a map of the nine dashed lines of China’s claim to the South China Sea, and it appears that the claim overlaps with Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone. That’s why since 2010, Indonesia has been asking China, through the United Nations, to clarify the meaning of those dashed lines.
At any rate, if China continues to behave the way it does, one of these days it will get into a fight with a weaker country and risk being seen as a putative hegemon. A bully that deserves to be ganged up on by the smaller boys. That’s a rock of a situation to be in.
On the other hand, China can be thwarted, as it was in its desire to set up an ADIZ in the South China Sea. If it’s successfully defied too often, and that’s bound to happen unless it’s willing to take ill-advised risks each time, it will lose face. For China, loss of face is a hard place to be in.
However, there’s a way for China to escape this dilemma. For starters, it can and should expeditiously conclude with Asean a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. On the basis of such a legally binding Code, China can change behavior without loss of face.
Then, for good measure, China can be politically creative and launch an internal debate resulting in, as some scholars suggest, a policy of asserting ownership to a huge part of the South China — but not all of it — on the basis of the land features that it claims. There will be no loss of face because the policy is the product of internal debate.
Territorial disputes will still be there, but in a less sulfuric setting.
And you’ll have a China that respects the Law of the Sea, a China that’s more credibly on a peaceful rise. A China with more soft power than ever.
Jamil Maidan Flores is a Jakarta-based writer whose interests include philosophy and foreign policy. He is also an English-language consultant for the Indonesian government. The views expressed here are his own.
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